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1 INTRODUCTION 
With the proposed restructuring of the electric energy markets in the United States 
cind in other countries of the world, several new market structures are emerging for 
the buying and the selling of electric energy. One such market structure is the energy-
brokerage, wherein buyers and sellers of electric energy submit bids to buy and sell energy 
to a central entity known as the broker. The broker then proceeds to match buyers and 
sellers to form binding transactions, subject to system constraints, such that the total 
savings resulting from the matching process is maximized. The resultant savings are then 
allocated among the various participants in a predetermined, and presumably, equitable 
manner. 
The subjects of how to perform the matching, and how to allocate the resultant 
savings are already well-researched areas in the literature. These will not be the focus of 
this research. The subject of how participants in the brokerage might use the available 
information in a strategic manner, and submit the resulting bids to the broker that diflFer 
from their marginal costs, is known as "strategic bidding'', and is a relatively new topic 
in the energy market context. The reason for this could be the fact that, in the past, 
utilities, and to a lesser extent, independent power producers, were assured of a net 
profit virtually irrespective of their costs. This was the underpinning of the regulated 
monopolies that were in existence until the so-called deregulation movement started. 
One of the effects of such a system was to reduce electric energy pricing to "merely" a 
production costing operation ^  
^It is, of course, well known that even this production costing function is complex, uncertain and 
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This subject of strategic bidding was the focus of the research reported in this dis­
sertation. Thus, the work presented here primarily deals with developing methods that 
individual participants could use in bidding into an energy brokerage market. Prelim­
inary bidding strategy development as a part of this research was reported in [1] and 
[2]. 
1.1 Problem Overview 
In this section, an overview of the work performed in this research is presented. This 
overview includes a statement of research objectives, the brokerage rules and assumptions 
used in the market modeling, an examination of the factors that affect bidding and the 
definition of scope for this research, and a brief description of the bidding strategies 
developed in this research. 
1.1.1 Statement of Research Objectives 
The main contribution of this research is the definition, and the demonstration of use, 
of a framework for the development and evaluation of bidding strategies, for participants 
to use, in preparing and submitting bids to an energy brokerage market. 
The framework includes: 
1. The rules under which the market operates. 
2. The different types of participants. 
3. The different objectives of these participants. 
4. The factors that affect the bidding of the participants. 
5. Strategies that consider the factors in item 4 and achieve these objectives. 
often inaccurate. However, the deregulated future promises to make the overall pricing process an even 
more complex and academically interesting activity. 
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6. A tool to simulate market conditions, including competition from other partici­
pants, with which to test these strategies. 
The various participants in the energy brokerage market could use this framework 
to evaluate and improve their bidding strategies and, thus, their economic performance 
according to their objectives. 
Of the above items, item 1, while not clearly defined in all aspects, is already a fairly 
well-researched topic in the literature. So, a subset of the rules reviewed from existing 
literature has been assumed in this research. Items 2 and 3 are less complex and are well-
defined in the literature. Examples of the types of participants defined in the literature 
include investor-owned utilities, independent power producers, generation companies, 
distribution companies, large industrial customers, power marketers and load aggrega­
tors. These types could also classified according to their functions as well as according 
to their performance goals. Some aspects of items 4 and 5 have been approached by 
other researchers in the power industry, and in other industries. This research aims for 
contributions that enhance these approaches, or adapt them for application to the power 
industry. Examples include the use of historical market information in bidding, and the 
modeling of competitors' behavior. Some aspects of items 4, 5, and 6 are relatively 
new topics in the energy brokerage context. Examples include the effects of generating 
unit availability, startup/shutdown considerations, load forecast errors, and transmission 
considerations. Of these, the effects of unit availability and startup/shutdown consider­
ations have been analyzed in 6. Admittedly, the modeling presented for these analyses 
is very simple. But as will be illustrated in that chapter, even for the simple model, the 
implications of including these considerations can be very complex. 
In addition, the tools developed for brokerage simulation and strategy evaluation are 
expected to be a useful contribution for future research. 
Thus, the primary focus of this research is to develop strategies for various types 
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of individual participants in the energy brokerage to use in order to bid successfully. 
This research does not propose new models for implementation of energj- brokerages. 
Rather, assumptions are made regarding brokerage implementation based on models 
already developed by other researchers. Given such a brokerage market, the strategies 
developed will aim to improve individual participants' goals within the rules of the 
market. To test these strategies and to draw insights from simulations, we needed a tool 
that simulates a brokerage. One such tool is the brokerage simulator developed as part 
of this research. Again, while the simulator is expected to be helpful in testing of the 
strategies, the strategies will be independent of the simulator, and will be applicable to 
participants who choose a diflferent (presumably more advanced) tool for evaluation. The 
contribution of this research includes original ways to utilize the information generated 
by the simulator. 
1.1.2 Brokerage Rules and Assumptions 
This section summarizes the rules and assumptions that are used in modeling the 
brokerage market. The rationale for these assumptions is explained in Chapter 2, in the 
context of a review of the relevant literature. 
1. The brokerage market is assumed to be a facilitator for exchange of bulk energy 
(real power and energy only) between participants. In genered, these participants 
could be buyers or sellers of energy. The primary focus of the strategy develop­
ment in this research is for participants who have generating resources, and either 
have a means to calculate their production costs, or have a way to determine the 
replacement cost/value of energy from a source outside the market. A participant 
who is a pure load can still use these same strategies. However, load-side issues 
such as demand side management and direct load control are not explored in this 
research. 
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2. Participants submit bids to buy or sell predetermined blocks of hourly energy-. The 
bids include the participant name, the hour for the proposed purchase or sale, the 
number of blocks, whether the bid is for a sale or a purchase, and the bid price. 
3. The broker accepts the bids and matches them according to the Florida high-
low matching method. The bidding is considered to be one-shot: in other words, 
multiple rounds of bidding are not performed. This method is explained Chapter 2. 
The transaction price is set to be the average of the buy and sell bid prices. 
4. The matching stops when the buy bid price no longer exceeds the sell bid price, 
i.e., when no additional savings can be achieved. 
5. In the cases where the transmission network is modeled, it is assumed that the bro­
ker performs a DC-power flow-based calculation for all the transactions that result 
in potential savings. Thermal line limit constraints are enforced. Transactions 
that violate these limits are rejected. 
6. Transmission usage costs are calculated by using the MW-mile method, which is a 
distance-based incremental flow method. These costs are split equally between the 
two parties of a successful match. If the potential savings from the energy price 
differential between the bids is less than the potential transmission usage costs, 
the transaction is rejected. 
7. The resultant match information is distributed only to the two parties involved 
in the transactions, i.e., bidding is sealed, and the bid information is assumed to 
private and protected. 
8. The broker reports the resulting transaction prices, and if applicable, the trans­
mission usage costs, from each transaction, in a public database that is equally 
accessible by all participants. Also reported in this database, are the line flows in 
each line at the end of each hour. 
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The above assumptions are a summary of the key assumptions made in this research. 
Other assumptions made primarily involve the detailed modeling of the market and the 
strategies, and will be stated and clarified in the appropriate sections. Of the above 
assumptions, two issues merit further comment. These are: 
• Ancillary Services: 
Exactly what the term ancillary services means is not sharply defined at the time 
of writing this dissertation. However, the Federal Energy Regulatorj- Commission 
(FERC) identified through its order no. 888, at least six services that a trans­
mission provider must include in an open access transmission tariff. These are, 
(1) energ>- imbalance service, (2) spinning reserve, (3) supplemental reserve, (4) 
reactive supply and voltage control, (5) regulation and frequency response, and 
(6) scheduling, system control and dispatching services. In addition, four other 
services were also identified, that the transmission provider may offer as optional 
services. These are (1) backup supply service, (2) djmamic scheduling service, 
(3) real power loss service, and (4) restoration service. These services are not 
considered as part of the brokerage market in this research. 
• Spinning Reserves: 
The issue of spinning reserves has been indirectly approached in this research as 
follows. It was assumed that each participant in the test system was required by 
an entity outside the brokerage to carry 15% of the hourly forecast load as spinning 
reserves, and this was enforced as a constraint during the unit commitment phase 
of the individual companies. However, the issue of spinning reserves to support 
the transactions occurring as a result of successful matches has not been included. 
The effect of spinning reserve requirements from new transactions will have an 
effect on the strategies of participants, and mechanisms to include this effect is a 
candidate for future research. 
1-1.3 Factors Affecting Bidding 
In this section, the various factors that could affect the bidding behavior of the 
various participants are examined. From this examination, the scope is defined for the 
resecirch described in this dissertation. 
The following parts of this section explain the impact of each of the factors on bidding 
strategies. 
1.1.3.1 Market-Related Factors 
Distribution of prices: Estimated price distributions serve the role of a forecast of 
market prices in the following bidding periods, and will impact the optimal bidding 
strategies of the players. One example of an impact is for the case of a seller who de-
terministically knows the cost of his generation and is trying to determine the optimal 
markup for bidding. This factor is well researched in other industries, and can be easily 
modified for power industry application. 
Expected savings/profits: Participants that wish to model competition might use the 
above distribution of prices to estimate probability of acceptance of their bids. This 
estimate is then used to derive an expected value of profit, which is then maximized. 
Company conditions compared to market conditions: This factor determines if the 
participants have any opportunity to wield market power and influence their profits. For 
example, if the mzirket is short on supply, and the peirticipant is long on supply, then 
the participant might be able to take advantage of the buyers by bidding high. 
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Table 1.1 Factors affecting the bidding strategies of the participants. 
FACTOR SELLER BUYER 
MARKET-RELATED 
Distribution of prices WS" ws 
Expected savings/profits ws ws 
Company conditions compared to market conditions ws ws 
(Energy shortage/surplus/neutral) 
SCHEDULING-RELATED 
Generating unit related: 
Online generation reserves ws ws 
Unit startup/shutdown ws ws 
Unit availability ws ws 
Unit maintenance requirements os^ OS 
Load-related: 
Load forecast error risk OS OS 
Load curtailment/DSM/DLC OS OS 
Weather and other external factors OS OS 
Transmission network related: 
System network condition OS OS 
Company network condition OS OS 
Transmission usage costs OS OS 
Transmission losses costs OS OS 
Network outage risk OS OS 
Ancillary services usage and costs OS OS 
Fuel-related: 
Fuel supply/network availability OS OS 
Fuel price risk OS OS 
Fuel contract limits OS OS 
Take-or-pay constraints OS OS 
On-hand fuel supply OS OS 
Emission-related: 
Compliance costs OS OS 
Emissions allowance availabilitv OS OS 
Emission allowance value OS OS 
Emission production OS OS 
®WS = Within Scope 
'OS = Outside Scope 
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1.1.3.2 Schednling-Related Factors 
Generating unit related factors: Unit avaUabilities, including maintenance require­
ments, affect both bidding behavior and eventual profit from bidding by introducing 
uncertainty in participants' supply/demand conditions. If participants consider these 
uncertainties, then their bidding strategies will be affected by this risk. Generation 
reserves or online excess capacity is a factor that affects the marginal costs of the partic­
ipants, and hence will affect bidding strategies. Traditionally, generation scheduling is 
performed to minimize the operating costs with respect to constraints. However, if the 
objective function is now to maximize (expected) profits, then startup and shutdown 
cost considerations will affect strategies if the participants wish to evaluate opportu­
nities to take advantage of market prices to a greater extent, and perform generation 
scheduling that is focused toward the marketplace. There is also the potential impact 
of minimum up/down times of the units started/shutdown on marginal costs in future 
bidding hours. Again, this process involves risk, and it is proposed in this framework to 
identify how this risk can be quantified. 
Load-related factors: Load forecast errors, including weather and other external fac­
tor effects, will have a similar effect as unit availabilities in that they introduce imcertain-
ties in supply/demand conditions. Thus they also affect the risk involved with bidding 
strategies. Load curtailment agreements, demand side management (DSM), and direct 
load control (DLC) all have complex effects on the uncertainties involved with demand, 
and thus will impact bidding strategies. However, they are outside the scope of this 
research. 
Transmission network related factors: System network conditions are expected to be 
public domain information. These will affect the participants' decisions by affecting the 
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feasibility of transactions. Transmission usage costs, losses costs, and ancillarv- service 
costs will affect participants' bid outcomes because they affect the overall economics of 
the bid matching process. While there is very little information on how small or large 
this impact will be in the future, an attempt was made in this research to incorporate 
their effects on the effectiveness of the bidding strategies of the participants. Network 
outage risk is a major aspect that affects sj-stem operation, and will have an impact on 
participants' bidding strategies. However, it is outside the scope of this research. 
Fuel-related factors: Internal and external fuel supply as well as fuel network capacity 
and availability obviously affect the production costs, and thus affect the participants' 
bidding strategies in an indirect way. The volatility of fuel prices might introduce errors 
in the participants' estimates of production costs, and might have an impact on strate­
gic bidding. However, many participants consider fuel price risk separately from the 
scheduling function. For example, the participants may hedge fuel prices by purchasing 
fuel options. Thus, as far as bidding in the energy brokerage market they might consider 
fuel prices to be deterministic. However, this might change in the future. For now, fuel 
considerations axe outside the scope of this research, while being a candidate for a future 
research topic. 
Emission-related factors: The impact of transactions on emissions will affect compli­
ance strategies and costs, and therefore the overall profitability of the transaction. Also, 
if the emission allowance (EA) market trading becomes significant in the future, then 
the value of the EA will affect costs. For now, emission considerations are also outside 
the scope of this research. 
Some of the above factors may not have a direct impact on certain types of players. 
For example, if the player owns no generation and is a pure buyer, or a power marketer. 
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then none of the generating unit related aspects affect him. 
1.1.4 Strategic Bidding 
As outlined in Chapter 2, different approaches have been suggested in the literature 
as possible methods for the pjuticipants to employ in an auction market such as the 
energv* brokerage. The approaches presented in this research essentially involve modeling 
competitors' bidding behaviors by probability distributions, followed by maximizing a 
lower bound to expected profits from the bidding activity. Thus, the implicit assumption 
is that participants seek to maximize not only their profit from the bidding activit>\ but 
also wish to achieve an optimal probability of acceptance. Thus, the objective function of 
the participants is assumed to be the expected profit, which is the product of the profit, 
and the probability of achieving this profit, given that the competitors bid according to 
an estimated probabilitj- distribution. 
In Chapter 6, some illustrative scenarios are presented, that extend this expected 
profit maximization approach to an expected utility maximizing approach. This provides 
a method to include the concept of risk preference in the bidding strategies. 
1.2 Executive Summary 
In Chapter 2, a review of the relevant literatiire is presented. Because of the wide 
scope of the strategic bidding problem, the volume of literature that could arguably 
be "relevant" to the research is very large. Thus, that chapter is not intended to be 
an comprehensive bibliography on the issues that affect strategic bidding. However, an 
attempt has been made to provide a review of a representative sample of the papers 
from each relevant area. 
In Chapter 3, strategies that attempt to include competitor behavior by using avail­
able market information are presented. A lower bound on the profit from bidding is 
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derived, which is useful in pro-viding an objective function that can be optimized using 
the limited information assumed to be a\'ailable in this research. This is followed by 
derivations for optimal bids that maximize this lower bound, for different assrunptions 
about the probability distribution of the competitors. Details on the optimality and 
concavitj- conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
In Chapter 4, the brokerage simulator, which was developed as a part of this research, 
is described. This simulator is an implementation of the rules assumed in this research. 
It was used to test the strategies developed and presented in Chapter 3. Resiilts of the 
simulations performed on this simulator are presented and analyzed in Chapter 5. Also, 
based on these results, some heuristics were developed to improve the performance of 
the strategies. Results from implementing these heuristics are also presented in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter 6, a qualitative treatment of the scheduling factors that might affect 
bidding strategies is presented, followed by numerical examples to illustrate these ef­
fects. Also included in this chapter, is a treatment of risk preferences by using results 
from recent developments in the field of utility theory and risk preference functions by 
researchers in economics. This is followed by the modeling of bidding objectives as 
expected utility maximizations, and the comparison of results from using this type of 
objective, to using the expected profit maximization objective, for various scheduling 
scenarios. These scenarios are to be viewed as a first attempt at modeling scheduling 
risk considerations in strategic bidding, and not as solutions prescribed to handle the 
rather complex considerations of risk in the energy markets. 
Conclusions and suggestions for future work are presented in Chapter 7. 
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1.3 Overview of Original Contributions 
This section provides an overview of the original contributions made by this research 
to the power systems area. While periodically in this dissertation, we make an attempt 
to clarify which parts of the work presented are results of assumptions and lessons drawn 
from existing literature, and which parts are results of original work by this author, this 
section clearly states the primary original contributions. 
1. The primary contribution of this research is the development of a framework for 
developing bidding strategies for individuzd participants. This framework includes 
suggested ways to model competitors, initial development, implementation and 
testing of strategies, and the development of a tool to simulate such strategies. 
Given that bidding strategies in energy markets is a hitherto less researched area, it 
is expected that several researchers are developing different frameworks to achieve 
these tasks. Therefore, no claims are made by this author as to the superiority' of 
the approaches presented herein; only the originality of the contributions to power 
system research is presented here. 
2. The modeling of competing bids as a probability distribution is an idea that has 
been used in several other industries. However, with the exception of [3], the work 
presented here is one of the first attempts, to the best of this author's knowledge, 
to apply this technique to energy brokerages. Reference [3], while being published 
at a time when this research was in its early stages, is an independent work, and 
did not serve as a model for our work. 
3. The consideration of buyer-side bidding is omitted in [3]. Buyer-side bidding is 
included in our considerations. As a way to avert the computational complexities in 
considering two different kinds of distributions at the same time, our contribution 
is the lower bounding of the profit, followed by the application of heuristics to 
fine-tune the bid. This is also a new development in energy brokerage bidding 
strategies. 
4. The detailed derivation of the first- and second-order conditions required for the 
implementation of the suboptimal bidding procedure, for the pol\-nomiai, the beta 
and the gamma distribution cases, were performed by this author. 
5. Several different simulators that use various models to implement energy broker­
ages have already been implemented by other researchers, and it is fair to assume 
that many more are under development. However, in this dissertation, we have 
developed original heuristics that adjust the bid prices in response to the base case 
results. Both the heuristics themselves, and the general framework of the simula­
tor that helps to develop these heuristics easily, are original contributions of this 
author, and are expected to be of value to the power industry. 
6. The use of utility functions to model risk in transactions is a well-researched su-ea 
in economics. However, the use of the results from work by Saha [4], in the form of 
the flexible Expo-power utility fimction, to model the effects of risk preference in 
energy brokerage transactions is original to this work. While the extent of modeling 
presented herein is limited, such an approach can be explored by researchers in 
a variety of power system risk researchers, and could be of value in several areas 
in addition to power system operations. It must be mentioned here that in a 
related area of transaction selection, Kumar et al [5] presented a framework for 
transaction selection using decision analysis. However, the utility function used 
there was purely exponential in nature, and is not flexible enough to model various 
risk preference attitudes. In our work, we chose the Expo-power function because 
of its flexibility. This flexibility is needed in order to allow enough latitude in 
our framework for participants of widely different risk preference attitudes, since 
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very little is known currently about the kind of participants that will evolve as the 
primary players in energy markets. 
Once again, it is emphasized that the purpose of this section is only to specify the 
original contributions made by this research. The other research projects referred to 
in the above item are expected to be ongoing projects, and the comparisons made in 
those items are based on published work only. The comparisons serve the purpose of 
distinguishing our work from the work presented in those references, and are not made 
with a view of criticizing those references in any manner. 
Also, although progress has been made in the areas described in the above items, 
none of the problems described in this research is considered to be solved completely. 
Future research will probably expand the results presented here. However, significant 
contributions have resulted from this research. 
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2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 Power Industry Restructuring £uid its Impacts 
In this section the papers reviewed cover the impact of the market restructuring 
on various aspects of the power industry. Kriz [6] provided an overview of the advent 
of competition in several states including California, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
New Hampshire. In that paper, the author outlined some of the legislative complexi­
ties involved in the process of deregulation, such as the issue of jurisdiction of various 
government bodies like FERC, Congress, state and local governments. The paper also 
provided a table of the electricity rates prevalent in 20 states with the highest and lowest 
10 rates being shown. It is not surprising to note that of these states, some with the 
highest rates (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and California) also have 
the hottest debates going on, regarding restructuring of the local energy markets. 
Dunn et al [7] broadly identified, the impacts of restructuring the energy markets on 
the objectives of the participants, control center applications, information technology 
requirements, and transactions analysis. In that paper, the authors identified some key 
issues such as the value of information, the possibility of gaming by generation market 
participants, and modifications necessary to conventional energy management system 
tools such as unit commitment. The emergence of financial tools for risk management 
was also pointed out in that paper. Sheble [8] identified the emergence of the view that 
electricity is a commodity and would be treated as a commodity. In that paper, some 
imresolved issues were raised, such as transmission wheeling priorities, the obligation 
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to serve, transmission network upgrades, etc. From these papers, it is evident that 
restructuring of the energy markets in the United States is imminent, if not already 
occurring. It is also obvious that the restructuring will have complex and far reaching 
effects on power system operations. 
From the customers' viewpoint, Stein [9], provided some insights into a significant 
driver of the restructuring of US energy markets - retail loads. In that paper. Stein 
argued General Motors' case for lower electricity prices by giving them the ability to 
choose their electricity provider. 
2.2 Energy Markets — Implementations and Rules 
This section reviews papers relevant to implementation and rules for some of the 
proposed competitive energy markets. Based on these papers, a subset of rules was 
defined in this research to implement an energy brokerage simulator. 
Energy brokerages are the specific type of energy markets being considered in this 
research, and consist of double auctions on the part of buyers and sellers of energy. One 
of the earliest papers on energy brokerages is by Barker [10]. In that paper, the author 
reported widespread interest in energy brokering in the United States. The author 
noted that the energy broker (at that time) could be either the primary facilitator for 
interchange energy trading, or cotild be a supplemental market to the existing bilateral 
interchange markets. At this point, it is still not clear if the energy broker will become 
the sole facilitator of energy trades. So in this research, we assumed that there is a 
possibility that participants may have energy contracts outside the jurisdiction of the 
broker. 
Several methods have been proposed for implementing brokerages. In reference [11], 
Doty et al proposed brokerages implemented based on high-low matching where the buy 
bids are ranked in decreasing order, and the sell bids are ranked in increasing order, 
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and the highest buy bid is '"matched" to the lowest sell bid, cind so on until no further 
savings are possible. A linear programming based implementation was proposed by 
Fahd et al in [12], where the optimal bids were determined by sensitivity analysis on 
economic dispatch, followed by LP-bsised bid matching. An optimal power flow (OPF) 
based implementation was proposed by Fahd et al in [13], where the optimal bids were 
determined by an OPF solution, followed by LP-based bid matching. The advzintage of 
this method is that network constraints can be incorporated. An augmented Lagrangian-
based approach was presented by Anwar et al in [14] for implementing the OPF. The 
amount of energy for sale and purchase were calculated in that paper by parametric 
analysis on the OPF solution. 
A three-level approach was presented by Post et al in [15]. In that paper, the first level 
consisted of optimally allocating supply and demand independent of the transmission 
network. The novel aspect of this allocation was the use of reservation prices by the 
sellers. This was followed by adjustment of supply allocation for losses. This was done 
by calculating losses by using penalty factors, and increasing the generation of the most 
economical generator to compensate for this loss power. The third step was an LP-based 
transshipment problem solution, with capacity constraints considered, to maximize the 
surplus from transactions that were feasible with respect to network conditions. This 
was modeled as a minimization of transmission usage costs using the MW-mUe method. 
Also, it was assumed that FACTS devices were in place that controlled the flows on the 
lines. Thus, the implementation of energy brokerages has been fairly well researched. 
Another key aspect of brokerages is a "fair" allocation of the resultant savings. In 
[16], a method that allocates savings based on the Shapley value of the participant is 
presented by Chattopadhyay. Shapley values are an estimate of the worth of a partici­
pant in an interconnected system from the point of view of net savings, and hence are 
expected to be superior criteria upon which to base allocations. Herriott [17] established 
theoretical grounds for equitable allocation of savings in the brokerage. In [18], Hahn 
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et al examined experimentally, the relative efficiencies of the split-savings method of 
allocation, and the single market-price method of allocation. The author noted that the 
single market-price showed higher efficiencies; however, both methods showed at least 
90% efficiency as compared to the competitive equilibrium. 
The advent of deregulation imposes some additional considerations on the energy 
brokerage problem. The objectives of the participants in the brokerage now becomes 
profit maximization, as opposed to cost minimization, even though the objective of the 
broker remains the same. In [19], Sheble et al pointed out that several regulatory ques­
tions need to be answered, such as wheeling costs, loss allocation, priority of transactions, 
etc. The answers to these questions are still not clear. 
The study of auction mechanisms in organized markets by experimental methods 
has been a well researched subject. An acknowledged leader in the area of experimental 
economics applied to auctions is Dr. Vernon Smith. An example of this work can be 
found in the paper by McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith [20], wherein the authors presented 
results from a computer-assisted market that were simulated in a laborator}' environ­
ment. These markets deal with gas and electric power, and use auction mechanisms to 
implement a competitive environment. In that paper the authors pointed out that, in 
these markets, the individual generator owners might submit bid prices that are lower 
th£in marginal generating costs, because of startup/shutdown cost considerations. The 
authors also suggested that spot prices at the buses be used to determine transmission 
prices. In [21], Sheble identified details for implementation of energy brokerages in the 
open transmission access context. In that paper, the author proposed the analysis of 
electric energy as a commodity in a financial framework. Definitions were provided for 
contracts traded in the cash market, futures market, options market, clearing house 
market and planning market. Another model was presented by Kimiar et al in [22] 
that considered an auction game. The objective of the auctioneer was to determine an 
optimal schedule of power transfer. This model assumed multiple rounds of bidding for 
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each period, where the auctioneer could continue to request additional bids from sellers 
and buyers until price discovery has taken place. The auction mechanism was assumed 
to be the high-low matching method. The advantage of multiple rounds per period is 
that participants have a better chance to discover the correct state of the market and 
respond to that state, rather than base their strategies only on historical data. This 
presumably improves the chances of clearing the market (satisfying the demand with 
the supply). 
Alvey et al [23] described a security-constrained bid-clearing system being used in 
the New Zealand wholesale electricity market. The model described in that paper is 
similar to the models described in the other paper reviewed in this section, in that the 
auction mechanism is a sealed double auction. The price used, however, is a single 
market clearing price, defined as the price of the last bid cleared. Also, an LP algorithm 
was used to solve the network constrained optimization problem, with the nodal prices 
determined by LP. In recent work, Singh et al [24], studied the effects of using a location 
dependent nodal spot pricing scheme, as opposed to using a single market clearing price 
mechanism. The authors showed in that paper that the former method could lead to 
arbitrage opportunities for the suppliers. 
Other models that have been proposed include the England and Wales Power Pool 
system, where the bids submitted by the participants also include unit commitment re­
lated data, in addition to bid prices, such as ramp rates, unit minimum run and down 
times, etc. In [25], Jia and Radinskaia showed that the heuristics used to implement 
the bidding rules in England can be derived analytically, using Lagrangian relaxation. 
However, Oren et al [26] have shown that, from the implementation point of view, the 
Lagrangian relaxation-based unit commitment algorithm used to implement such a com­
petitive market is subject to volatility in the price signals provided and the profitability 
of some units, depending on the parameters for step size selection used in the dual op­
timization. Thus, that paper provided support for a more decentralized approach to 
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the energy market, where a simpler auction is performed, with details of unit commit­
ment and scheduling left to the individual participant to determine. In [27], Al-Agtash 
showed a Lagrangian multiplier based implementation for the operational planning in 
such a system, which is a simplified model of the proposed California power exchange 
(PX) and independent system operator (ISO). 
In this research, we have assumed that the decentralized model (somewhat similar 
to the proposed California market model) will be in effect, and that unit commitment 
decisions will not be the concern of the broker, but of the individual participant. As far 
as the broker is concerned, each hour will be treated separately from the other, in other 
words, there is no temporal constraint in the objective of the broker. 
Another key consideration that is a result of open access to transmission is the pricing 
of ancillary services. In [28], Kumar et al presented the approach that ever\- transac­
tion in an energy brokerage depends on multilateral contracts for ancillarj- services. .A. 
separable programming problem with a piecewise linear objective function is presented 
as the objective for the broker to maximize. The objective translates to maximizing 
transactions while ensuring system demand, spinning and ready reserve requirements, 
and satisfying the transmission line losses. 
Based on a literature review, some important assimiptions have been made in this 
research. These are stunmarized as follows. We implemented a simplified brokerage 
model that follows the high-low matching algorithm that is outlined in [11]. This was 
followed by a power flow based algorithm outlined later, that attempts to maximize 
surplus from feasible transactions. This is essentially a simplified variation of the model 
presented in [15]. 
Savings allocations are determined by the split-savings method given in [11], even 
though this may not be a "fair" allocation under all scenarios. The reason for this is the 
ease of implementation and the current use of spUt savings in the power industry. In 
the context of reference [21], this research deals only with the cash market. Inasmuch as 
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transactions may occur after a certain time period from price determination, the model 
in this research might be classified as a forward market, but the classification is not 
central to any of our approaches. Single round (or one-shot) bidding for energy has been 
the norm in the brokerage markets implemented or proposed in several instances ([10], 
[11], [16], [18]) and was the model assumed in this research as well. But the strategies 
developed are by no means irrelevant in the multiple round scenario. Indeed, the strate­
gies developed in this research can be envisioned as starting points for developing bids 
in each of the several roimds in each period of bidding, if a multiple round model is 
assumed. 
Ancillarv* services are assumed to be contracted outside the jurisdiction of the broker. 
However, it is recognized that future strategies will be affected by and must consider the 
level of usage of ancillary services by the participants. At this point in time, ancillary 
service considerations are beyond the scope of the model proposed here. 
2.3 Strategic Bidding — Other Industries 
The papers reviewed in section 2.2 deal with implementing energj- brokerages with 
the goal of optimizing total system savings, subject to a variety of constraints, including 
non-traditional considerations such as ancillary services. This was usually followed by 
equitable allocation of savings according to certain rules. Thus the papers discussed 
the structure of the market. Within this structure, participants choose to bid for energv* 
based on different factors. If factors other than just the cost of production are considered, 
then the participants are said to bid strategically. Strategic bidding is the process by 
which a participant in a market develops bids that are perceived to be effective in 
achieving its performance goals. Such strategic bidding behavior, while imcommon in 
an energy brokerage context, is common in other industries. Stark et al [29] presented 
a comprehensive bibliography on competitive bidding. The number of citings in that 
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reference shows that competitive bidding and the area of strategic bidding in particular, 
are very well researched in other industries. The following sections review literature 
pertaining to strategic bidding, both in the power industry and in other industries. 
Some of the industries where strategic bidding is commonly used include construc­
tion, oil tract leasing, and property sales. Such bidding typically relies on market in­
formation, such as transaction prices to estimate competitors' behavior. Based on this 
market information bids are developed. One of the earliest papers on competitive bid­
ding is by Friedman [30]. In that paper, the author suggested a variety of objectives that 
a company could use in competitive bidding. The author also presented a method to 
estimate the probability of winning a bid against competitors based on market data, and 
to use this probability to determine the optimal bid. In reference [31], Griffis provided 
a method by which competitors are modeled according to probability distributions of 
their bids. This same reference [31] also presented a method for updating probability 
distributions when new data become available. In reference [32], Baron discussed the 
eflFect of risk aversion on optimal bid prices of a firm in the case of incentive contracts. 
Wilson [33], discussed the equilibrium solution in the case of asymmetric information 
among competitors. In reference [34], LavaUe presented a Bayesian approach to bid 
development, based on conditional probabilities, involving asymmetric information and 
asymmetric perception on the possession of such information. In [35], Skitmore et al 
proposed a multivariate approach to using the probability distributions, thus extending 
the methods in works such as [30]. In reference [36], Boughton presented approaches to 
bidding that go beyond probabilistic models. Some of these methods may be applied di­
rectly to energy brokerages. Other methods may be modified (such as by using the lower 
bounding method presented later in this research) for application in energy brokerages. 
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2.4 Strategic Bidding — Power Industry 
This section reviews some of the papers that apply strategic bidding techniques 
in the power industry* context. In [37], Rozek provided a survey on developments in 
competitive bidding in the emerging electricity markets. That paper primarily focused on 
the new generation capacity market, rather than the energy market. Nevertheless, some 
of the issues are the same for the energy markets. The issues, that were raised in that 
paper, include the adnainistration of the bid evaluation process, influence of the bidding 
rules on the offer strategies of the bidders, and the use of experimental economics, i.e., 
markets simulated in a laboratory environment to study the effects of various factors on 
market performances. In [38], Kahn et al presented optimization methods for evaluating 
competitive private power contracts in the capacity planning function of a utility. That 
paper presented the use of the Benders decomposition approach to select the optimal 
bids. The paper assumed that the bids are for dispatchable blocks of power submitted 
by different producers (sellers) to the utility (sole buyer) for consideration. Thus that 
strategy considered the case of a dominant buyer who has complete knowledge of the 
market price distribution in advance. 
In [3], David presented a strategic bidding approach for the case where there are a 
number of sellers, and one buyer, who picks the least bid seller. Both a deterministic and 
a probabilistic formulations were presented. The approaches in that paper are similar 
in the following ways to the approaches in this research. The probabilistic approach 
in both involved using distributions for the bids of competitors. But no mention is 
made in [3] of what distributions should be used to model competitors, and how the 
strategies are implemented for more complex distributions than those with a linear 
CDF. In this research, we investigated both issues in detail. Both methods have as an 
objective, the maximization of expected value of profit. However, that paper considers 
a very simple market structure, neglecting the possibility that buyers might also be 
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submitting a veiriety of bids. Also, mininiuin up and down times of units, and unit 
commitment costs. These are components that have been included in our research, 
in the illustrative examples presented in Chapters 5 and 6. .AJso, while the author of 
that paper has commented on using utility functions to model preference functions, no 
analysis is presented on the nature of the utility functions that could be used, and the 
effects of risk attitudes on bidding strategies. These issues have also been investigated 
in this research^ 
The method in [3] has one advantage in that, the objective function is posed as a dy­
namic programming problem, with the stages being the bid blocks, and the states being 
the bid prices. Since dynamic programming is very flexible in possible modifications to 
objective function, this might be a worthwhile consideration in future additions to this 
research. 
In [39], Richter has presented a novel approach to strategic bidding in the brokerage 
market using genetic algorithms (GAs). The brokerage model assumed is similar to that 
given in [22], with multiple rounds of bidding for each period. Richter used GAs to both 
predict the future market price, as well as determine the optimal bid. This was done by 
evolving genetic agents that perform better in each round of bidding. Also, that work 
was presented as the development of a framework for bidding strategies. It would be 
interesting to see further developments in that area when complex strategies are actually 
analyzed. It would be of value to see if the strategies developed by using intelligent 
agents could be distilled in the form of easy to understand niles. Also conceivable is the 
scenario that participants may not place a high premium on knowing why a particular 
agent performed well in a given situation, so long as it is possible to reproduce the 
bidding performance in a market situation. 
1 While a part of this research was performed after the publication of reference [3], our work was 
independent of the work presented there. In fact, application of probability distributions to model 
competitors is an idea already applied widely in other industries, as shown in Section , amd those 
references were the primary source of inspiration for our work. 
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The primary difference between [39] and this research is that this reseeirch considers 
a framework that includes unit commitment considerations and, to a limited extent, 
transmission considerations. However, this research does not explore the use of genetic 
algorithms for bidding. Instead, conventional methods for optimal bidding are used with 
the application of expected value or utility maximization. 
In recent work, Sakk et al [40] reported the use of a neural-network based learning 
algorithm to develop bidding strategies in a sequential bidding model. The strength of 
this algorithm is that it being implemented as a tool that can be used across the internet, 
with no additional capability on the part of the users except a web-browser. However, in 
that paper, it was assimied that bidding histories of the participants were made public. 
This may not be a realistic assumption, since this could reveal cost structures of the 
participants. In [41], Hao et al formulated a bidding model based on consumer payment 
minimization. This is a relatively new approach, compared to the unit commitment-like 
methods that aim to minimize totai system costs, or maximize total system savings. 
Under this model, the bidding strategy of the units that are "on the margin", i.e., with 
operating costs close to the market clearing price, is expected to be to slightly shave the 
bid, in other words to bid slightly above the marginal cost, for selling. However, it is 
tmclear as to what the exact amount of shaving should be. Also, buyer side bidding is 
not considered. 
An interesting paper related to strategic bidding was presented recently by Krishna 
[42], where intelligent agents (computer programs) were allowed to negotiate and com­
municate with intelligent agents of other players, to form collusive coalitions in market 
games. This is a novel approach based on game theory. In our research, however, we do 
not assume that participants form any coalitions. 
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2.5 Generation and Transactions Scheduling 
In this section, transactions and scheduling related literature is reviewed. In the 
past, some approaches have been tried wherein the uncertainties in system scheduling 
data are incorporated in scheduling transactions. In [43], Prasannan et al presented 
a method to incorporate sale transactions in the hydrothermal coordination problem. 
In that paper, the authors assimied that transaction prices axe predetermined by the 
selling utility and power levels at this price are oflFered to the purchasing utility. This 
purchasing utility might then choose up to the level of power offered at the offer price. 
The method presented is an attempt to optimize this real time pricing problem by 
Lagrangian relaxation. In [44], Zhang et al presented a similar approach, solved by 
using the augmented Lagrangian decomposition method. Both methods attempt to 
minimize cost. In [45], Fan et al considered including the effect of committing purchase 
transactions on system energy price by a first order approximation of a Taylor expansion 
of the system energy price with respect to transaction power. The unit commitment 
algorithm proposed was a sequential unit commitment method, which is essentially a 
heuristic method. The above references are relevjint to later sections where scheduling 
related strategies are concerned. In those sections, the approaches that incorporate 
uncertainties involve quantifying the risk from the uncertainties, and modifying the bid 
prices based on this risk. While Lagrangian relaxation based approaches were used in 
the approaches, the unit commitment tool used in our research was a priority list based 
program that is admittedly less flexible than the Lagrangian relaxation approach. This 
method was chosen for ease of implementation and speed of execution. However, the 
strategies developed in this document are not dependent on the type of unit commitment 
tool used, and will be equally applicable if the participant were to use a Lagrangian 
relaxation based tool for unit commitment. 
In [46], a stochastic unit commitment model was proposed by Takriti et al, based on 
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scenario bundles, for situations where the demand is uncertain. The basic concept is to 
minimize the probability weighted average cost of production for the possible scenarios. 
The solution process was by Lagrangian relaxation. In [47], Breiphol et al presented 
a Gauss-Markov load model for application in risk evaluation. In that paper, the load 
model was used to predict system hourly load mean and variance based on the previous 
hour's load. In [48], Hoffer et al discussed various distributions to be considered for 
conditional load duration curves. The distributions considered include gamma, beta 
and triangular. These references are relevant to the discussion of the effect of load 
uncertainties on the participant's bidding strategy, in later sections. 
In [49], Billinton et al considered the generating system operating health and risk with 
and without stand-by units, intemiptible load, and postponable outages. A risk index 
was defined to quantify the probability of the system being at risk (in this context, the 
sum of the probabilities of the system being at emergency state and extreme emergency 
state, because of unit outages.) 
However, in the context of a competitive market, it may be difficult to assess an 
acceptable risk level based on such an index. An intuitively more appealing approach 
is one where scheduling options available to participants could be evaluated based upon 
a method that considers not only the relative profitability of selecting the option, but 
also upon the participant's attitude towards risk-taking. Such a quantity is the so 
called utility function of the participant. Literature relating to this area is reviewed in 
Chapter 6, as part of Section 6.4.2. 
2.6 Transmission Access and Pricing 
This section references some papers that are relevant to the assumptions made in 
this research with respect to transmission. Transmission is the most complex of the 
issues that were raised with deregulation; there is a large volume of literature on this 
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subject. This section is not to be considered by any means, an extensive bibliography. 
In fact, Lankford et al have published such a bibliography for the IEEE Task Force on 
Transmission Access [50]. In [51], Vojdani et al raised some of the issues that have to 
resolved with the advent of of open transmission access. Some of these include models 
for transmission rights, dispatch, control and pricing. The authors noted that the FERC 
accepted contract path as a way of pricing transmission usage. However, alternatives 
were expected to be proposed for this method that reflect actual flows on Unes. Naumann 
[52] presented the impact of FERC Orders 888 and 889, which required the posting of 
pro forma open access tariflfe, and available transmission capabilities (ATCs) on the 
open access same-time information system (OASIS), and also required that reservations 
for transmission be made only through the OASIS. In that paper, the author related 
the experiences of the Commonwealth Edison Company. Some of the impacts were an 
increase in transaction volume, increased concern about loop flows, and the complexities 
involved in the request, reservation and use of transmission service. 
In [53] Outhred et al presented the various alternatives being considered by the 
Australian industry for transmission pricing. Of these, the "benefits method" (which 
consists of allocating the cost of the high voltage network element according to user 
benefit generators and loads equally), and the distance based MW-Km (or MW-mile) 
method were selected as the two most favored options. Based on these options, a nodal 
auction market model was presented. 
In [54], Tabors discussed the different approaches to transmission pricing, short-run 
marginal cost (SRMC) based, and long-run margined cost based (LR^IC). In reference 
[55], Happ has described four different cost of wheeling methodologies, including the 
MW-mile method. In [56], Tsukamoto et al proposed the allocation of fixed transmission 
to wheeling transactions as an extension to the MW-mile method. The extension is 
the consideration of cooperative game theory to minimize the maximum regret of each 
participant, with the allocation of costs. In [57], Scarfone presented an interesting 
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application of short-circuit simulations to calculate MW-miles of a transaction. The 
basic concept is to perform a short-circuit study of a fault at the delivery bus being 
considered, by means of commercially available software, and to use a percentage of the 
fault current on each line to determine the MW-mile impact of the proposed transaction. 
Obessis et al [58], presented a review of existing cost based transmission pricing schemes, 
and proposed a new approach to combine the spot pricing and the embedded cost based-
pricing methods. 
In this research, it was assumed that transmission is modeled according to the MW-
mile method. The primary reason for this is ease of implementation. Also, it is superior 
to postage stamp method because it includes the concept of the distance between the 
supply and delivery points. This assumption is also supported by the indication that 
the MW-mile method seems to be becoming a common method for pricing transmission 
in the United States. 
2.7 New Tools and Concepts in Energy Markets 
In this section, some of the new tools and concepts being used and proposed for use 
in the emerging energy markets are reviewed. In [59], Thomas et al presented a very 
detailed analysis of the different kinds of tools that will be required under three different 
scenarios of market restructuring. These scenarios were defined as the base case scenario, 
the maximum ISO scenario, and the minimum ISO scenario. In the base case scenario, 
the market is considered in the short-term after the FERC orders 888 and 889 become 
effective, with no retail access, vertically integrated utilities, amd non-discriininator>' 
transmission access being provided to all users. The second scenario assumes that the 
ISO performs a centralized unit commitment based upon bid prices, and also sets prices. 
All energy is assumed to be bought and sold through this ISO. In the third scenario, 
the ISO does not own any generation or transmission, and primarily is concerned with 
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network security. 
Clayton et al [60] identified different kinds of tools required for use in system planning 
in the competitive environments. Flatabo [61] described some of the new tools developed 
or adapted for use in the Scandinavian market. These include price forecasting, risk 
management, trading systems, and transmission congestion and pricing software. 
A class of tools, proposed for risk management in the energy markets, is a set of 
financial derivative instruments, such as futures and options contracts for electric energj*. 
Ramesh [62] provided the basics of financial derivatives in energy markets. Other related 
references in this area include [8] and [21]. 
From these papers, it is clear that modifications will be needed for conventional 
tools, and that new tools will be needed, in order to cope with the changes that market 
restructuring has introduced into power system operations. 
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3 MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES 
3.1 Perfect Competition 
In a perfectly competitive market there are no barriers to entry and exit and complete 
and accurate information is available to all the participants [63]. In such a market, no 
single participant will have the market power to influence the price of the commodity 
being bought and sold, and will thus be a "price taker". In such a market, the following 
condition can be derived for a profit maximizing producer: 
where: 
q is the quantity- of the product that the participant produces, 
p is the market price for the commodity, 
7r(g) is the profit of the producer from producing quantity q of the product, 
C{q)  is the production cost of the producer, a function of quantity alone. 
In Equation 3.1, the only production decision that the producer needs to make is 
that of the quantity to produce, q. Differentiating the above equation with respect to q, 
and applying first order conditions yields the following expression: 
Rearranging the terms of the above equation yields the following well known condi­
tions for price in a competitive market: 
Ti{q)  =pq-  C(q)  (3.1) 
7r'(?) = P -  C ' i q )  =  0 (3.2) 
P = C'{q) (3.3) 
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Equation 3.3 states that the optimal quantity that a producer should produce in a 
perfectly competitive msLrket would be such that the difference between marginal cost 
of production and market price is zero. From a power industry perspective, this is the 
rationale behind moving to a price-based market structure from a cost plus-based market 
structure. The implication of this equation is that each producer will dispatch their 
generating units such that the incremental cost of production (marginal cost, C'{q)) 
is equal to the market price. This, of course is the "equal Lambda" criterion that 
centralized economic dispatch achieves. 
In the context of the energy brokerage market, this would imply that there is no 
need for any strategies to bid in the market. Merely bidding the marginal cost of 
production at each bidding period would be the optimal bidding strategy in a perfect 
market. However, the real energy markets that have existed so far, and are currently 
evolving, are not perfectly competitive markets. In the following section, some of these 
imperfections are examined. 
3.2 Imperfect Market Conditions in Energy Markets 
In the energy markets that have been in existence until now, zmd in some of the mar­
kets evolving in the future, some barriers to entry and exit exist. One barrier to entry 
is the requirement for memberships in certain power pools, power exchanges or some 
similar market structure. Thus, new entrants to the market cannot freely participate 
without investing some amount of resources as sunk costs, capital or membership fees. 
Also, the obligation to serve load has not been entirely removed in these markets. In 
the United States, one such evolving market at the time of this research is the proposed 
California power exchange. Thus, there is a barrier to exit the market. This prevents, 
at least to a certain extent, market participants from choosing not to generate power 
if market conditions such as price are not favorable. Also, the existence of large power 
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generating companies with a diverse mix of generating resources of varying costs and 
eflBciencies, in conjunction with relatively weaker competitors with high cost resources 
suggests that there is the possibility that one or more players might have more market 
power than others. Another consideration that is important is the availability of infor­
mation. Even though certain relevant system data is made public in the energy markets, 
the ability to transform this data quickly into usable information, will depend on the 
resources available to individual participants. The lack of liquid markets for hedging 
price and quantity risks also means that there is considerable uncertainty that the pro­
ducer faces prior to making production decisions. Thus, we can see that in the incipient 
stages of deregulation in the United States, energy markets have attributes that would 
not conform to the perfectly competitive markets assumed in the analysis of Section 3.1. 
Regulators are striving to correct such imperfections in current and proposed market 
structures, and might well succeed in eliminating them. However, even if future markets 
evolve that are very close to rectifying the above imperfections, uncertainties and risk 
attitudes would make it likely that participants would be reluctant to bid their marginal 
costs, and would instead add a profit margin to their bids. Given this situation, each 
participant must develop a strategy by which bids for the energy markets can be devel­
oped. In Section 1.1.3, some the factors that might affect the development of such bids 
was outlined. In the following sections, one such factor, modeling competitor behavior, 
is examined in detail. 
3.3 Modeling Competitor Behavior 
Some attempts have been made in the literature to model competitor behavior by 
using game theoretic models, intelligent agents, or by conjectural variations in oligopoly 
models. In this research, a probabilistic approach for modeling competitor behavior is 
examined. In this approach, the bids of the competing participants of an energj- bro­
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kerage are assumed to be distributed randomly. Then, based on this distribution, the 
probability of success of a participant's bidding strategy is evaluated. Next, the partici­
pant's bidding strategy can be developed as an expected value maximization approach. 
This procedure is outlined in this section, using a simple triangular distribution, for 
illustration, after which, the procedure is developed for three different distributions in 
the following sections. 
3.3.1 Using Bid Distributions - An lUiistrative Example 
Let Pb S/MWH represent a buyer's bid price for buying a unit block of energv'. Let 
c represent the marginal cost of generating this unit block of energj- if the buyer owns 
generation, or the value of this unit block to the buyer. In order to achieve a goal of 
expected profit maximization, the buyer must maximize the following objective function: 
Maximize nu a-n 
P6 (3.4) 
where: 
S{pb) is the probability of success of the bid pi, 
Ps is the sell bid to which the buy bid was matched. 
A bid may be for multiple unit blocks of energy. Regardless of the quantity of energy 
involved, the blocks of energy in a single bid are aU considered to be priced by the bidder 
on a per unit basis, at the given bid price pb-
The competition for this bid may be represented in the form a distribution of com­
peting buy bids. In order to be successful, the buyer's bid pb should be greater than the 
competing bids. The expression for expected profit cannot be directly maximized with 
respect to the decision variable Pb because the buyer does not have any information, 
in general, on the sell bids, and in particular, on which sell bid would be matched to 
Pb- However, according to the brokerage rules, the sell bid ps to which this winning bid 
would be matched, must be less than Pb in order for a saving to exist. Therefore, the 
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follo^ving relationship can be derived: 
Ps < P b = > c-pb  < c~  (3.5) 
The second part of Equation 3.5 implies (c—pb) is a lower bound to the profit from a 
successful bid to buy. The advantage of this equation is that a lower bound to expected 
profit from a bid can be derived as follows: 
Maximize 
P b  S i p b ) { c ~ p b )  (3.6) 
Maximizing the above equation hcis the effect of maximizing the lower bound to ex­
pected profit. This in general need not result in maximum expected profit. Therefore, 
the strategy resulting from maximization of the lower bound to expected profit is con­
sidered to be a "suboptimal" bidding strategy*, because of the lack of seller information. 
3.3.2 Development of a Suboptimal Bidding Strategy 
In this section, an illustrative case is presented to explain how a participant could 
develop a suboptimal bidding strategy, as defined in the previous section, using the 
available market information. First, for this illustrative case, we will assmne that the 
participant has available a subjective probability distribution to represent all the com­
peting bids for a given hour, and that this is a triangular distribution as shown in 
Figure 3.1. This shape is only assumed here for illustrative purposes. In the following 
sections, the strategy is developed for three other shapes, that are more representative 
of a practical example, and the shapes are obtained by fitting the distributions to data 
from simulations. However, the simple triangular shape will allow us to derive a closed 
form expression for the suboptimal bid, and illustrate the mechanics of the strategy 
easily. 
Let us assume that the participant, who is considered a buyer, uses a probability 
density function (PDF) as shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Triangulax PDF for buy bids. 
In this figure, the random variable X represents the competitors' buy bid. The 
quantities, bmin and bmax, represent values below and above which the competitors are 
not expected to bid. The distance d between bmin and bmax represents the possible spread 
over which the competitors axe expected to bid. The probability density- function for X 
i s  f { X ) .  By definition, the area within the triangle ACD is one. Further, let us assume 
1 d that^ AF = FD = For a given buy bid value of  X  =  pf , ,  the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of competitors' bids, F{pi,) is given by: 
F(pb)  =  r  KX)dX = Pr{X <  p, )  (3.7) y —00 
In other words, the CDF evaluated at pf, gives the probability that the competitors 
will bid a value less than or equal to pi,. Thus, if the buyer bids a value just greater 
than pb, F{pb) gives the probability of winning the block of energy over his competitors. 
Thus, F{pb) gives the probability of success of a bid Pb- This was denoted by S{pb) in 
Equation 3.4. For the triangular PDF, S(pb) is the area of the region ABE. It can be 
^Such a symmetrical distribution is assrimed only for illustrative purposes. In reality, participants 
could assume asymmetrical distributions. 
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shown that this area is given by: 
n \ -iPb bmin) SM = ^5 (3.8) 
if Pb < bmin + and by: 
(3.9) 
if bj j i i j i  + 2 — Pb ^ ^max' 
The lower bound to expected profit from bidding Pb is obtained by substituting this 
expression for S{pb) in Equation 3.6 and is denoted by Eib{pb)-
Applvong the first-order necessary conditions to Eibipb)-. we can solve for the subopti­
mal buy bid price, pj. This is done by taking the first derivative of the expression given 
by Equation 3.10 with respect to Pb, and setting it equal to zero. Since we have two 
expressions for S(pb), we must solve both forms of the first-order necessary condition. 
Then, depending on where the solution for pb lies, to the left or the right of point F in 
Figure 3.1, the solution obtained from using the corresponding form of S(pb) should be 
selected. The closed-form solutions for the suboptimal bid for the two possibilities are 
given by the following equation: 
The second-order sufficient condition is obtained by differentiating Equation 3.10 
twice w.r.t. pb, and setting the resulting expression to be less than zero. This is satisfied 
S»(Ps) = S(pi,).(c - Pi) (3.10) 
'mtn 
Pb — bmin — 
Pb = 46r„ax + 2C - yj{2bmax + c)2 - 4" icbjr,ax ~ 
6 
d 
bmin "l~ 2 — (3.11) 
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if c > bmin- This condition translates to the requirement that the marginal generating 
costs of the buyer be greater than the lower limit of the competitor's bid. If c < bmin: 
the solution for pj is c itself. This gives a zero probability of acceptance. In other 
words, if the buyer can generate power at a lower cost than the competitor's lowest 
buy bid, it is not worth bidding more than marginal cost. On the other end of the 
spectrum, if pl > bmax-. the buyer should not bid a price value greater than bmax-. since 
the probability of acceptance is not increased beyond the probabilitv* of acceptance at 
bmaxi [S{bmax) = !]• Thus, for c < b^in, the suboptimal bidding strategy described 
dictates that the buyer should bid according to Equation 3.11, upto a maximum of bmax-
The corresponding values of the probability of acceptance, S{pb), and the expected value 
of the lower boimd on the savings, Eib{pb), are obtained by substituting this value for pl 
in Equations 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. 
Similar arguments can be appUed to the case of the participant who is considered a 
seller. For a seller to be successful, the selling bid Ps must be the lowest bid for a given 
block of energy. Thus, the probability of success of a sell bid Ps, S(ps) is given by the 
following equation: 
S(Ps)  =  Pr{ps  <X)  = l -  Pr{X < Ps)  (3.12) 
Figure 3.2 shows such a triangular distribution for a seller. Again, the area of the 
triangle ACD is 1 by definition. The complement of the CDF evaluated at Ps is shown 
by the shaded area, region BED. 
In other words, the probability of success is the complement of the probability that 
the seller's bid Ps is higher than all the competing bids. But the rightmost term in the 
above equation is simply the CDF of competing sell bids, evaluated at Ps- Thus, the 
probability of success for a seller can also be related to the CDF of the competing sell 
bids, in a manner very similar to that for a buyer. Closed form expressions for a seller's 
suboptimal bid could also be derived. 
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Figure 3.2 Triangulax PDF for sell bids. 
3.3.3 A Numerical Example 
In this section, the mechanics of the suboptimal bidding strategy for the triangular 
distribution are illustrated by means of a numericad exsmiple. Let us assume that the 
buyer's notion of the competitors' bidding behavior corresponds to the values for bmin 
and bmca in Table 3.1. 
Let us also assume that the marginal cost of generation of the buyer varies according 
to the values for c. Then, for each value of c, the corresponding value of the suboptimal 
bid, the probability of acceptance, and the maximum expected lower bound on profits are 
given in Table 3.1, based on the first part of Equation 3.11, and the following reasoning 
where the equations yield unacceptable values. Cases 1 and 2, where c = 8 and c = 10 
correspond to cases where the buyer's generating costs are lower than or equal to bmin-
For these cases, the suboptimal strategy dictates that the buyer should not bid above 
the marginal cost of generation. Thus, the suboptimal bid is the marginal cost itself. 
The probability of acceptance for these cases is zero. In Cases 3 and 4, where c = 12 and 
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Table 3.1 Variation of suboptimal values with marginal 
cost - triangular distribution. 
Case ^min ^max c Pl S{p l )  Eibipb) 
1 10.00 15.00 8.00 8.00 0.0000 0.0000 
2 10.00 15.00 10.00 10.00 0.0000 0.0000 
3 10.00 15.00 12.00 11.33 0.0711 0.0474 
4 10.00 15.00 13.75 12.50 0.5000 0.6250 
5 10.00 15.00 14.00 12.60 0.5386 0.7540 
6 10.00 15.00 16.00 13.26 0.7592 2.0802 
7 10.00 15.00 18.00 13.72 0.8704 3.7253 
8 10.00 15.00 25.00 14.43 0.9735 10.2899 
c = 13.75, the suboptimal strategy yields a positive probability of acceptance S{pl ) ,  and 
an increasing maximum lower bound on expected profit Eibipl). Also, for these values of 
c, the solution for pl lies to the left of point F in Figure 3.1, so we choose Equation 3.11 
to determine the suboptimal bid. In Cases 5 through 8, where c = 14, c = 16, c = 18, 
and c = 25, respectively, the solution for pj lies to the right of point F in Figure 3.1, 
so we choose the second part of Equation 3.11 to determine the suboptimal bid. These 
considerations are illustrated in Table 3.1. It can be seen that as the suboptimal bids 
increase in price, so do the corresponding probabilities of acceptance and lower bounds 
to expected profits. 
These values are implicitly based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that 
the buyer's goal is to maximize expected value of savings. The second assumption is 
that the buyer has a notion that the competitor's bidding behavior will obey a triangular 
density function. The former assumption could be varied to fit various performance goals. 
For example, if the participant is a utility that is only interested in keeping a certain 
plant shut-down, regardless of the cost of energy, then the goal could be to maximize 
probability of acceptance, instead of maximizing expected value of savings. The latter 
assumption admittedly makes the problem easier to solve in the closed form. However, 
if the buyer assumes a more complex density function, the general principles of the 
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strategy still can be applied, with a higher degree of computational intensity. In the 
following sections, three such functions are explored. 
3.4 Polynomial Modeling of a Bid Distribution 
In this section, a suboptimal bidding strategy based on directly modeling the CDF 
of competing bids is developed. This is because of difficulties in fitting a model to 
the PDF, followed by the numerical complexities in integrating this PDF to obtain the 
CDF. A CDF is usually smoother than a PDF, and hence is easier to fit a model to. 
An approximate CDF can be obtained by constructing a cumulative relative frequency 
(CRF) curve from the histogram of historical transaction prices. Fitting a polynomial 
curve to this CRF curve then 5delds an expression for the CDF as function of bid price. 
Figure 3.3 shows an example where a polynomial of degree 5 is used to fit a CRF curve 
obtained from historical transaction prices. These historical prices are obtained from 
simulations performed on a brokerage simulator described in Chapter 4. A polynomial 
of degree n is assumed in this section, to represent the CDF of competing bids. 
Now, following similar arguments as that presented in Section 3.3, we equate the 
probability of acceptance, S(pi,) to be the CDF of the competing bid distribution, F(pi,), 
evaluated at Pb. The objective now becomes: 
Maximize 
P b  F { p b ) i c - p b )  (3.13) 
Let us assume that the result of fitting a polynomial of degree n to the CRF curve 
results in the following equation for CDF of competing bids: 
F{X) = ag + CliJC + 02-^^ "l~ — + ^ (3-14) 
The competing bids are represented by the random variable X, and the coefficients 
of the polynomial in Equation 3.14 are obtained by regression. For a buyer, F{pij) will 
43 
1.2 
0.8 
CRF 
Fitted Curve 
0.4 
10 14 15 
Bid Price 
Figure 3.3 Fitting a polynomial to bid data. 
represent the probability of success of bid pj following the arguments of Section 3.3.2. 
Thus, the following expression can be derived for the lower bound to expected profit 
from bid pb, in the case of a buyer using the polynomial model: 
Eibipb) = S{pb){c - Pb) = F{pb){c - Pb) (3.15) 
Using Equation 3.14, this leads to: 
Eib(pb) = (c - pb)iao + aiPb + a2Pb^ + ... + + OnPb'') (3.16) 
Applying first order necessary conditions to the above equation will result in the 
following expression^: 
(n + l)(can+i - an)P6" + n{can - a„_i)p6"~^+ 
. . .  + 2 { c a 2  —  a i ) p b  +  { c a i  —  a o )  =  0  (3.17) 
^In Equation 3.17, the coefficient On+i is a fictitious coefficient introduced only for reasons of sym­
metry. It is set to zero before the equation is solved. The advantage is that the coefficients of the first 
order condition can now be expressed by a general formuJa, which helps in computer implementation. 
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The derivation of the above expression is given in Section A. 1.1. The solutions of 
Equation 3.17 that satisfy second order sufficient conditions, and the condition pb < c 
(the buyer should not bid a value greater than generating cost) will be the desired subop-
timal bids. In order to find the best bid in case of multiple solutions for Equation 3.17, 
the participant can simply pick the bid that results in the maximum expected lower 
bound to profit that result from Equation 3.16. 
A similar approach may be followed by a seller using a polynomial model. In this 
case, the probability of success of a sell bid ps will be given by the following equation: 
S(ps )  = Pr{ X  > p s )  =  l -  F { p , )  (3.18) 
In other words, the seller must have the lowest bid compared to his competitors. 
Also, the lower bound to expected profit will now be given by 
EibiPs) = S{ps){ps - c) = (1 - F(j}s ) ) iPs  -  c)  (3.19) 
With these modifications, it can be shown that the equation for suboptimaJ seller's 
bid is given by^: 
(n + l)(ca„+i - an)ps" + "(con -
+2(ca2 — (^i)Ps + (cfli — qq + 1) =0 (3.20) 
Thus, the participant can build a realistic model of competing bids by polynomial 
modeling, and incorporate this model in the bidding decision easily. The advantage 
of the polynomial model is the ubiquitous nature of polynomial regression modules in 
most spreadsheet packages. So obtaining such a model from historical data is relatively 
simple. Another advantage is that for lower degree polynomials, a closed form expression 
for suboptimal bids can be derived from the first-order necessary conditions. Thus, the 
polynomial model is a good candidate for modeling CDF of competing bids. 
^Here a„+i is again zero, and was included for assistance in computer implementation. 
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Table 3.2 Variation of suboptimal 
values with marginal cost -
polynomial distribution. 
Case c Pb S{pl)  Eibipl) 
1 8.00 8.00 0.0000 0.0000 
2 10.00 9.97 0.0325 0.0010 
3 12.00 10.70 0.5020 0.6533 
4 14.00 11.12 0.6279 1.8034 
5 15.00 11.30 0.6616 2.4490 
6 17.00 11.63 0.7123 3.8246 
7 17.50 11.73 0.7246 4.1838 
8 20.00 13.13 0.8968 6.1605 
Some numerical examples are given in Table 3.2 to illustrate the variation of subop­
timal values with the cost of generation, for the case of a buyer. The values given in 
Table 3.2 are based on the assumption that a polynomial fit is obtained by fitting a fifth 
degree polynomial to a sample of data that represents an approximation to competing 
buy bid distribution. Although the values used for c are the same as in Table 3.1, the 
resulting suboptimal bids are different. This is because the distribution parameters in 
this case, are obtained from curve fitting a set of data, and not assumed as in the case 
of the illustrative example for the triangular PDF. 
Let the curve fit result in the following equation for F{X): 
F { X )  =  
0.0013X^ - 0.0930;\:^ + 2.5674J5£:3 - 35.1178X2 + 238.4708X - 643.4213 (3.21) 
The sample data curve and the fitted curve are as shown previously in Figure 3.3. 
Details on obtaining such a sample and results of simulations based on this method are 
given in Chapter 5. Then, by using the approach developed in this section, the buyer's 
suboptimal bids cgin be computed based on Equation 3.17. These are shown in Table 3.2. 
It can be seen from this table that for very low costs of generation, such as 8 $/MWH, 
the best bid is the same as the marginal cost. This is because the suboptimal bid for 
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this cost by polynomial modeling yields a v-alue for suboptimal bid that does not satisfy-
pb < c. In other words, such a bid would result in a negative lower bound on expected 
profit. Thus, for this cost, the best value to bid would be the generating cost itself. The 
table shows a zero probability of acceptance, and zero expected profits corresponding 
to this bid. But for higher values of generating cost, it can be seen that the procedure 
results in suboptimal bids that lead to higher probabilities of acceptance (approaching 
1) and higher lower bounds to expected profit (approaching c — pj). 
The disadvantage of the polynomial fit is that for a good fit, a higher degree poly­
nomial is required. This leads to multiple solutions that must be evaluated. .AJso, it 
is difficult to obtain a set of coefficients for higher degree polynomials, that satisfy the 
requirement of the CDF that the value of F(X) be between 0 and 1. In addition, the 
PDF of a polynomial CDF is also a polynomial. In general, the shape of such a PDF 
is hard to interpret, and might not resemble a normal distribution. While this is not 
a serious problem, there exist some other distributions that are better candidates than 
the polynomial distribution from these points of view. Two of these are investigated in 
the following sections. 
3.5 Incomplete-Beta Function Modeling of a Bid Distribution 
In this section, the CDF of competing bids is modeled in the form of an incomplete-
beta function, whose shape is defined by two shape parameters. In other words, the 
competing bids are assumed to be distributed according to a beta distribution. The beta 
distribution has been used to fit distributions whose range of variation is known [64]. 
The mean of the distribution depends on the ratio of its shape parameters. The variance 
of the distribution is inversely proportional to the magnitude of its shape parameters. 
As this magnitude increases, the distribution tends towards a normal distribution. The 
following analysis defines and develops the incomplete-beta function as a possible way 
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to model competing bids. 
The expression for the Beta function is defined as follows [65]: 
B{a, b) = r  (3.22) 
Jo 
where: 
a.b are shape parameters, 
B{a, b) is the value of the Beta function evaluated at a, b. 
The incomplete-beta function of a variable x is defined by the following equation 
[65]: 
Figure 3.4 shows examples of the incomplete-beta function for various values of the 
shape parameters a, and b. By regression, the appropriate parameters can be obtained 
that fit the incomplete-beta function to the cumulative relative frequency (CRF) curve 
obtained from market data. The mathematical property of the incomplete-beta function 
of a normalized variable x is that the limiting values are 0 and 1. Thus, the required 
property of the CDF is satisfied by this fimction. Also, upon differentiating equation 
3.23, we may obtain the PDF resulting from such a CDF. The shape of this PDF is 
plotted in Figure 3.5. It can be seen that this is a bell shaped curve and can be used 
as an approximation for a normal distribution. The choice of the parameters results in 
shifting the mean of the PDF to the right or left. 
In addition, it is relatively easy to implement numerical evaluation of the function 
and its derivative, when compared to other standard probability distributions. Also, 
the second derivative of the function is a polynomial, and so concavity conditions can 
be easily established. Thus, the incomplete-beta function is a good candidate for a 
distribution to fit market data. 
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3.6 Suboptimal Bidding Using the Incomplete-Beta Function 
Now, if we use an incomplete-beta function with parameters a, and b to represent 
the CDF, we need to normalize the variable Pb so that it can var\* between 0 and 1. Let 
us effect the following normalization: 
Pa = mx => X = — (3-24) 
m 
where m is the largest unit price in $/MWH that the participant infers as "sufficient" 
to virtually ensure acceptance. In other words, the participant considers m to be the 
farthest outlier of competing competing unit buy bids. Having performed this normal­
ization, let us define a new objective function that is in terms of x as follows: 
M aximize 
X F(x)(c — mx) (3.25) 
We can now insert the incomplete-beta function in place of F(x} to arrive at the final 
objective function. 
Maximize 
X Eib{x) (3.26) 
where Eib{x) is the lower bound to expected profit and is given by: 
(3.27) 
For a seller, a very similar procedure would result in the following Eib(x): 
E„{x) = (tm - c) fl - (1 - (3-28) 
The normalization procedure is also the same, with Ps replacing Pb- The above expres­
sions can be numerically maximized to determine the value of x (and hence pb and p,) 
that maximizes the lower bound to expected profit. This suboptimal bid is then subject 
to heuristic tuning along the lines of that presented in [2]. However, before we proceed 
to maximize the above objective function,  i t  is  worthwhile to derive condit ions on x 
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for Eib{x) to be concave, in terms of the parameters a, b, m, and the marginal cost c. 
If these conditions lie beyond the constraint boundcu:\- for x (x lies between 0 and 1), 
then it is futile to attempt numerical maximization, and we assume that as a fall back, 
the participant bids the marginal cost. To determine these conditions, we differentiate 
Eib{x) twice w.r.t. x and set the second derivative to be negative. 
After performing some simplifications, shown in Section A.2.2, we arrive at the fol­
lowing expression: 
Elb(x) < 0 =>• (a-h b)mx^ — {(a + l)m-h c(a-h b — 2)}x + c(a — 1) < 0 (3.29) 
This condition holds if x lies between the roots of the quadratic expression. This can 
be easily checked. It can be shown that the concavity conditions for the seller are also 
identical to the above condition. 
If concavity condition holds, then we have a unique maximum over the allowable 
range for x. Figure 3.6 shows such a case where a buyer with a marginal generating 
cost of 12 S/M"V\TI is considering the bidding decision. The variation of En,{x) with x is 
shown for a maximimi bid price of 14.99 S/MWH. It can be seen that the lower bound 
to profit has a maximum of 0.6187 $/MWH, at x = 0.7143. 
The value obtained for x is in terms of the normalized bid price. To obtain the 
suboptimal bid price in $/MWH, we multiply x by m, the normalizing maximum bid 
price. This results in a suboptimal bid price of 10.7074 $/MWH with a probability of 
success of 0.4786. This maximum can be numerically isolated by using any of a number of 
classical techniques, such as Brent's method, which is a hybrid of quadratic interpolation 
and golden section search. Source code for the Beta function, incomplete-beta function, 
and for Brent's method are readily available in the literature, and in this research were 
obtained from the book Numerical Recipes in C [65]. 
Similar to Table 3.2, suboptimal values can be calculated for the above case of an 
incomplete-beta function with a = 25, and 6 = 10 for various values of c. These are 
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Figure 3.6 Variation of Eib{x) with x. 
presented in Table 3.3. The values for c used are once again the same as the values used 
in the previous two distributions, but the resultant values from optimization are different 
because of the choice of parameters. Again, it can be observed that the procedure results 
in suboptimal bids that lead to higher probabilities of acceptance (approaching 1) and 
higher lower bounds to expected profit (approaching c — pl), as c increases. 
Table 3.3 Variation of suboptimal values with 
marginal cost - beta distribution. 
Case c X* Pb S{pl)  Eibipl) 
1 8.00 0.5036 7.55 0.0051 0.0023 
2 10.00 0.6180 9.26 0.1074 0.0790 
3 12.00 0.7108 10.66 0.4607 0.6196 
4 14.00 0.7681 11.51 0-7506 1.8664 
5 15.00 0.7856 11.78 0.8241 2.6567 
6 17.00 0.8085 12.12 0.8998 4.3915 
7 17.50 0.8126 12.18 0.9108 4.8442 
8 20.00 0.8279 12.41 0.9446 7.1691 
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3.7 Incomplete-Gamma Function Modeling of a Bid Distribu­
tion 
In this section, the CDF of competing bids is modeled in the form of an incomplete-
gamma function. In other words, the competing bids are assumed to be distributed 
according to a gamma distribution. The gamma distribution has been used to represent 
many physical phenomena [64] in areas such as failure studies, economics and insurance 
risk theory. It provides a flexible skewed density over the positive range. The following 
analysis defines and develops the CDF of the gamma distribution, the incomplete-gamma 
function, as a possible way to model competing bids. 
The expression for the Gamma fimction is defined as follows [65]: 
r(a) = r (3.30) 
Jo 
where: 
a is a shape parameter, 
r (a) is the value of the Gamma function evaluated at a. 
The incomplete-gamma function of a variable x is defined by the following equation 
[65]: 
It has the limiting values P(a,0) = 0 and P(a, oo) = 1. Thus the required property 
of a CDF is also satisfied by this function. 
Figure 3.7 shows examples of the incomplete-gamma function for various values of 
the shape parameter a. Also, the PDF resulting from the incomplete-gamma CDF can 
be obtained by differentiating Equation 3.31 and is plotted in Figure 3.8 for a specific 
value of a. It can be seen that this PDF is also bell shaped, although the right outlier of 
the PDF does not occur at a finite value of x, unlike the incomplete-beta function. This 
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is because the domain of the incomplete-gamma function is not normalized between 0 
and 1. In the context of the strategic bidding application developed in this research, 
this means that no normalization of the bid-price by a ma^dmum bid-price is necessary. 
In addition, similar to the incomplete-beta function, numerical evciluation of the 
incomplete-gamma function and its derivative is relatively simple. The second derivative 
is a polynomial, and concavity conditions can be easily established for objective functions 
such as those described in the previous section. Thus, the incomplete-gamma function is 
a good candidate for a distribution to model market data. However, because of the use 
of only a single shape parameter a, it was observed that a good fit to market data was 
difficult to obtain when using the incomplete-gamma function. Due to this limitation, 
simulations supporting incomplete-gamma modeling were not performed. Nevertheless, 
it is of value to develop a theoretical procedure similar to the incomplete-beta function 
approach of Section 3.6. Such a procedure could be applied if a satisfactory fit were 
obtained using an incomplete-gamma function. 
o.a 
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Figure 3.7 Incomplete-gamma function. 
54 
0.14-
0.12 -
X 
0.1 - Shape parameter 
0.08 - a = 9 
0.06 • 
0.04 -
0.02-
0 
0 5 10 15 
X 
Figure 3.8 PDF from incomplete-gamma CDF. 
3.8 Suboptimal Bidding Using the Incomplete-Gamma Func­
tion 
In this section, the theoretical development of a suboptimal strategy by using incomplete-
gamma function modeling is presented. Proceeding in a manner similar to that of Sec­
tion 3.6, we have the following lower bounds to expected profit for a buyer and a seller 
respectively: 
The above expressions can be numerically maximized, with the resulting suboptimal 
bid being subject to heuristic tuning. Concavity conditions for both buyer and seller, 
derived in Section A.2.3, result in the following inequation: 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
Bl'i,(x) <0 => — (a + c+ l)p + c(a — 1) < 0 (3.34) 
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where: 
p =  pb for a buyer, 
p = ps for a seller. 
This condition holds if the bid price lies between the roots of the above quadratic 
expression. Unlike the case of incomplete-beta modeling, there is no obvious way to check 
for concavity because the domain of the incomplete-gamma function is unboiinded on 
the positive side. However, participants may perform sanity checks to see if there exists 
a maximum to the objective function within a certain "allowable" range of bid prices 
before proceeding with the numerical maximization. If the concavity condition holds, 
then we have a unique maximum of the objective function. Figure 3.9 shows such a case 
where a buyer with marginal generating cost of 12 $/MWH is considering the bidding 
decision. The variation of Eib{pb) with pi, is shown. It can be seen that the lower bound 
to profit has a mciximum of 1.67 $/MWH, at p(, = 8.5145 S/MWH. 
1.5 
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a= 9.00 
-2 • 
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Figure 3.9 Variation of Eibix) with x. 
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The corresponding probability of success of 0.4789. This maximum can be numeri­
cally isolated by Brent's method [65]. 
Similar to Table 3.3, suboptimal values can be calculated for the above case of an 
incomplete-gamma function with a = 9, for various values of c. These are presented in 
Table 3.4. It can be observed that the suboptimal bidding procedure results in bids that 
lead to higher probabilities of acceptance (approaching 1) and higher lower bounds to 
expected profit (approaching c — pi,*), as c increases. 
Table 3.4 Variation of suboptimal 
values with marginal cost -
ganmia distribution. 
Case c Pb Sipl) EibijPl) 
1 8.00 6.34 0.1897 0.3150 
2 10.00 7.52 0.3409 0.8451 
3 12.00 8.51 0.4789 1.6692 
4 14.00 9.34 0.5881 2.7411 
5 15.00 9.70 0.6320 3.3518 
6 17.00 10.32 0.7022 4.6896 
7 17.50 10.46 0.7167 5.0444 
8 20.00 11.08 0.7750 6.9134 
3.9 Other Candidates for Modeling a Bid Distribution 
In selecting the distribution with which to model competitor behavior, this author 
must admit to having resorted to the trial-and-error algorithm to a certain extent. In 
general however, a good candidate distribution for modeling competitor bids must have 
the following properties: 
1. The distribution must be continuous, and must have a domain that is bounded 
on the positive axis, so that only positive bid prices are modeled with a non-zero 
probability. 
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2. The shape of the distribution should be flexible by changing the parameters, so 
that market data can be fitted relatively easily. 
3. If a closed form expression for the CDF is not available, then the distribution 
should be numerically integrable in an eflScient manner. This is because a large 
number of bids might have to be submitted in a relatively short amount of time, 
and the process should not become computationally cumbersome. 
Considering the above factors, several distributions were available to this author. 
The selection of the beta and the gamma distributions from these was made solely 
on the basis of source code being readily available to integrate them [65]. However, 
the following is a list of some other distributions that might be good candidates for 
modeling competitor bids, provided that a suitable fit can be obtained for the market 
information. The primary source of information on the distributions described in the 
following sections is Probability Distributions [64], a compact booklet describing various 
distributions, their properties, and their potential appUcations. 
For all of the following distributions, similar shapes to those presented in Figures 3.4, 
3.5, 3.7, and 3.8 can be generated, with an appropriate choice of parameters. Thus, all 
of the following distributions satisfy the properties of the CDF, as well as resemble the 
bell shape of the normal distribution. 
3.9.1 The Pareto Distribution 
This distribution has a PDF of the following form: 
/(x;A:,q;) =-^ (3.35) jl 
where: 
a is a parameter, 
X > A: > 0. 
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The advantages of this distribution are that it is a relatively simple distribution to 
implement, and inherently bounds the variable x to be greater than k. This could be 
useful in the instances where participants have a good estimate of the lower (or upper) 
limit of the competing bids. Also, this distribution is widely used for modeling stock 
price fluctuations, personal incomes and other such empirical phenomena, and could 
prove to be a good model upon further study. 
3.9.2 The Exponential Distribution 
This distribution has a PDF of the following form: 
where: 
A is a parameter, 
X > 0. 
The advantage of this distribution is that it is relatively simple to implement. It is 
also a special case of the gamma distribution with the shape parameter a = 1. Its appli­
cations are usually in the field of lifetime studies. Applicability to economic phenomena 
such as the bid modeling area is yet to be studied. 
3.9.3 The Weibull Distribution 
This distribution has a PDF of the following form; 
where a > 0 and 6 > 0 are parameters, 
I > 0. 
The CDF of this distribution is not easily implemented. However, it provides extra 
flexibility over the exponential distribution. Its applications have been in the area of 
f ix:  A) = Ae"^ (3.36) 
f{x- ,a,b) = abx^ (3.37) 
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breaking strengths of materials and reliability-. Applicability to economic phenomena is 
yet to be studied. 
4 BROKERAGE SIMULATOR 
In Chapter 3, suboptimal bidding strategies were presented, which incorporate com­
peting bids in the form of distributions, and production costs, to calculate a bid price 
that maximized the lower bound to expected profit from the bid. In order to test these 
strategies and to develop additional strategies, we have developed a brokerage simulator, 
which is described in this chapter. The simulator consists of a bid matching module that 
performs the function of the broker. Various participants can be simulated by submit­
ting different bid data to the bid matching module. The results from the matching are 
made available to other modules that calculate the performance of the individual partic­
ipants based on the results of the bid matching process, which is a simulation of trading 
activit}'. Thus, an energy brokerage market is simulated, and from the outputs, the bid­
ding strategies of the participants can be evzJuated. Such a simulator could be used by 
the participants in a real energy brokerage for a variety of functions, such as evaluating 
their strategies, observing the outcomes of the strategic bidding activity, modeling the 
behaviors and strategies of key competitors, and training their energy traders. 
4.1 Rationale for Simulation 
The advantages of using a simulator for research purposes are as follows: 
• Strategies can be formulated and tested easily in the controlled environment of a 
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• Market data for future use can be generated by performing a few rounds of bro­
kerage simulation. Such market data may be difficult to obtain otherwise. 
• Market rules and structure can be modified easily in a simulator, thus allowing the 
extensive study of different strategies under different conditions. 
• Simulations help in understanding some of the intricate relationships and effects 
of various market factors on the effectiveness of strategies. 
Thus, there are several advantages in developing a brokerage simulator for research 
purposes. However, some difficulties exist when participants wish to use such a simulator 
as a tool to improve their performances in real life situations. These are discussed next. 
• Modeling all the rules of the energy brokerage market to the fullest extent is a 
difficult, time-consuming and ongoing job. Participants might not wish to invest 
the necessary development time and money required. An option might be to 
purchase an off-the-shelf product that offers flexibility in modeling various types 
of energy markets. It remains to be seen how much choice participants would have 
in such products, and how flexible the products would be. The development and 
enhancement costs could be distributed among a number of participants, in the 
case of such products. 
• Modeling competitors in the simulator would mean that participants should have 
some amount of intelligence on the past bidding histories of these competitors. 
Such intelligence could prove expensive, and its accuracy hard to estimate. An 
alternative would be to use publicly available transaction price information as a 
proxy to bid histories, and to modify this information heuristically if necessary. 
This approach was investigated with limited success in this research and results 
are reported in the next Chapter 5. 
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• The success of using past histories to guide future strategies is dependent on future 
market conditions being similar to those used in the development of the strategv". 
If this condition is not met, then the bid distributions used in deriving the results 
of Chapter 3 would be inaccurate, and perhaps render the strategy- to be of poor 
quality. This is a generic problem inherent in many trading strategies in other 
markets as well. Thus, peirticipants should consider the results from simulations 
in the light of current market conditions and up-to-date information. Performing 
simulations for a wide variety of system conditions could be one way of mitigating 
this problem. 
In spite of the above difficulties, usiug a simulator as a testing and development tool 
for real energy floor trading does have the same advantages as those listed for research 
purposes. In addition, such a simulator can also be used by participants for training 
purposes. A less likely, but possible use for such simulators would be by regulators to 
test various market structures and their effects on electricity prices, market power of 
individual participants, etc. 
4.2 Simulator Overview 
Figure 4.1 shows a functional overview of the different modules that constitute the 
brokerage market simulations performed to test the strategies developed in Chapter 3. 
Most of the modules shown in the figure were developed and implemented as part of 
this research. The main programming environment was C/C-l—h on a HP-9000 CllO 
Workstation. Some of the modules were also developed as Matlab v.4.0 m-files. The 
different modules interface through text input/output files, and are invoked and managed 
by Perl scripts. The use of Perl enhances the flexibility of the simulator. The free nature 
of Perl also adds to portability to different platforms. As nearly as possible, programming 
language usage conforms to .A.NSI standards. The compilers used were Gnu's gcc and 
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g-i-+. This further enhances portability- to various UXDC platforms. Porting to a PC 
platform has not been examined at this point. 
4.2.1 Bid Matching Module 
The bid matching module performs the function of the broker in an energy brokerage. 
The objective of the bid matching module is to match buy and sell bids in a manner such 
that the net savings (the difference between buy bid and sell bid) is maximized. In the 
simulator, it is implemented as a program written in C++. The inputs to the module 
are hourly bids to buy or sell energy, at a given price. The bids are in fixed block sizes 
(of say, 20 MW). The algorithm for bid matching is the high-low matching algorithm, 
commonly found in the literature for fast and simple implementations. In this algorithm, 
the buy bids are sorted in descending order, the sell bids are sorted in ascending order, 
and the highest buy bid is matched to the lowest sell bid, and so on. Matching stops 
when the current buy bid under consideration is less than the corresponding seU bid, 
i.e., no further savings are realized by matching. The bids that are not matched are 
considered rejected. This algorithm is equivalent to an LP solution in the absence of 
transmission constraints. In the presence of transmission, the solution is suboptimal. 
The following are the inputs to the bid matching module: 
1. Bids from company I interface 
2. Bids from bid builder module 
3. Bids from other bid sources 
The following is an example of a bid file. As long as the information shown in the 
bid file is present in the order shown, the bid matching module does not discriminate 
between bids from any of the above three sources. 
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Company_Name(Max 20 chars) 
cat 
Beg_Hr Eiid_lir Split/All #Blocks Qty Price Type 
1 1 Split 1 20 8.99 Buy 
1 1 Split 1 20 8.83 Buy 
1 1 Split 1 20 9.09 Sell 
1 1 Split 1 20 9.15 Sell 
The following axe the outputs from the bid matching module: 
• If transmission is not considered, the bid matching module produces the final 
match list. In this case, the outputs are: 
1. Individual match information files. 
One file is written for each participant. It contains all the matches that the 
participant was involved in, either as a buyer or as a seller, in each hour during 
the bidding period specified. The information contained includes buyer name, 
seller name, hour number, quantity bought/sold, and the transaction price. 
The transaction price is set at the average of the buy and the sell bids. This 
file is considered "private". In other words, when the simulator is upgraded 
for implementation on a relational database, this file can be accessed only by 
the concerned participant. 
2. Price and volume information files. 
One file is written for each hour in the bidding period. It contains the hour, 
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quantity and transaction price of ever>' match for that hour. No information 
is displayed regarding the buyer or seller. This information is considered 
"public", and may be accessed by all participants. 
3. Master output file for transmission evaluation. 
Even if transmission option is turned off, a file is produced containing all the 
information present in the individual match information files, for use by the 
transmission evaluation module if need be. A sample master output file is 
shown below. The information includes seller, buyer, hour number, block size 
in MW, transaction price, buy bid, and sell bid. 
cat Sell to: wings 1 20 9.04 16.62 12.83 
cat Sell to: swamp 1 20 9.09 15.22 12.155 
cat Sell to: swamp 1 20 9.15 14.58 11.865 
4. Output listing of the matching process 
A list file is produced containing number of bids submitted by each partic­
ipant, number of bids matched, and all transaction information, including 
any error messages. The purpose of this file is for debugging purposes, but 
the information can be used for purposes of evaluating market structure and 
performance. 
• If transmission is considered, the bid matching module only produces the master 
output file for transmission evaluation, and the output listing of the matching 
process. 
4.2.2 Transmission Network Module 
The transmission network modeling included in the brokerage simulator is of rudi­
mentary detail. This is because, at the time of developing this simulator, it is still not 
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cleax what the consensus model is going to be in the power industry for modeling trans­
mission pricing, available transmission capacity, loss allocation, etc. Thus, a verj* simple 
DC-power flow capabilitj* has been added with the view that when such a consensus 
model evolves in the market, this transmission network model can be upgraded to re­
flect current models. Currently, the module is implemented as a C+-I- program that 
can be invoked by the user if desired. Currently, the network module uses the master 
output data described above, and evaluates each match to detect thermal line flow eind 
economics violations. The following assumptions are made: 
1. Each participant has a preassigned bus in a fixed system network, which is the 
designated power injection bus for that participant. All transactions that result 
from bids are modeled as positive (negative) injections of the bid quantitj- at the 
seller's (buyer's) designated bus. 
2. Only thermzJ line limits are considered in the model. 
3. Matches (proposed transactions) from the bid matching module are considered in 
decreasing order of the magnitude of the resultant savings. If a match results in a 
violation of thermal limits, then it is rejected. 
4. The thermal limits are obtained from an input file. Under the current model, the 
thermal limits for all periods are assumed to be the same, and are assimied to in­
clude any previously scheduled transactions excluding those accepted by the broker 
through the bidding process. These transactions include any bilateral transactions 
entered into by participants. 
5. Transmission pricing is performed by the MW-mile method, wherein the resulting 
transmission charge is determined as the change in net MW-mile costs caused by 
the transaction. The net MW-mile costs are calculated as the sum of the product 
of the absolute value of line flows, the corresponding line's MW-mile tariff, and 
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its length in miles. The tariSs and the line lengths are assumed to be known in 
advance to the network module. Each line has its own unique MW-mile tariff. 
In this model, only one tariff is assumed for all times. However, it is a relatively 
simple task to provide the capability of multiple tariffs, one for each period, such 
as on-peak, off-peak, etc. 
6. If the transmission charge for a match is more than the savings resulting from the 
match, the match is rejected. 
7. Transmission charges from the final set of accepted matches are equally divided 
between the seller and the buyer. 
8. The assumption made regarding transmission charge allocation is that all fees are 
initially paid to the broker or some other entity, who disburses the charges to the 
appropriate owners. In other words, transmission charge allocation is not dealt 
with directly in the simulator. 
9. Transaction fees payable to the broker are not currently modeled in the simulator. 
While the above assumptions are admittedly very limiting to the capabilities of the 
network module, they have been made to simplify the implementation. If a more detailed 
network module were available to the participants, there is theoretically no reason why 
the current network module caimot be replaced by the more detailed module. 
The inputs to the network module are: 
1. The master output file from the bid matching module. 
2. Network data files with line reactance, line length, and MW-mile tariff information. 
The outputs from the network module are; 
1. Match information files that are written for each participant with details of trans­
actions that the participant was involved in. The following sample is an example 
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of the match information written by the network module. It contains informa­
tion regarding seller, buyer, hour, quantity, transaction price and transmission 
cost. For a seller, the price information represents revenue, and transmission cost 
information represents expenditure. For a buyer, both represent expenditure. 
Hour Qty Price TraasCost 
cat Sell to: wings 1 20 12.83 5. .35 
cat Sell to: swamp 1 20 12.155 3. ,775 
cat Sell to: farm 1 20 9.515 5. 14167 
2. Price information files for each hour containing limited details of all the matches 
that are approved for that hour. The following sample is from a price information 
file. If transmission is not modeled, then this file is written by the bid matching 
module, without the transmission price information. This data is considered public 
and may be accessed by all participants. 
Hour Quantity Price Transmission 
1 20 12.83 5.35 
1 20 12.155 3.775 
1 20 11.865 3.79167 
3. Accepted transaction files that are considered confidential and are not accessible by 
anyone except the broker or the independent transmission system operator (ISO) 
for evaluation purposes. The following is a sample from the accepted transactions 
file. 
cat Sell wings 1 20 9.04 16.62 12.83 
Energy Cost Savings = 151.6 
Transmission Costs = 5.35 
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cat Sell swamp 1 20 9.09 15.22 12.155 
Energy Cost Savings = 122.6 
Transmission Costs = 3.775 
4. Rejected transaction files which are considered confidential and are not accessi­
ble by anyone except the broker or the independent transmission system operator 
(ISO) for evaluation purposes. The following is a sample from the rejected trans­
actions file. 
cat Sell zoo 1 20 9.42 9.49 9.455 (Economics Don't Justify TransCosts) 
cat Sell zoo 1 20 9.45 9.47 9.46 (Economics Don't Justify TransCosts) 
5. As part of the output from the network module, the final line flows after the last 
accepted match for each hour are reported. The following is a sample from this 
data. 
Line Flow Data at the I end of Hour 1 
Flow from bus 0 to bus 1 is -94.6172 
Flow from bus 0 to bus 9 is 156.422 
Flow from bus 1 to bus 0 is 94.6172 
Flow from bus 1 to bus 2 is 187.112 
Flow from bus 2 to bus 1 is -187.112 
Flow from bus 2 to bus 3 is 125.092 
Flow from bus 2 to bus 25 is 39.0101 
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4.2.3 Bid Builder Module 
This module produces the competing participants' bids from production cost databases. 
These production cost databases are obtained from off-line unit commitments performed 
on competing companies' generating unit mixes. If the participants do not have an ac­
curate idea of the competing companies' generating unit characteristics, the production 
cost databases can be obtained from the best estimates that the peirticipants can make 
about the mixes. Since the unit commitment program used in this research is written 
in Matlab, the bid builder module is also implemented as a Matlab program. The in­
puts to this program are Matlab variables obtained from the base case unit commitment 
runs. Both buy and sell bids are obtained by performing repeated economic dispatches 
based on the base case unit commitment. The maximum energy that can be bought and 
sold in a given hour is determined from the minimum and maximum on-line generating 
capacities from the base case, and a fixed spinning reserve percentage input by the user. 
The output is the bid file in the format shown earlier in this section. 
4.2.4 Other Bid Sources 
This module is used when the participant wishes to model some other type of com­
petitor, whose behavior cannot be modeled accurately using the production cost model. 
Examples include power marketers, load aggregators, etc. So long as the other bid 
sources are capable of giving an output in the format shown for bids, the bid matching 
module will be able to accept the inputs. Currently, this feature is not used in the 
simulator, but adding this feature involves minimal work. 
4.2.5 Bid Development Module 
This module uses the bid distribution data, load data, production cost data and 
heuristics, and calculates the suboptimal bids for each block of energy that the pro-
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ductioa cost data file contains. The algorithms for finding the suboptimal bids are 
implemented as C++ programs invoking C functions. The following sections briefly de­
scribe the two kinds of bid development algorithms implemented: polynomial function 
based and incomplete-beta function based. 
4.2.5.1 Polynomial Modeling 
Suboptimal bids are determined as roots of Equations 3.17 and 3.20 for buy and 
sell bids respectively. Polynomial root finding is performed by Laguerre's method. Im­
plementation is by slightly modifying the functions laguer and zroots found in [65], and 
calling these functions from the bid development function repeatedly. Laguerre's method 
does return both real and complex roots for the polynomial, so the complex roots are 
eliminated in the modified version. Furthermore, the suboptimal bid is chosen by cal­
culating the lower bound to expected value of profit for each of the positive real roots, 
and picking the root that yields the maximum lower bound as the solution. Also, sanity 
checks are implemented where the suboptimal buy bids do not exceed the decremental 
cost, and the suboptimal sell bids are greater than or equal to the incremental cost. 
4.2.5.2 Incomplete-beta Modeling 
Suboptimal bids are determined by numerical maximization of the objective function 
given by Equations 3.27 and 3.28. The search range for the normalized suboptimal bid 
price is [0,1], by definition of the beta function^. Before the numerical maximization is 
performed, concavity conditions are tested by verifying that concavity conditions given 
by Equation 3.29 do not result in a range that is outside the allowable range for the 
normalized suboptimal bid price. If this is not the case, then numerical maximization 
will not result in a usable bid price, so the C++ program written for the incomplete-
^ There is a further reduction in the acceptable search range, which results from the sanity checks 
mentioned in the previous section. Thus the se3urch range is [0, for a buy bid and [^, 1] for a sell 
bid. 
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beta model defaults to marginal cost for a bid price, in the case when the concavity-
conditions are not met. If concavity conditions are not violated in the search range, then 
the numerical maximization is performed by using Brent's method for minimization, 
as presented in [65]. Brent's method in one dimension is a combination of parabolic 
interpolation and golden section search. It is a very fast and robust way to search for 
a local minimum in a given range, provided the range brackets such a local minimiiTn 
To use this method, the objective function to be maximized is multiplied by -1 before 
applying Brent's method. The specific C functions used from the book Numerical Recipes 
in C [65] are hrent for minimization, betai, betacf and gammln for calculation of the 
incomplete-beta integral. 
In addition, lower bounds to the probability of acceptance, and/or to the expected 
profit, can be specified manually by the user. If the suboptimal solution does not satisfy 
these lower boimds, then the program defaults the bid price to equal marginal cost. This 
was done to model the fact that participants need not always "trust" the suboptimal 
bidding algorithm to come up with a suitable bid price. 
4.2.6 Profit Calculation Module 
The profit calculation module is a program written in C++. It takes as inputs: the 
match files written by the network module (or the bid matching module if the transmis­
sion network module is not included), and the production cost data. Then it calculates 
the profits made by the participant for each hoxu". The net energy bought or sold by 
the participant, and the corresponding net revenue or expenditure, is first calculated 
by processing the match information. Then the production cost for the corresponding 
net sale/purchase blocks is determined from the production cost data. The difiierence 
between the two is the profit for that hour. The module then calculates the total profits 
for the bidding period by adding the profits from all hours. The output is a profit file. 
A sample of the profit file is shown below. It contains information on net number of 
blocks bought or sold, net expenditure, and net savings. 
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PROFIT INFORMATION 
Hour Blocks Type SavedCost AmtPaid Savings 
1 -10 1 -1843.40 -2092.90 249.500 
2 -8 1 -1476.00 -1505.80 29.8000 
3 -9 1 -1671.40 -1759.30 87.9000 
4 -12 1 -2239.40 -2502.00 262.600 
Total 18930.0 
4,2.7 Regression Analysis 
For polynomial modeling, regression analysis using Matlab provides estimates of 
the parameters of the competing bid distributions using the price data output by the 
network module (or the bid matching module). The data from the prices output files 
are first collated into appropriate categories, such as on-peak or off-peak hour prices 
by using Perl scripts. The user can select which hours are on-peak and which hours 
are off-peak. Then the resulting collated price files are sorted, and input to a Matlab 
function that constructs a cumulative relative frequency (CRF) histogram of the prices. 
This histogram is used as an approximation of the CDF of buy/sell bids. The user can 
select the number of bins in the histogram (which affects the accuracy of the curve fit). 
Then, the Matlab function polyfit is used to find a least-squares poljmomial fit of a user 
specified degree, to the relative frequency histogram. 
For incomplete-beta modeling, non-linear regression is required to fit an incomplete-
beta function to the CRP histogram. Such a function is available in the SPSS package. 
In this package, two options exist to perform the regression. One is the Levenberg-
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Marquardt algorithm and the second is the sequential programming algorithm. For the 
data used in this research, it was found that the sequential programming algorithm 
resulted in a better convergence to the parameter estimates. 
From the above two short descriptions, it can be seen that the regression analysis 
feature of this simulator is primarily obtained from external packages. If the participant 
desires, they could develop ciistom applications to suit their modeling needs. In this 
research however, the focus is on how to use the results from fitting distributions to 
simulator-generated market data, rather than on the fitting itself. So, the regression 
analysis implementation is of a rudimentary nature. 
4.2.8 Heuristics 
The distribution parameters obtained from the previous section use transaction prices 
as proxies to actual bid data, which are confidential. But based on the performance of the 
participant's strategies in initial rounds of bidding, it is possible that the participant has 
obtained some knowledge about the actual bid distribution. This market '^wisdom" has 
been aggregated and is functionally represented by the heuristics module in Figure 4.1. 
The heuristics may serve to modify both the distribution parameters, as weU as the 
bids themselves. The first kind of heuristics affects bids indirectly, and the second kind, 
directly. 
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5 SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In tliis chapter, the results of the simulations performed using the brokerage simula­
tor described in the previous chapter for various energy brokerage maxket scenarios are 
presented and analyzed. The simulations and the analyses presented are not proofs that 
the strategies developed here are correct, or that they work under all circumstances. 
In fact, they will not. Further, the scenarios presented are only a small subset of the 
complex possibilities that exist even in a market with as simple a structure as the one as­
sumed in this dissertation. The goal behind the simulations is primarily to examine some 
of the mechanisms by which the strategic bidding theory developed in Chapter 3 can 
be implemented with limited information, modified heuristically to compensate for the 
limited information, gmd tested. We cannot conclusively say that the strategies improve 
bidding performances under most scenarios until extensive simulations are performed for 
different market conditions. However, the simulations performed to date indicate that 
the bidding strategies theoretically developed can be implemented relatively easily, and 
show some promise of improving performances of participants. 
5.1 Simulator Use Overview 
The simulator itself is presented as a tool an individual participant could use to 
test their strategies before using them in actual bidding situations. This testing could 
proceed along the following steps: 
i i 
1. Generate off-line unit commitment and production costing simulations on own 
generating system. 
2. Prepare production cost data for competitors if detailed modeling data is available, 
or use "generic" numbers to generate competitor cost information. 
3. Use the bid-builder module to generate bids for own system, and competitors' 
systems, from the cost data and submit these bids to the bid-matching module. 
4. Perform bid-matching and profit calculation for each participant for the given 
bidding period. This is the "base-case" simulation, where all players bid their 
marginal costs. 
5. Use the transaction price data from the base-case simulation as public information, 
and generate approximations to bid distributions, using the regression module^ 
6. Use the bid distribution parameters to generate suboptimal bids for user's own 
system, by using one of the strategies developed in previous chapters. If need 
be, apply heuristic tuning to these bids (described later in this chapter) to com­
pensate for the errors in approximating bid distributions from transaction price 
distributions. 
7. Submit the suboptimal bids for user's own system to the bid matching module, 
while keeping all other bids the same. 
8. Evaluate profits from this new simulation against the base-case profits, to deter­
mine the effectiveness of the strategy. 
9. Translate any insights obtained into knowledge that can be used in the future. 
10. Repeat the procedure for various scenarios. 
^At present, regression is performed manually, by invoking SPSS or MATLAB. However, a future 
enhamcement of this simulator should include an automated module to perform regression "on-the-fly". 
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In the following sections, the simulations described were performed by using the 
simulator in a manner similar to that just described. 
Thus far in this chapter, we have focused on evaluating the profits made by the 
individual participants. However, the main motivation behind the regulatory changes 
occurring in the power industry seems to be reducing the prices that the rate-payers 
(or the customers) pay the producers. As of yet, it is unclear how the power companies 
propose to share the profits they might stand to make in the bulk power market with 
the end users. Indeed, it is not clear if a net decrease in electric rates would occur at all. 
Therefore, we make the distinction in this research, between improving the performance 
of the individual companies, and reducing electricity rates: the strategies developed and 
tested in this research focus on improving the profits of the individual companies that 
employ them. No effect is presumed or predicted on the price of electricity to the end 
user. 
5.2 Overview of the Test System 
This section briefly describes the test system used to run the simulations. The test 
system used in the simulations consisted of 8 companies, which are all assumed to be 
participants in the brokerage market. The eight systems are assmned to be utility­
like entities, in that they all own generating resources, and have to satisfy a native 
load. This is not a requirement, but was chosen for convenience. Further, it is assumed 
that the generating capacity of each participant is sufficient to satisfy its corresponding 
generating requirements, including a spinning reserve requirement of 15% of the hourly 
forecast load. This is verified for each system by performing a priority list based unit 
commitment^. The companies will be denoted by using numbers, as company 1 through 
company 8. Table 5.1 shows the company summary information, including number 
-The unit commitment program used is based on a priority list based progremi developed by Sridhar 
Kondragunta and enhanced by this author. It is implemented in Matlab. 
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of units, peak load, sum of maximum and minimum capacities assuming all units are 
online^. 
The relevance of the native load requirement is justified in the current transitional 
environment where traditional utilities are preparing for competitive markets, while still 
having to satisfy native load commitments. In the future, less regulated environments, 
the native load requirements will be replaced by firm generation contracts that are al­
ready in existence at the time the bidding decision is being made. Thus, the strategies 
developed in this research with the assiimption of an underlying "base-case" unit com­
mitment are still expected to be relevant and applicable. 
Table 5.1 Test system data - company summary information. 
Company Units Peak Load (MW) YlPmin (MW) EPmax (MW) 
1 16 2,050 770 2,940 
2 4 150 62 224 
3 14 1,775 1.018 2.523 
4 4 175 85 247 
5 22 5,025 3,150 7.182 
6 4 225 93 310 
7 4 100 50 134 
8 16 1,975 948 2,804 
Totals 84 11,475 6,176 16,364 
All participants are assumed to be bidding to buy and sell simultaneously in the 
brokerage market. This assumption is made so that no preconceived notions exist about 
the nature of the participants. 
In the first part of this chapter, the scenarios presented are simulations of the ef­
fects of strategies on the bidding performances of the participants, without modeling 
transmission. In the latter part, transmission is also included to a limited extent in the 
modeling. For these scenarios, the transmission system underlying the brokerage market 
is assimied to be the IEEE 30 bus reliability test system (lEEE-RTS), which has been 
^The assumption of all units being online is made only for presenting the data in the table, and not 
for the simulations. 
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slightly modified. The modifications are: 
• The slack bus has been renumbered to be bus 0, instead of bus 30. 
• The generators in the slack bus and bus 20 have been dropped. The slack bus 
generator has been dropped because the model used to calculate line flows is a 
DC power flow model, and so losses are not considered. The generator on bus 20 
has been dropped so that the total number of generators can be limited to 8, the 
number of participants in the system. Bus 20 was chosen because bus 19, in close 
proximity, is the designated bus of one of the companies. The resultant modified 
lEEE-RTS system is shown in Figure 5.1. 
• Only Y-bus data is used from the lEEE-RTS test system. All the generators shown 
in Figure 5.1 represent the entire generating system of each participant. 
The modifications were made for simplifying the transmission modeling, and for 
keeping the number of generating buses in the system to be equal to the number of 
participants. 
Further, for pricing purposes, all lines are assumed to have a length of 50 miles, and a 
MW-mile tariff of 0.01 $/MW-mile. These numbers were assumed because no economic 
data was available for the lEEE-RTS system. The magnitudes of the numbers used 
were chosen based upon trial and error simulations, such that the transmission price 
component of the transactions were approximately in the 4 range. This was 
within the range of currently posted transmission usage tariffs'^. 
5.3 Initial Calculations and Simulations 
In order to develop bid distributions from past bidding history, and to use these 
distributions to develop bids for the market, we needed some starting point for the 
"Tor example, Pemisylvania Power & Light tariffs range from 0.05 to 0.2 S/KW per day for reserving 
capacity, which translates to approximately 2 to 8 $/MWH. 
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strategies to use. Also, to consistently compare the performance of a particular strategy-
for diflferent participants, we needed a benchmark. In the following sections, such a 
"base case" was obtained by assuming that all the participants of the market operate 
under perfect competition assumptions. Thus, the bids submitted to the broker by the 
participants is simply their marginal cost/value of energy. This cost is obtained by using 
the Matlab-based bid-builder module, outlined in Section 4.2.3. This module uses a one-
week unit commitment as a basis for generating block-incremental and block-decremental 
production costs for each hour. 
Another possible approach for obtaining a benchmark is to perform a combined unit 
commitment of all the companies' units, serving the combined loads of the all companies. 
This would have resulted in the traditional pool-dispatch of the units, and provided a 
benchmark that considers the case that maximizes system savings, and reduces the 
system costs. However, we opted for the competition assumption, with individual unit 
commitments, for this research. 
The number of blocks bid for in each hour was determined by the minimum and 
maximum online capacity for that hour as scheduled by the unit commitment run, the 
native load for that hour, and the reserve requirements. The block-incremental/block-
decremental costs were obtained by running economic dispatches with and without the 
block being sold/bought, and using the difference in costs to cost the block. The resulting 
bids were used as a base-case bidding strategy for each participant. 
The base-case bids developed by the above module were processed by the bid-
matching software described in Section 4.2.1. The resulting transaction prices for each 
hour were considered to be the publicly available information to the participants. Based 
on this information, the participants were assumed to develop suboptimal bidding strate­
gies, using the results developed in this dissertation thus far. These bids were then 
submitted to the bid-matching module to evaluate the effectiveness of the particular 
strategy. 
83 
Table 5.2 shows the resultant profits of each of the companies from bidding according 
to various strategies, for a period of 168 hours. In the second column, labeled "INIT". the 
results shown are the profits from bidding marginal costs, in other words, this column 
represents the base case described in Section 5.3. In submitting the bids to the bid-
matching module, it was assumed that all the participants were bidding simultaneously 
to sell and buy energy. 
Table 5.2 Polynomial model - all-participant profits in $. 
Scenario 
Co. INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19,649 20.233 19,229 18,686 19,394 19.609 18,943 18,943 19,299 
2 19,212 19,244 21,505 19,213 19,243 19,212 19.321 19,253 19.212 
3 13,714 13,489 13,646 12,435 13.729 13,721 13,517 13,691 16,159 
4 8,118 8,118 8,135 8,118 9,166 8.117 8,113 8,118 8,119 
5 83,407 82,889 81,391 79,032 81.759 83,419 79,909 82,484 77,504 
6 36.440 36,441 36.609 36,441 36,441 36.441 40,906 36,506 36,441 
7 11,784 11.784 11,795 11,784 11,784 11,784 11,826 13,033 11,784 
8 17,644 17,468 17,524 17,524 17,596 17,648 17,428 17,583 16,916 
Tot. 209,969 209,730 209,835 205,966 209,112 209,953 209,967 209,969 204,577 
An examination of the match information after the fact, however, showed that com­
panies 2 and 5 were predominantly selected by the module to be sellers, while the other 
companies were primarily buyers, in most of the hours. 
5.4 Polynomial Model 
In this section, simulations from using the polynomial modeUng results developed in 
Section 3.4 are presented. Using the transaction prices data generated from the base-
case simulations above, a cumulative relative frequency (CRF) curve of the prices was 
obtained. The prices were divided into on-peak and oflf-peak prices, using Perl scripts to 
collate the data into appropriate hours. In these simulations, hours 8 through 22 were 
assumed to be on-peak for each day, with the other hours being classified as off-peak. 
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This was done follow-ing current power industrj- convention^. Then, a MATLAB script 
was used to curve-fit a 20th degree polynomial to the on-peak and oflf-peak CRF curves. 
Thus, two different polynomials were used to model on-peak and off-peak periods. These 
polynomials are approximations to the CDF of transaction prices occurring in the mar­
ket. In the absence of any information on the actual bids that resulted in these prices, 
this research attempts to use the CDF as proxies for the bid distributions themselves. 
The resulting bids then can be subjected to heuristics, which are attempts to guess more 
closely, the actual bid distributions. 
As an initial step, bids were developed that do not involve any heuristics. In other 
words, the coefficients of the polynomial obtained are directly assumed to be the coef­
ficients of Equation 3.14. Following this. Equation 3.17 was solved for each bid block, 
using the associated generating cost determined by the bid-builder module, and the 
coefficients of the polynomial. Thus, for each block that the participant bids, a suboi>-
timal solution was obtained from the results developed in Section 3.4. The calculations 
were performed by a C-f-+ program on a HP CllO workstation, and the approximate 
execution time for the largest company, company 5, was 192 CPU seconds. This exe­
cution time was for suboptimal bid calculations for the 168 hour period, and involved 
the pricing of 18,429 blocks. The execution time for the other, smaller companies was 
substantially lower. Thus, the required calculations can be performed very efficiently in 
a relatively short period of time. 
Columns 3 through 11 in Table 5.2, labeled "1-SUB", "2-SUB", etc., represent profits 
from bidding scenarios where each company was in turn assumed to use the suboptimal 
strategy, while the other companies were assimied to submit the same bids as in the base 
case, i.e., the marginal cost based bids. Thus, the column labeled "1-SUB" represents 
the case where only company 1 was assumed to be bidding suboptimally. To evaluate 
®Some utilities use hours 7 through 22 as on-peak, while others use "shoulder" hours between on-
and off-peak hours. 
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the effectiveness of the strategy", we compare the profits in row 1 of this column to the 
corresponding profits in row 1 of the column labeled "INIT". From this comparison, we 
can see that there is an increase in the profits of company 1 when compared to the base 
case. The other numbers in the column labeled "1-SUB" represent the profits of the other 
companies for this scenario. Table 5.3 summarizes the results from these simulations. In 
this table, the column labeled "INIT" is identical to the column in Table 5.2 of the same 
label. The third column, labeled "SUBOPT" contains the profits from the scenarios 
when the company corresponding to the row label, uses the suboptimal strateg}-. In 
other words, this column shows the diagonal elements of the section of Table 5.2, from 
columns 3 through 11. 
Table 5.3 Polynomial model -
suboptimal bidding 
profits in $. 
Scenario 
Company INIT SUBOPT 
1 19,649 20,233 
2 19.212 21.505 
3 13,714 12,435 
4 8,118 9,166 
5 83,407 83,419 
6 36,440 40,906 
7 11,784 13,033 
8 17,644 16,916 
Comparing the numbers in each row of this column with the corresponding row of 
column 2 of the same table, we can see the effect of the strategy on the bidding profits of 
the company. It can be seen that with the exception of companies 4 and 8, the strategy 
resulted in an increase in bidding profits for all the other companies. 
Upon examination of the bids, it was observed that all the suboptimal sell bids 
were greater than or equal to the base-case bids, and all the suboptimal buy bids were 
less than or equal to the base case. This implies that the suboptimal bid development 
86 
algorithm works correctly, by determining a mark-up/mark-down on the marginal cost 
for the selling/buying decisions. Also, upon examination of the matches, it was observed 
that for all the companies, the number of bids matched was lower than in the base case. 
This is also not surprising, since the bid-matching module only matches a pair of buy 
and sell bids if a positive savings results. Adding mark-ups/mark-downs would move 
the supply and demand curves closer to each other, thus resulting in lower volume. 
The structure of the market is such that, if this mark-up/mark-down is too high/low, 
then the bid stands the risk of being rejected in favor of competing bids. Now, the com­
peting bids are represented by an approximation to their probability- distribution, and 
so the negative effects of the strategy can be explained by the fact that the distributions 
do not represent the competing bids well for that particular participant. The fact that 
the same strategy, using the same distribution, resulted in an increase in profits for 6 of 
the 8 companies can be explained by one of the following two reasonings: 
• Errors in the assimied distribution of competing bids were such that the resulting 
suboptimal bids were shifted in the direction that increased probability of accep­
tance, so that, while bidding profits were reduced, bid acceptances were not. 
• Errors in the assimaed distribution did result in increased bid rejections in favor 
of competing bids, but the production cost structure of the participant was such 
that, in spite of this effect, there was a net increase in profits. 
Because of the large amount of data generated by the simulator, it is hard to un­
derstand clearly which effect predominates for each participant. However, the results 
indicate that the suboptimal strategy does result in some improvements of profits even 
for the rather simplistic modeling used here. It would be of interest to see the effect of 
detailed past-history modeling, perhaps using a distribution for each hour in the sim­
ulation period of 168 hours, on the effectiveness of the strategy. But such a study is 
beyond the scope of the time and resources available to this author. 
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However, the following attempt was made to implement a heuristic modification 
of the suboptimal bid. The main reasoning behind this heuristic is that, since the 
suboptimal bids resulted in mixed results, both an increase and a decrease in profits, 
there may be some merit in averaging the bid prices obtained from suboptimal bidding 
and the base-case bids. Such a heuristic can be seen as the action of a participant who 
wishes to lessen the negative effects of the errors in bid distribution. This action was 
performed, and once again 168 hours of bidding was performed for scenarios where each 
of the companies, in turn, subnoitted the average values to the bid-matching module. 
Table 5.4 shows the results from these simulations. The data is shown in a format similar 
to that of Table 5.2, with the columns labeled "1-SUB", "2-SUB", etc., now representing 
results from bidding the average of the suboptimal and base-case values. The diagoneil 
elements of the new columns are summarized in column 3 of Table 5.5. Comparing 
this column with column 2 of the same table, it can be seen that the strategic bidding 
results uniformly in an increase in profits for all the companies, when compared to the 
base case. 
Table 5.4 Modified polynomial model - all-participant profits in $. 
Scenario 
Co. INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19.649 19,931 19,417 19,011 19,493 19,608 19,273 19,451 18,683 
2 19,212 19,227 20,320 19,212 19,221 19,212 19,263 19,227 19,212 
3 13,714 13,618 13,689 14,103 13,749 13,726 13,618 13,708 15,247 
4 8,118 8,152 8,127 8,118 8,465 8,117 8,117 8,118 8,119 
5 83,407 83,123 82,380 80,703 82,426 83,423 81,674 82,964 79,794 
6 36,440 36,440 36,521 36,440 36,441 36,441 38,690 36,454 36,440 
7 11,784 11,784 11,785 11,784 11,784 11,784 11,792 12,433 11,784 
8 17,644 17,547 17,593 19,190 17,631 17,643 17,537 17,611 18,667 
Tot. 209,969 209,825 209,835 208,565 209,212 209,958 209,967 209,969 207,949 
Whether the above heuristic is the best one for each company can only be determined 
by performing extensive simulations of different scenarios for each company. But the 
analysis presented here is to show that heuristic tuning of suboptimal bids is possible for 
polynomial modeling. The heuristic suggested here is that of averaging the suboptimal 
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bid with the marginal cost. This action can be interpreted as the actions of a company 
that is aware of the limitations of the information used by the strategy, and attempts 
to compensate by making the bid "more conservative" by averaging it with the most 
conservative bid (from the point of view of acceptance probabilities) - the marginal 
cost. This action could be further refined by using a weighted average of the two bids, 
instead of a simple average. The actual weights could be tested by trial and error, and 
simulation. Again, such a task is very time consuming and has not been pursued in this 
research. Future research in this direction could prove interesting. 
Polynomial modeling thus seems to be a promising way to include market information 
into the bidding process. It is a relatively fast, and conceptually simple way to model 
competitors, and the preliminary simulations shown in this section indicate that when 
heuristically tuned, the bids determined in this way can improve upon the marginal cost 
bidding benchmark. 
Table 5.5 Modified Polynomial 
model - suboptimai 
bidding profits in $. 
Company 
Scenario 
INIT MODSUB 
1 19,649 19.931 
2 19,212 20.320 
3 13,714 14.103 
4 8,118 8,465 
5 83.407 83,423 
6 36,440 38,690 
7 11.784 12,433 
8 17,644 18,667 
Even though it has its has advantages, some disadvantages were discovered in poly­
nomial modeling. These are summarized as follows: 
• A relatively high degree (20) polynomial was required before a reasonable fit to 
the CRF curve could be obtained. This results in multiple values for suboptimai 
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bids, which must be evaluated. 
• Because of the fact that a polynomial fit does not always satisfy the property of 
the CDF that requires it to be between 0 and 1, erratic solutions sometimes result. 
This is especially true when probabihty of acceptance is close to zero (sell bid price 
is high or buy bid price is low). Thus, sanitj" checks may have to be implemented 
to ensure that the bid prices resulting from the model make physical sense. 
• Since the polynomial model does not have a standard shape associated with it. 
heuristics are hard to develop that could take advantage of other market infor­
mation, such as high and low bids, most likely bid, etc., should such information 
become available to the participant. 
The above disadvantages do not exist, at least theoretically, for incomplete-beta 
modeling. The next section outlines the implementation and testing of that model. 
5.5 Incomplete-Beta Model 
Using the CRF curves generated from the base-case transaction prices, incomplete-
beta function curve fits were obtained. As in the previous section, the prices were again 
divided into on-peak and off-peak prices. The curve fit was achieved by using SPSS 
version 6.1.1, on a DEC Alpha workstation. The nonlinear regression required for the 
curve fit was achieved by using the sequential programming option in the package. This 
option was found to have better convergence properties than the Levenberg-Marquardt 
algorithm option. Based on this curve fit, two sets of coefficients were obtained, one 
each for on-peak and off-peak price distributions. These values were substituted into 
Equations 3.27 and 3.28 which are the objective functions of the buyer and the seller 
respectively. The value for m, the maximum likely bid were assumed to be the value of 
the maximum of the transaction prices occurring in the on-peak or off-peak periods. The 
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resulting expression was numerically maximized® by searching between 0 and 1 for the 
normalized suboptimal bid, that maximizes the objective function. The numerical max­
imization, and the required integration of the incomplete-beta function were performed 
by invoking C functions available in [65]. The maximization algorithm was a modified 
minimization algorithm known as Brent's method. Generating suboptimal bids for the 
largest company, company 5, took only 15 CPU seconds on the HP CllO workstations. 
Thus, the suboptimal bid development implementation using incomplete-beta model is 
very eflBcient, compared to the polynomial model. 
The resulting bids were assumed to be submitted by each company, in turn, to the 
bid-matching module. The profits from the simulations of various scenarios, similar to 
those described in the pre\'ious section, are shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Incomplete-beta weekly model - all-participant profits in $. 
Co* 
Scenario 
INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19,649 1.306 18.060 18,303 18,859 43.906 16,595 18,073 18.439 
2 19,212 19,017 27,393 19,166 19,252 16.392 19,647 19.371 19.141 
3 13,714 12,482 13,330 4,503 14,054 6,748 12.789 13.397 17,801 
4 8.118 8,056 8,373 8,042 9,786 5,480 8,652 8,240 8,020 
3 83,407 94,524 73,954 77,630 79,491 41,130 65,053 77.737 75,413 
6 36,440 36,087 36,854 36,329 36,440 31,453 53,597 36.784 36,313 
7 11,784 11,648 11,816 11,777 11,784 10,778 11,838 17,620 11,752 
8 17,644 16,020 17,100 21,784 17,975 7,609 16,642 17,263 7,085 
Tot. 209,969 199,143 206,884 197,537 207,644 163,500 204,816 208,488 193,966 
The sxmimary of the data in this table is shown in Table 5.7, in column 3, labeled 
"WEEKLY". Column 1 of this table shows the profits from the base case simulation 
described in the previous section. By the comparing the corresponding elements of the 
two columns in each row, we can see the effect of the strategy on the bidding profits 
of the participants. Unlike the polynomial modeling case, incomplete-beta modeling by 
assuming weekly classification of price periods results in negative effects on the profits 
®Before maximization was performed, the concavity conditions presented in Section .A..2.2 were 
checked 
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of companies 1, 3, 5 and 8. The profits of the other companies shows an increase over 
the base case. 
Further, it can be seen from columns 3 and 7 of Table 5.6, that when one of the 
predominantly selling companies 1 and 5 employ the suboptimal strategj-, the other 
company has an increase in profits. Upon examination of the matches (not shown), it 
was found that this was because the incomplete-beta model parameters imder-estimated 
the bids of the competing company, and thus resulted in a large number of bids being 
rejected by the bid-matching module for the company employing the strategy. This 
resulted in the other company virtually cornering the mcirket for energy, leading to 
the observed profit distributions. These results suggested that perhaps the suboptimal 
bidding model was not detailed enough in terms of modeling different distributions of 
competing bids for different periods. 
Table 5.7 Incomplete-beta weekly 
model - suboptimal 
bidding profits in S. 
Company 
Scenario 
INIT WEEKLY 
1 19,649 1,306 
2 19,212 27,393 
3 13,714 4.503 
4 8,118 9.786 
5 83,407 41,130 
6 36,440 53,597 
7 11,784 17,620 
8 17,644 7,085 
Based on the results observed, the next step was to incorporate a more-detailed bid 
distribution model. The base-case transaction prices were now divided into 7 different 
days of the week, which were further sub-divided into on-peak and off-peak prices, and 
CRFs were constructed. These CRFs were then curve-fitted with incomplete-beta func­
tions, using SPSS. Thus, we now modeled 14 different sets of incomplete-beta function 
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parameters in the 168 hour simulations. The profits from the simulations are sho\\Ti in 
Table 5.8, and are summarized in column 3 of Table 5.9, labeled "DAILY". It can be 
observed from the latter table, that the negative effects on profits persist for companies 
1, 3, 5, and 8, although the magnitude of this effect is less compared to the weekly model 
(column 3, labeled "WEEKLY"). Also, the increase in profits for the other companies 
is more than in the case of weekly modeling. 
Table 5.8 Incomplete-beta daily model - all-participant profits in S. 
Co. 
Scenario 
INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19,649 3,833 18,160 18,153 18,983 43,803 16,804 18,122 18,234 
2 19,212 19,017 29,148 19,147 19,252 16,551 19,627 19.365 19.122 
3 13,714 12,594 13,388 8.068 13,977 9,000 12,996 13,445 17,602 
4 8,118 8,059 8,352 7,997 10,382 5,625 8,577 8,232 7.987 
5 83,407 94,430 74,099 78,085 79.757 42,429 65,185 77,747 76,097 
6 36,440 36,085 36,854 36,291 36,440 31,683 56,474 36,784 36,282 
7 11,784 11,647 11,816 11,777 11,784 10,848 11,838 18,375 11.741 
8 17,644 16,121 17,090 21,833 17,854 9,576 16,728 17,321 12,121 
Tot. 209,969 201,790 208,909 201,356 208,433 169,519 208,233 209,394 199,189 
Table 5.9 Incomplete-beta daily models - subop­
timal bidding profits in $. 
Co. 
Scenario 
INIT DAILY AVERAGE SPREAD 
1 19,649 3,833 9,899 20,310 
2 19,212 29,148 24,782 24,472 
3 13,714 8,068 13,483 12,915 
4 8,118 10,382 10,274 9,816 
5 83,407 42,429 80,097 84,418 
6 36,440 56,474 47,778 47,310 
7 11,784 18,375 15,371 15.428 
8 17,644 12,121 18,180 17,421 
This suggests that a more detailed model for competing bid distributions could im­
prove the effectiveness of the suboptimal strategy. It would be possible to explore this 
procedure further by incorporating an even more detailed model, for example, several 
more than just two price periods per day. However, collating prices, and obtaining 
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incomplete-beta function fits to CRFs is currently implemented manually, cmd is a some­
what laborious process even for the less detailed models presented so far. So, we did not 
attempt to study very detailed price period models. 
In spite of the apparent improvement in the effectiveness of the strategy, we can still 
implement heuristics to further fine tune the suboptimai bids. The first kind of heuristic 
attempted was identical to the one presented for the polynomial model, i.e., averaging 
the suboptimai bids with the base-case bids. Results from using these average bids in 
simulations are shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 Incomplete-beta average model - all-participant profits in S. 
Scenario 
Co. INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19.649 9,899 18.820 18,670 19,331 33,742 17,961 18,764 18,465 
2 19,212 19,042 24,782 19,169 19,244 17,544 19,450 19,315 19,158 
3 13,714 12,523 13,536 13,483 13,666 9,138 13,328 13,621 16,539 
4 8,118 8,045 8,167 8,050 10,274 6,660 8,145 8,116 8,040 
5 83,407 92,906 78,651 79,968 81,537 80,097 74,267 80,552 78,726 
6 36,440 36,126 36,759 36,347 36,440 33,405 47,778 36.681 36,349 
7 11,784 11,657 11,815 11,777 11,783 11,183 11,838 15,371 11,760 
8 17,644 16,103 17,347 20,492 17,535 10,004 17,172 17,510 18,180 
Tot. 209,969 206,304 209,880 207,959 209,813 201,777 209,944 209,934 207,221 
Here, each company is assumed to (in turn) bid the average of the bids obtained by 
the suboptimai bidding strategy using daily incomplete-beta function models, and the 
base case, marginal cost bids. The data shown is in the usual format, and is summarized 
in column 4 of Table 5.9. 
By comparing this column with columns 2 and 3 of the earlier Table 5.7, and coliman 
3 of Table 5.9, it can be observed that while the negative effects still persist for company 
1, 3, and 5, the magnitude of this effect is markedly reduced. Company 8 now shows 
an increase in profits. The other companies continue to show an increase in profits. 
Thus, the heuristic does decrease the negative effects of the strategy. This averaging 
can once again be interpreted as the action of a participant who wishes to submit a 
more conservative bid. In fact, this interpretation is supported by the decrease in the 
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magnitude of the increase of profits of companies 2, 4, 6 and 7, when compeired to their 
performances without employing the heuristic. In other words, these companies now 
submitted needlessly conservative bids, and lost some the benefits from the suboptimal 
strategy. Achieving the right balance of conservatism and strategy thus is a key to 
designing the best strategy for a company. Such a balance could be possibly discovered 
by performing extensive simulations for a variety of scenarios. 
The above heuristic, while attractive in its simplicity, fails to incorporate one other 
advantage of incomplete-beta modeling. This advantage is the fact that the relatively 
small number of parameters of the model (3), suggest a direct way of compensating for 
the errors introduced by using transaction prices as a proxy for the buy and the sell 
bids of competitors. To investigate this advantage further, we need to investigate the 
sensitivity of the suboptimal bid to changes in the parameter values. Unfortunately, no 
closed form solution exists for the maximum of the objective function given by Equa­
tions 3.27 and 3.28. Therefore, mathematical sensitivities to parameters are hard to 
derive. However, numerical calculations can be performed to examine the behavior of 
the suboptimal solution as a function of the three parameters of the incomplete-beta 
model. These parameters are the shape parameters, a and 6, of the incomplete-beta 
function, and the estimated maximum likely bid, m which is used to normalize the 
search space for the suboptimal bid. Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 show the variation of the 
suboptimal bid with m, a, and b respectively. 
From these figures, it can be seen that the suboptimal bids for both a buyer and a 
seller increase with an increase in m and a, while the bids decrease with an increase in 
h. Now, the participant can use these properties to directly adjust the suboptimgJ bids, 
instead of taking averages with the base-case bids. Using the sensitivity of the bid to 
the parameters a and h will involve changing the curve fit obtained by regression, and 
is a more complex operation to interpret physically. This was not attempted in this 
research. 
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Figure 5.2 Sensitivity of suboptimal solution to m. 
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Figure 5.3 Sensitivity of suboptimed solution to a. 
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Figure 5.4 Sensitivity of suboptimal solution to b. 
The peirameter m, however, is a normalizing factor, and can be interpreted as the 
participant's estimate of the largest bid that could occur in the competing bid distri­
bution. Now, we assume that the participant uses transaction prices to obtain a and 
b through regression. Then, instead of using the largest occurring transaction price to 
directly represent m, as in the previous cases, the participant changes m as follows: 
the values for m for the buy bid distributions are all increased by 4 S/MWH, and the 
values for m for the sell bid distributions are decreased by 5 S/MWH. In other words, 
the participants would like to impose the heuristic tuning that there is a 9 $/MWH 
spread between the highest possible buy bid and the highest possible sell bid (since m 
is the normalizing factor for the sell bid case also, we still interpret it as the highest 
possible sell bid, and not the lowest possible sell bid). The particular numbers were 
chosen by (unfairly) looking at bid data and selecting the adjustment to be close to the 
actual bid distributions. However, it is reasonable to expect that a participant with 
some experience with the market, or some form of market intelligence, would have an 
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opinion of the magnitude of this spread, and could include this opinion into the heuristic 
tuning by adjusting m as above. The effect of this adjustment would be to increase the 
suboptimal buy bids and to decrease the suboptimal sell bids. In other words, the par­
ticipant's strategy now is modified to recognize a "stronger" competition than reflected 
by transaction prices alone. 
Such modifications in the vjdues of the parameter m were made, and the suboptimal 
bids were generated for each company. The resulting sell/buy bids displayed the expected 
decrease/increase. These bids were submitted to the bid-matching module, in turn, and 
the results from the bidding are shown in Table 5.11. These results cire summarized in 
column 6 of the earlier Table 5.7. Upon comparison of the values in this column with the 
corresponding values in column 1, it can be seen that the strategy results in an increase 
in profits over the base case for all the companies except company 3 and company 8. 
This shows that it is possible to directly modify the bids generated by the suboptimal 
strategy by adjustments the parameters of the bid distribution heuristically. The fact 
that the strategy still resulted in a decrease of profits for company 3 and company 8 can 
be explained by the reasoning that the adjustments were not suflBcient in those cases to 
mitigate the effect of rejected bids. 
Table 5.11 Incomplete-beta spread model - all-participant profits in $. 
Scenario 
Co. INTT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 19,649 20,310 18,845 18,836 19,335 19,665 18,033 18,701 18,505 
2 19,212 19,252 24,472 19,212 19,249 19,118 19,471 19,325 19,212 
3 13,714 13,309 13,505 12,915 13,680 13,483 13,272 13,603 15,860 
4 8,118 8,220 8,161 8,117 9,816 8,076 8,173 8.115 8,119 
5 83,407 82,899 78,952 79,694 81,624 84,418 74,673 80,518 78,255 
6 36,440 36,435 36,775 36,440 36,441 36,225 47,310 36,713 36,440 
7 11,784 11,783 11,816 11,784 11,784 11,756 11,838 15,428 11,784 
8 17,644 17,334 17,295 19,828 17,567 17,202 17,110 17,497 17,421 
Tot. 209,969 209,543 209,824 206,829 209,498 209,947 209,884 209,902 205,598 
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5.6 Variations on Competitor Strategies 
In the previous sections, each competing company was assumed to bid its marginal 
cost, while the company selected to be Company I in the simulation was assumed to bid 
strategically. This assimaption was made to see clearly the effectiveness of the strategy 
on a particular participant's performance, given that the bidding of the competitors 
remains essentially unchanged. This approach can be justified as a "first approximation" 
solution, in the absence of any knowledge of competitor behaviors. Thus, such a strategv* 
can be tested by simulation even in the absence of any other information except a set 
of recent transaction prices that are expected to repeat^. However, if approximate 
production cost data is available for competitors, it is conceivable that some companies 
would model their competitors' bids in a more complex manner than assumed in the 
previous sections. For example, company 1 might wish to model the key competitor for 
selling, company 5, as a player who also employed the suboptimal bidding strategy that 
company 1 itself uses. Alternatively, buying companies may model selling company bids 
by incorporating a suboptimal strategy, while testing their own bidding strategies for 
buying. 
An exhaustive analysis of all possible combinations is too time consuming to be 
performed within the scope of this research. However, a set of "extreme case" simulations 
were performed. In these simulations, each company was assumed to use the data from 
the base-case simulation to generate suboptimal bids by using each of the strategies 
illustrated above by simulations. These bids were simultaneously used to test the relative 
effectiveness of these strategies, the results are shown in Table 5.12. 
The arrangement of results in this table is similar to the earlier tables showing all the 
participant' profits. The second column, labeled "INIT" shows the profits from the base 
^If such a set is unavailable, participants could use a forecast of transaction prices. Although this 
seems like uncertain information on which to base bidding, traditionally, utilities have based unit 
commitment models on forecasted loads. Therefore, the problem of imcertainty in supply eind demsuid 
conditions is not new. 
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case simulation. The subsequent columns labeled "POL" and "POL-AV, stand for the 
cases where all participants submit, respectively, suboptimal bids from the polynomial 
model, and the polynomial model with averaging heuristics employed. Columns 5, 6, 
7 and 8 show the results when all participants submit suboptimal bids generated by 
employing, respectively, the incomplete-beta strategy with the weekly model, the daily 
model, the daily model with averaging heuristics, and the daily model with the assumed 
spread in the parameter m. These are labeled "BET-WKL", "BET-DLY", "BET-AV~% 
and "BET-SPR", respectively. 
Table 5.12 Simultaneous strategy simulations - all-participant profits in $. 
Co. 
Scenario 
INIT POL POL-AV BET-WKL BET-DLY BET-AV BET-SPR 
1 19,649 16,059 17,480 4,016 7,478 14.980 14,704 
2 19,212 21,720 20,421 21,180 24,888 22,833 24,944 
3 13,714 16,284 15,977 34 697 7.547 14,982 
4 8,118 9,337 8,526 1,246 4,583 8,437 10,264 
5 83,407 62,965 71,966 30,062 34,110 66,409 55,391 
6 36,440 41,060 38,750 42,333 49,413 43,840 47,577 
7 11,784 13,140 12,462 16,553 17,420 14,634 15,857 
8 17,644 20,730 20,508 282 635 8,578 19,076 
Tot. 209,969 201,300 206,092 115,711 139,227 187,262 202,798 
It can be seen from this table that the effects of the strategies on individual, as 
well as total profits in the system is far more complex than in the case when only one 
participant is assumed to be using the strategy. 
In the case of the polynomial strategies, using the polynomial strategy increases the 
profits of all the predominantly buying participants, companies 2,3,4,6,7 and 8, when 
compared to the base case profits of column 1. Companies 2 and 5, the primary sellers 
in the system, lose profits, when compared to the base case. For the polynomial strategy 
with heuristic tuning, the general pattern of improving individual profits upon heuristic 
tuning is not observed. Compared to the base case, profits for the buyers, companies 
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 are still higher. Profits for the sellers, companies 1 and 5 are lower 
than the base case, but are not as low as without heuristic tuning. Also, total system 
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profits for the strategic bidding cases are not as high as in the base case. This is 
understandable, since the base case is the case where all players bid marginal costs, and 
such a solution is the optimal solution from the point of view of total system savings. 
However, as we improve the bidding strategies heuristically, we find that the totai system 
profits do increase. This can be interpreted as the market participants learning to guess 
competitor's behavior better, and thus the total system profits move towards the base 
case of perfect competition. 
Comparing the incomplete-beta models with the base case, we find a similar situation, 
with the buyers, in general, improving their performances with strategic bidding, at the 
expense of the sellers. Again, as we improve the detail of the modeling, firom weekly 
model, to daily model, to daily model with averaging and finally to daily model with a 
spread assumed, we find that total system profits improve towards the base case. 
While it is interesting to observe that the simultaneous strategies trend towards the 
perfectly competitive base case, the goal of the strategies, £Lnd the function of the simu­
lator is not to achieve competitive equilibrium. Instead, it is to test the effectiveness of 
each strategy in enhancing the performance of an individual participemt, under various 
conditions. This can be seen by comparing the columns labeled "POL-AV" and "BET-
SPR", the most "sophisticated" strategies studied in this section, with the base-case 
column, labeled "INIT". Clearly, although the total system profits approach the com­
petitive levels in all three cases, the distribution of profits among the market participants 
is different in each case. Thus, the effectiveness of the strategy has been different for each 
player. Also, in performing these simulations, it has been assumed that each participant 
uses the same bid distributions, with the same heuristic tuning, to calculate the subop-
timal bids. This might not occur in real life situations. Therefore, the simulations and 
analyses presented in this section are not an exhaustive or even realistic representation 
of real-life scenarios. Rather, they are simplified versions, that could be improved upon 
by participants, if they so desire, by including detailed models for competitors, and by 
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performing a nmnber of simulations. 
5.7 Effects of the Transmission Network Module 
In this section, the results of simulations are presented, which included transmission 
network modeling to a limited extent, as outlined in Section 4.2.2. The companies 
modeled in this section so far were now assumed to be sited at the various generating 
buses, as shown in the earlier Figure 5.1. Four sets of simulations were performed, under 
two different line loading assumptions. 
5.7.1 Light Line Loading Conditions 
Under the first assumption, the maximum allowable flow on each line in the system 
- was assumed to be 200 MW. This assumption implies a relatively lightly loaded trans­
mission system. In other words, if a flow of more than 200 MW occurred in any of the 
lines as a result of a match, this match would be rejected. For this assumption, two sets 
of simulations were performed. One simulation was a repeat of the base-case simulation 
of the previous sections, with participants bidding marginal costs. The other set of sim­
ulations involved the participants (in turn) submitting the suboptimal bids developed 
by assuming a modified parameter m for the incomplete-beta modeling, which was dis­
cussed in the last part of the previous section. The results are shown in Table 5.13, and 
are arranged in the usual fashion. 
It can be seen from column 1 of this table that the base-case profits of all the com­
panies were less than the base-case profits when transmission was not considered. The 
results are summarized in Table 5.14. In this table, profits from bidding the base case 
and from bidding the strategic bids, are shown in columns 2 and 3, labeled "INIT-
LGT" and "SPR-LGT" respectively. A comparison of the two columns shows the effect 
of employing the suboptimal bidding strategy with heuristic tuning of the distribution 
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Table 5.13 Light line loading - all-participant profits in S. 
Scenario 
Co. INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 7.798 8,083 68,32 7,800 7,840 7.908 6.081 6,922 7,808 
2 12.462 12.460 18.432 12.462 12,469 12,395 11,309 11,944 12,462 
3 1.137 829 917 1,104 1,101 1,137 977 1,093 1,140 
4 167 180 181 167 44 160 36 166 167 
5 21.446 20,879 16,830 21.460 21.445 21,656 14,703 18,427 21.482 
6 10.876 10.820 10.279 10.848 10,876 10.629 15,219 11.594 10.875 
7 5.847 5.883 5.731 5.875 5,847 5,827 5,995 9,226 5,847 
8 2,356 2,213 2,261 2,350 2,270 2,356 1,077 2,139 2,356 
Tot. 62,091 61,352 61,466 62,069 61,895 62,071 55,400 61,514 62,141 
Table 5.14 Transmission modeling - suboptimal bidding 
profits in $. 
Co. 
Scenario 
INIT-LGT SPR-LGT INIT-HVY SPR-HVY 
1 7,798 8.083 7,185 7,315 
2 12,462 18,432 12,219 17,595 
3 1,137 1,104 1,102 1,067 
4 167 44 142 38 
5 21,446 21,656 20,570 20,780 
6 10,876 15,219 10,686 15,001 
7 5.847 9,226 5,847 8,797 
8 2,356 2,356 2,223 2,223 
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parameters. It can be seen that companies 3 and 4 experienced a decrease in bidding 
profits, company 8 has the same profit as the base case, while all the other companies 
experienced an increase in profits compared to the base case. The profits shown in the 
tables take into account the reduction in profits because of the transmission costs. Also, 
upon examination of the output files from the bid-matching modules, it was observed 
that the volume (the number of accepted transactions) was lower than the case where 
transmission was not considered, with 18 proposed transactions being rejected because 
of line flow limitations, and 3770 proposed transactions being rejected because trans­
mission costs were not justified by the energy cost savings. Another interesting aspect 
of modeling transmission is the fact that, since we model transmission cost by the in­
cremental MW-mile cost impact, there are transactions for which the transmission costs 
are negative. In the network module, the transmission costs for an accepted match were 
assumed to be evenly split between the buyer and the seller. In the lightly loaded case, 
the effect of the strategies is very similar to the effects seen without transmission mod­
eling. The fact that company 4 experienced a decrease in profits can be explained from 
Figure 5.1. In this figure, company 4 is located at bus 29, relatively far from companies 
1 and 5, the primary sellers, who are located at buses 4 and 6 respectively. This distance 
results in the rejection of a large nimiber of matches between company 4 and the sellers, 
on the basis of insufficient savings to justify transmission costs, even in the base case. 
In the suboptimal case, the energy cost savings would be even less because the strategy 
decreases the buy bids, and thus more transactions would be rejected between company 
4 and the sellers. For company 8, the only transactions that were allowed by the net­
work module for the suboptimal strategy case, are the ones that by default, are equal 
to the marginal cost bids, and so the profits for this company are identical to the base 
case. Once again suboptimal bidding with incomplete-beta modeling, with adjusted rris 
was simulated, with the new line limits in place. Results are given in Table 5.13 and 
summarized in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.14. 
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5.7.2 Heavy Line Loading Conditions 
Under the second assumption, each line was now assumed to have a maximum flow 
limit of only 100 MW. Simulations from the previous case were repeated with these new 
limits in place. The base-case profits are given in column 2 of Table 5.15. These are less 
than the base-case profits for the lightly loaded case. For this case, 849 bids were rejected 
because of line flow limitations, and 3026 were rejected because transmission costs are 
not justified by energy cost savings. Base-case and suboptimal bidding simulations were 
again performed for each company and the results are shown in Table 5.15, and sum­
marized in the earlier Table 5.14, labeled "INIT-ITV^V"' and "SPR-HVY" respectively. 
Comparing these columns (4 and 5) of this latter table we find that the efiects on the 
profits are similar to the lightly loaded case. 
The above two sets of assumptions are by no means an exhaustive set of transmission 
conditions under which bidding strategies can be tested. However, they have been 
included to illustrate some of the effects that transmission loading has on bidding profits. 
Table 5.15 Heavy line loading - all-participant profits in $. 
Scenario 
Co. INIT 1-SUB 2-SUB 3-SUB 4-SUB 5-SUB 6-SUB 7-SUB 8-SUB 
1 7,185 7,315 6,202 7,183 7,182 7,295 5,785 6,319 7,195 
2 12,219 12.206 17,595 12,190 12,225 12,152 11,309 11.800 12,219 
3 1,102 821 914 1,067 1,056 1,103 978 1,034 1,106 
4 142 174 181 142 38 136 36 141 142 
5 20,570 20,391 15,981 20,558 20,572 20,780 14,305 17.629 20,607 
6 10,686 10,634 10,255 10,661 10,686 10,439 15,001 11,524 10,686 
7 5,847 0,883 5,731 5,875 5,847 5,827 5,995 8,797 5,847 
8 2,223 2,080 2,081 2,217 2,130 2,223 1,015 1,984 2,223 
Tot. 59978 59508 58943 59897 59740 59958 54429 59232 60028 
6 SCHEDULING-BASED STRATEGIES 
In Chapter 3, the strategies described were primarily concerned with determining the 
optimal price to bid, given a cost or value of generation, such that other participants' 
bidding behavior was incorporated. The cost was assumed to be a simple number already 
available from, say, economic dispatch calculations. However, in this chapter, scheduling 
considerations are analyzed, that lead to the calculation of this cost. In the first part 
of this chapter, a qualitative treatment of scheduling factors that may affect bidding is 
presented. This treatment is to provide a broad scope for the sample numericcd examples 
that follow in the third part of this chapter. Complete analysis of all the factors is beyond 
the scope of this research work. However, analysis for some typical scenarios is presented. 
The second part of this chapter provides background on utility functions as a means 
of incorporating risk preferences into the participants' bidding strategies. Again, the goal 
of the presentation is to provide a scope for using utility theory results in generation 
bidding strategies, as opposed to providing an exhaustive treatment of utility theory 
itself. References are provided on this subject for the interested reader. 
6.1 Scheduling Considerations in Bidding 
In Section 3.3.1, and in the subsequent analyses presented in Chapter 3, the implicit 
assumption made was that the commitment schedules of the generating units were pre­
determined from native loads or pre-existing firm contracts. In this section, we provide 
some reasons that lead to generating unit commitment schedules being changed from 
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the "base case". Table 6.1 lists the different types of schedule changes that could occur, 
in the columns. A in a cell indicates that this schedule change could occur as a result 
of the reason listed in the corresponding row. An 'X' indicates that it is uncommon for 
this schedule change to occur as a result of this reason. 
Table 6.1 Reasons for changing commitment schedule. 
REASON Startup Delayed Shutdovm Delayed 
Shutdown Startup 
Generation requirements v/ y v/ ^ 1 
Reliabilitj- requirements yj V 
Maintenance requirements y y y 
Environmental requirements X X V y 
Fuel considerations si V 
Efficiency considerations y V 
Market conditions y x/ y 
Secondary effects N/ si n/ 
The following are brief explanations of the reasons: 
• Generation requirements: The forecasted load used in the initial unit commitment 
might be too high or too low, causing a unit status change to be required or 
considered. Also, changes in the system schedule because of other reasons (given 
below) could result in a change in the generation requirement. This could be as 
a result of changing weather conditions or power system events including outages, 
load forecast errors or a unit returning from maintenance earlier than planned. 
• Reliability requirements: Some of the units might be required to be started or 
kept running for reasons such as spinning reserve or to provide reactive support. 
Scheduled transactions might have to be reduced or terminated, or generating 
units might have to be shutdown because of transmission limitations imposed by 
reliability requirements. Such a need could arise at short notice, also because of 
changes in weather conditions or equipment outages. 
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• Maintenance requirements: Unforeseen changes in maintenance schedules and test­
ing procedures might require a change in unit status. The changes in maintenance 
schedules might be a delay or an advancement in a generating unit's availability, 
or an increase or decrease in the expected capacity at which the unit is available. 
Thus, it could result in any of the four scheduling decisions being considered. 
• Environmental requirements: Load fluctuations might lead to unforeseen level of 
emission amounts, causing the shutdown or delayed startup of thermal units. River 
water cooled units might require shutdowns because of heat exchange limits. Loss 
of a scrubber or other air emission control device might also affect the operation of 
thermal units. Other examples include emergency situations in nuclear units and 
water availability or flow requirements in hydro units. 
Fuel considerations: Take-or-pay requirements might force thermal units to startup 
or delay shutdown. Fuel network events, such as transportation disruptions, might 
force thermal units to shutdown or delay their startup. Fuel spot-market conditions 
and related decisions could also affect the operation of fossil units. 
Efficiency considerations: Potential savings from changing commitment status of 
units, other than those identified by the scheduUng algorithm might arise because 
of changed system or market conditions. 
Market Conditions: Supply, demand and price conditions in the spot electricity 
market might provide incentive to change the commitment status. 
Secondary Effects: A change in status of one unit because of one or more of the 
above reasons might result in a secondary effect on system conditions, that might 
require a further change in status of other units. For example, a unit startup for 
reliability requirements might result in an excess generating capability or emission 
limit violation, either of which could result in the shutdown of some other unit. 
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6.2 Factors To Be Considered in Scheduling Decisions 
In addition to the above factors, which arise at the system level, the following gen­
erating unit level characteristics should be considered relevant to bidding decisions: 
• Unit type and size 
• Unit condition 
• Current status 
• Minimum and maximum power output 
• Incremental heat rate curves 
• Minimum up and down times 
• Startup cost components and time requirements 
• Response times and ramp rate Umits 
• Reserve contribution 
• Fuel tjpes and fuel availability 
• Environmental impact 
• Geographical location 
Also, local transmission conditions may play a significant role in changing generating 
unit status. 
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6.3 Effects of Schedule Changes on Economics and Operations 
In this section, the effects of the schedule changes listed in the previous section, 
on economics and on operations are listed. In Tables 6.2 and 6.3, a '?' means that 
the schedule change listed in the columns may or may not have the effect listed in the 
corresponding rows, while a '•/' means that the effect is usually observed. 
Table 6.2 Effects of changing commitment schedule on economics. 
EFFECT Startup Delayed Shutdown Delayed 
Shutdown Startup 
Changes total production cost s/ y V 
Changes marginal cost ? 7 9 9 
Changes selling capability y y 9 9 
Changes buying capability 7 9 y V 
Changes environmental 
requirements and costs y y y/ V 
Changes fuel costs y /^ y V 
Introduces demand risk 9 ? 9 9 
Table 6.3 Effects of changing commitment schedule on operations. 
AFFECTED AREAS Startup Delayed 
Shutdown 
Shutdown Delayed 
Startup 
Maintenance schedules y/ N/ y/ y/ 
Reliability margins V N/ yj 
Fuel consumption y y y yj 
Emissions y y V yJ 
Operational flexibility a/ V /^ 
6.4 Modeling Risk Preference in Scheduling Decisions 
Thus far in this dissertation, it has been assumed that the participants under con­
sideration are all expected value maximizers. In other words, the players always seek to 
optimize expected values of profits, without regard to the magnitude of monetary losses, 
resulting from the downside to a rejected bid. This does not seem unreasonable when 
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considering the relatively simple bidding scenarios where the unit commitment is fixed, 
because there is no downside to a rejected bid However, when scheduling consider­
ations such as a change in commitment are incorporated, then situations arise where 
downsides exist in the form of additional system costs incurred or penalties, as will be 
illustrated in later sections. In such situations, expected value maximization alone might 
be insufficient to model the participants' behaviors. When there are distinct downsides 
present in bidding outcomes, utility theory provides procedures to incorporate the risk 
involved. Before we begin to model this risk, the following section presents some of the 
factors that may cause risk in bidding outcomes. 
6.4.1 Classification of Risk 
Several definitions of risk are available. One such definition of risk is, the effect of 
a certain event on an objective function multiplied by the probability of the event. In 
this research, however, we define bidding risk as follows: 
Bidding risk is the product of monetary losses from a certain event, and the probability 
of occurrence of this event. If several mutually exclusive events exist, that may cause a 
monetary loss from bidding, then the total risk is the sum of the risks from each such 
event. 
One type of event that could cause monetary losses is the rejection of a bid by the 
broker if a schedule change has been made by the participant, who expects the bid to be 
accepted. In this case, the monetary losses could occur as reduced revenues, unrecovered 
startup costs, dump power penalties, etc. The probability of occurrence of this event 
is calculated as the complement of the probability of acceptance. Thus, the risk in this 
case can be computed. 
Another type of risk that could cause monetary losses is the outage of a unit in a 
^In reality, the only downside of a rejected bid is the fee to be pzdd to the broker, which is implicitly 
assumed to be small. Even if the fee is substantial, it is reasonable to expect that it would be fixed, 
and not a fimction of the bid price. Thus, it does not enter into the objective function at hand. 
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seller's system, after a bid has been accepted. The probability of outage of the unit 
could be obtained from unit forced outage rates, which are presimiably independent of 
bid acceptance probabilities. So the risk in this case can also be computed. 
The former kind of risk is essentially a risk due to market conditions, i.e., it is a p-rice 
risk. The latter kind of risk is a risk due to generating system conditions, i.e., it is a 
production risk. A third type of risk is that associated with the third-party transmission 
delivery system. This type of risk is very complex to quantify and aneilyze, and is beyond 
the scope of this research work. However, the utility theory approach can be modified 
to include the risk from transmission system effects if participants have a measure of 
these effects that they can trust. 
6.4.2 Utility Functions 
Both kinds of risks described above need to be incorporated in the bidding decisions 
of participants, in order to obtain a realistic and usable bidding strategy. One possible 
way to do this is to maximize the expected value of profit minus the risk instead of 
maximizing expected value of profit. This may or may not lead to a solution that does 
not truly reflect the goals of the participant. For example, a participant may consider 
losing a dollar to be worse than gaining a dollar. So, we need some way to incorporate 
the downside of the bidding also into the profit objective function, while attempting 
to suitably tradeoff between profit and risk. On the other hand, the participant may 
not assign the same amount of negative value to losing or gaining a dollar, under all 
circumstances. For example, a participant who has achieved a large percentage of a 
given periods profit goals might be more willing to risk the loss of a dollar than he was 
at the begirming of a given period. Utility functions offer a systematic and rational way 
to do include such considerations, while allowing the participant to choose his attitudes 
towards risk, termed as risk preferences. Indeed, it can be shown that expected value 
maximization is a special case of a linear utility function, one that gives equal weightage 
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to profit and risk. 
The utility function, in the context of this research, is a measure of the satisfaction 
that a participant derives from a certain level of profit, denoted as by the variable wealth, 
w. The amount of satisfaction, while a non-decreasing function of wealth, need not be 
linearly dependent on wealth. The advantage of using the utility function is to model 
the behavior of a variety of rational participants, with different attitudes toward wealth 
in the presence of uncertainty and risk. In order to incorporate imcertainty and risk into 
the decision making problem, the participants will be assumed to maximize expected 
utility of profits as opposed to expected value of profits. 
Let us consider the following problem involving uncertainty, which is slightly modified 
from an illustrative example from [66]. A participant has two possible outcomes from a 
bidding situation, that would result in profits, or wealths, of A and B respectively. The 
probability of the outcome leading to A is p, and the probability of the other outcome 
is 1 — p. Such a situation is called a lottery and is denoted by: 
L = (P,-4,B) (6.1) 
The probability P basically introduced imcertainty in the wealth outcome. Under 
such situations. Von Neumann and Morgenstem [67] showed that it is possible to con­
s t ruc t  a  u t i l i ty  func t ion  tha t  can  be  used  to  model  the  par t ic ipan t ' s  choice .  I f  U{w)  
represents the utility function of the participant, then the expected utility of the lottery 
L is given by: 
E[U{L)]  =  PU{A)  -t- (1 - P)U{B)  (6.2) 
This is different from the utility of the expected profit from the lottery, which is: 
U{E[L])  =  U{PA -f (1 - P)B)  (6.3) 
The above equation is simply the utility of the expected value of profit from the 
lottery, and maximizing it is identical to maximizing expected value of profit, because 
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utility functions are monotonically increasing (additional wealth always increases util­
ity, although the amount of increase may vary.). However, an expected utility maxi­
mizing participant maximizes the function given by Equation 6.2. The Von Neumann-
Morgenstem utility functions can be used to model risk preferences precisely because 
of this. A participant who maximizes expected utility has different attitudes toward 
decisions in the face of uncertainty, depending on the level of wealth they have achieved. 
These differences may not depend on the total wealth they possess, i.e., on the absolute 
size of the participant, but rather, on the incremental amount of wealth they have ac­
quired in a given bidding period. In other words, regardless of the size of the participant, 
they might have different attitudes toward risk, based upon the recent performance in 
the market. 
Now, a person is a risk averter relative to a lottery if the quantity in Equation 6.3 is 
greater than the quantity in Equation 6.2. In other words, the person prefers a certain 
outcome to an uncertain one with the same expected value. For this to be true, we need 
to select U{w) to be concave. It is also possible to model a risk seeker, in other words, 
a participant with the opposite behavior, by selecting a convex U(w). However, in this 
research, we will assimie that all participants are risk averse. Now, even though we 
assume that all participants are risk averse, the degree to which they are risk averse may 
vary depending on a lot of factors. In other words, all participants need not necessarily 
have the same amount of willingness (or lack thereof) to take risk under all situations. 
To quantify this degree of risk aversion, the Arrow-Pratt [68] coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, r, is defined as follows: 
r = - ^  ( 6 . 4 )  
U'(w)  ^  '  
This measure is positive if the participant is a risk averter^. One other detail re­
garding utility functions will be examined before we relate utility function theory to 
^For a participant who maximizes expected value of profit, as in Chapter 3, this measure is zero. 
Such a participant is Sedd to be risk neutrai 
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strategic bidding. This is the derivative of the measure r with respect to wealth. In 
other words, how does the participant's degree of risk aversion vary with wealth? We 
would intuitively expect most participants in common decision making situations to be 
less risk averse as wealth increases. For example, a large, profitable corporation would 
be less averse to losing $100,000 than a smaller or less profitable company. Thus it would 
seem as though a logical choice for a utility function should be one that has r'{w) < 0. 
Consider the modified exponential utility fimction given below; 
Clearly, this could be a choice of utility function to model our participants. Such 
a participant is said to have decreasing absolute risk aversion with increasing wealth 
(DARA). However, with a lack of much knowledge on how participants' risk taking 
behaviors will be in the deregulated future, we cannot make such a strong assximption. 
Thus we need to be able to model participants that have constant, or perhaps even 
increasing absolute risk aversion with increasing wealth (CARA and lARA). For these, 
two possible utility functions are the exponential and the quadratic utility functions 
respectively: 
U{w)  =  1-6-" '  ,0.5 
r ' {w)  =  —Q.2bw~^  — O.Zlow < 0 (6.5) 
U{w)  =1-6- ' "  
=> r{w) = 1 > 0 
=» r'{w) = 0 (6.6) 
U (w)  =  w — aw^  
(6.7) 
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Thus, we have illustrated the use of different forms of utility functions to model 
different participants. However, it would be convenient for implementation, and add 
to the flexibility of modeling, if one form of utility function could be used to model all 
three kinds of risk attitudes, DARA, CARA and lARA. Such a form is the Expo-Power 
utility function proposed by Saha in [4]. This function is given by: 
U{w)  =9-
. , 1 — a + a^w'^ 
r(it;) = (6.8) 
w 
where a, 3, 9 are positive parameters. By \-arying these parameters, we can achieve 
varying degrees of risk aversion. For example, for a = 1, we get CARA: for a = 0.8 we 
get DARA, etc. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the effects of a and /? on the Expo-Power 
utility. In Figure 6.1, ^ = 1, and 3 = 4.1667 x 10""^. In Figure 6.2, 9 = 1, and a = 1. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the \*ariation of t { w )  with wealth for different values of a .  
Again, for this figure, 9 = 1, and 3 = 4.1667 x lO""*. 
For the rest of this chapter, the utility function used to model participant risk atti­
tudes will be assimied to be of the Expo-Power form. 
6.4.3 Modeling Risk in Strategic Bidding Using Utility Functions 
Now, we will relate the utility function concepts described above to the strategic bid­
ding problem. Consider the objective function from Chapter 3, Equation 6.9, repeated 
here: 
Maximize 
Pb Sipb)ic-pb) (6.9) 
This objective function represents an expected value of profit maximizing participant, 
with no downside to a rejected bid. Now let us assxune that the participant is an expected 
utility maximizer. Then, the objective is modified as follows: 
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Maximize 
Pb S{pb)U{c-pb)= 
S ipb)  [d  - (6.10) 
In this equation, a, /3, and d are the usual parameters of the utility function, c and 
Pb are the usual cost and bid price values. S{jpb) is the probability of acceptance of bid 
price Pb- q is the quantity of energy being bid for, i.e., it represents the size of the bid. 
The new parameter introduced here, is an initial wealth parameter, that can be used 
to represent the current wealth of the participant, at the time the bidding decision is 
made. It is distinguished from total wealth w by the fact that it is a constant, and is a 
parameter selected by the user. Thus overall wealth of the participant, for the purposes 
of evaluating a bid of size q is given by: 
w = W-i -q(c  — Pb)  (6.11) 
W will affect the outcome of the suboptimal bidding procedure, depending on the 
choice of the other parameters. The reason for including it is twofold: 
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• W adds to the model flexibility by providing one more way to fine tmie risk atti-
tudes-
• A positive W is required when using non-integral values for a, in the presence of 
events that cause a financial loss. This is because, such events result in a negative 
incremental utility (a negative wealth), and with non-integral q's, W is required 
to avoid complex number solutions to the suboptimal bidding problem. 
Similarly, for a seller, the objective function now becomes: 
The suboptimeil bidding problem now reduces to maximizing the objective functions 
given by Equation 6.10 and 6.12. The derivatives of the Expo-Power equation can 
be easily calculated, and maximization of the concave objective can be performed by 
any of a number of classical optimization techniques. Examples of such analyses will 
be presented in later sections of this chapter. In the next section, we examine some 
scenarios that illustrate what scheduling considerations could afiiect the bidding process. 
6.5 Scheduling Considerations — Illustrative Scenarios 
6.5.1 Change in Generation Requirements 
This section illustrates a change in commitment schedule that is mandated by a 
change in generation requirement. Such a change could arise because of a changed load 
forecast, weather conditions, etc., which was not foreseen at the initial conmiitment 
stage. The following two cases illustrate the options available to the participant when 
the generating capacity committed for the current hour is too high or too low for the 
following hour. 
Maximize 
Ps  S{ps)U{ps  -  c)= 
(6.12) 
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I. Generation committed is too low. 
The options that might be available to the participant include; 
(a) Additional unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Additional unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy 
sell) 
(c) Bid to buy with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Use available interruptible native load contracts 
(g) Combination of above 
2. Generation committed is too high. 
The options that might be available to the participant are: 
(a) Additional unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Additional unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy 
sell) 
(c) Bid to buy with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Use available interruptible native load contracts 
(g) Combination of above 
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6.5.2 An Increase in Reliability Requirements 
This section illustrates a change in commitment schedule required for reliability rea­
sons, typically a must-run situation for units, or em increased spinning reserve require­
ment. The options available to the participant would be: 
1. Generation committed in an area is too low 
(a) Additional unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Additional unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or 
sell) 
(c) Bid to buy with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Use available interruptible native load contracts 
(g) Combination of above 
2. Generation committed in an area is too high 
(a) Additional unit shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Additional unit delayed startup (with or without additional bids to buy or 
sell) 
(c) Bid to sell with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Defaiilt on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Combination of above 
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6.5.3 A Change in Maintenance Requirements 
This section illustrates the cases when generating units that are down for mainte­
nance come on line either later or earlier than expected during the initial commitment 
stage. It is not unusual for units to have a must-run requirement immediately following 
maintenance, for testing reasons. Such a status will be assTimed in the following cases, 
so that a change in conamitment will be required. This should not be considered as 
unusual since all units realistically have a minimum rrm time after startup. 
1. Unit maintenance time is longer than expected and unit is unavailable for imme­
diate startup 
This could lead to a shortage in online generation from the planned scenario. The 
options available to the participant would be: 
(a) Other unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Other unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(c) Bid to buy with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Use available interruptible native load contracts 
(g) Combination of above 
2. Unit maintenance time is shorter than expected and unit is started sooner than 
planned 
This could lead to a surplus in online generation if the unit is started. Then, the 
options available to the participant would be: 
(a) Other unit shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(b) Other unit delayed startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(c) Bid to sell with brokerage 
(d) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(e) Default on generation reqiiirement with penalty incurred 
(f) Combination of above 
6.5.4 Unit Environmental Requirements 
This section illustrates the case where a unit must be shutdown because of enwon-
mental reasons, not foreseen at the initial commitment stage. Such a situation might 
arise because of emission limits being reached, or weather conditions as in the case of 
river cooled thermal units. Loss of a scrubber or other emission-control device on a 
thermal unit might also be a cause. Other examples include emergency situations at 
nuclear units, and water availability or flow requirements for hydro units. The options 
available to the participant are: 
(a) Specified unit backdown or shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy) 
(b) Specified unit delayed startup (with or without additional bids to buy) 
(c) Other unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(d) Other unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(e) Bid to buy or sell with brokerage 
(f) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(g) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(h) Use available intemiptible native load contracts 
(i) Combination of above 
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6.5.5 Unit Fuel Considerations 
Fuel considerations in the operation of thermal units are very complex, and often lead 
to changes in the original schedules of units. Under certain fuel network conditions, fuel 
suppliers strictly enforce take-or-pay requirements. Thus, participants have to conform 
to the requirements with short notice, not foreseen in the initial commitment stage. 
Also, fuel network problems could lead to the shutdown of units. Thus, two kinds of 
scenarios that could arise are described in the following cases. 
1. Increased fuel consumption requirements 
The options available to the participant include: 
(a) Specified unit startup (with or without additional bids to sell) 
(b) Specified unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to sell) 
(c) Other unit delayed startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(d) Other unit shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(e) Bid to buy or sell with brokerage 
(f) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(g) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(h) Combination of above 
2. Decreased fuel availability. 
The options available to the participant would be: 
(a) Specified unit shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy) 
(b) Specified unit delayed startup (with or without additional bids to buy) 
(c) Other unit delayed shutdown (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
(d) Other unit startup (with or without additional bids to buy or sell) 
124 
(e) Bid to buy or sell with brokerage 
(f) Attempt to buy or sell through bilateral transactions 
(g) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(h) Use available interruptible native load contracts 
(i) Combination of above 
6.5.6 Efficiency Considerations 
This subsection illustrates the scenarios when changes in commitment schedule could 
result in increased efficiency and savings. The changes are other than those identified 
by the commitment program, which only looks to schedule units for the forecasted 
generations requirement. This section explores the possibility of commitment change 
that is contingent upon a change in generation requirement because of potential sales or 
purchases. 
1. Avoiding shutting down an efficient unit during low load periods 
This situation typically arises for participants with a low minimum load compared 
to their average load, and who own efficient units with a large Pmin- If partic­
ipant could sell a sufficient amount of energy in the low load periods to keep the 
unit running, significant savings could be realized. The options available are: 
(a) Keep specified unit on (with bid to sell at low price) 
(b) Dump power with incurred penalty 
(c) Attempt to sell through bilateral transactions 
(d) Combination of above 
2. Avoiding starting an inefficient unit during peal load periods 
This situation arises for utilities with a high peak load compared to average load, 
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and who own one or more ineflBcient units. For the peak hours, which may be as 
few as 3 or 4, expensive peaking units are started up. Avoiding these startups 
might result in significant savings. The options available are: 
(a) Keep specified unit off (with bid to buy at high price) 
(b) Default on generation requirement with penalty incurred 
(c) Attempt to buy through bilateral transactions 
(d) Combination of above 
6.5.7 Market Condition Considerations 
This subsection illustrates the cases where market conditions provide an opportunity 
for additional profits when commitment schedules are changed. The two cases considered 
are when market prices are unusually high and low. 
1. Market price forecast is high. 
In case of such a forecast, if a participant has a relatively low percentage of their 
generating capacity committed, then the following options are available: 
(a) Bid to sell as appropriate firom currently committed or operating units only 
(b) Consider starting additional units and bid to sell 
(c) Attempt to sell through bilateral transactions 
(d) Combination from above 
2. Market price is forecast is low. 
In case of such a forecast, if the participant has a relatively high percentage of 
their generating capacity committed, then the following options are available: 
(a) Bid to buy as appropriate considering only decommitted or non-operating 
units only 
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(b) Consider shutting down additional units and bid to buy 
(c) Attempt to buy through bilateral transactions 
(d) Combination of above 
6.5.8 Secondary-Eflfect Considerations 
The secondary effects on schedule changes, as described in Section 6.1, also result in 
one or more of the situations illustrated above, and will not be illustrated separately. 
Also, dependent on the resultant changes in unit status and transactions, the resultant 
net interchange in the hours affected may be more or less than initially planned. 
6.6 Scheduling Considerations — Numerical Examples 
In this section, the concepts of utility using the Expo-Power utility function will 
be illustrated and contrasted with expected value maximization approach, for various 
scenarios where scheduling considerations come into play. 
6.6.1 Selling/Buying Without Changing Commitment Order 
Selling and buying without changing commitment order from a base case unit com­
mitment was examined in Chapter 3. In this section, the approach is essentially similar 
to that approach, except that expected utility maximization is illustrated. However, in 
using the expected utility maximization approach in conjunction with the Expo-Power 
utility function, it must be mentioned that the choice of the parameters W, a and /? 
affect the optimal solution. An increase in unambiguously results in an increase in the 
participant's absolute risk aversion, in other words, the participant will choose a more 
conservative bid price with increasing j3. The effect of W and a are more complex. These 
are illustrated in Figures 6.4-6.6. In Figure 6.4, the expected utility from a sale scenario 
is illustrated. In the example shown, the selling participant models competitor behavior 
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in the form of an incomplete-beta function, and uses the Expo-Power objective function 
given in Equation 6.12. For this particular scenario, the parameters for optimization are 
as follows: 
c = 6.67 ^/MWH (generating cost) 
d = 1: P = 4.1667 X 10"°'^ (utility function parameters) 
a = 15.7103; b = 4.6644; m = 15.0000 (incomplete-beta function parameters) 
Given these parameters, the on each curve represents the suboptimal,^ normalized 
bid price x for various values of initial wealth, W, when a = 1. As we can see, this 
value remains constant at 0.5315 $/MWH. Thus, we can see that selecting a = 1 indeed 
does correspond to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), and the participant would 
show the Scime degree of risk aversion, regardless of the level of initial wealth. Figure 6.5 
shows the case where all other parameters are the same as before, except a = 1.1. This 
corresponds to increasing absolute risk aversion with wealth (lARA). Though it is not 
easily apparent from the figure, the suboptimal bid price does shift to the left (lower val­
ues) for each higher-wealth curve, giving values of 0.4745, 0.4716, and 0.4693 respective 
for initial wealths of 5000, 6000, and 7000. Since we are considering a seller, this does 
mean that the seller becomes more "conservative" in its bidding strategy with increasing 
wealth, for a constant bid size. This may not be common in real life. But it certainly 
can be modeled if the situation arises, by simply selecting a value for a > 1. Figure 6.6 
shows the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion with wealth (DARA), which is the 
most conventional assumption of risk attitudes in commodity trading models. Here, 
a = 0.8. For this case, the suboptimal values increase with increasing wealth, resulting 
in values of 0.5607, 0.5620, and 0.5629 respectively for initial wealths of 5000, 6000, and 
7000. Thus, we can see that the seller bids a more bid price with an increase in 
wealth, for a constant bid size. 
^Rather than implement customized code for each such scenario, the results shown in this chapter 
were generated using Matlab Version 5.0, £md its Optimization Toolbox. The specific routines used 
were fmin for unconstrained maximization, cind constr for constrained maximization. 
128 
0.5 WsSOOO 
W s O  
•o 
a= 1.0 
p = 4.1667e-04 
-2.5 0= 1.0 
0.1 0.3 0.6 OA 0.5 
Normalized bid pnce x 
0.7 0.6 0.9 
Figure 6.4 Variation of optimal solution with wealth: CARA. 
1 
0.996 
! : 1 1 
W.7000 
0.996 
-
W = 6000 \ \ 
a994 
>» 
= a992 — • O "—. \ 
"3 T3 O 0.99 
w = soco \ \ 
o a> 
x-a988 
- \ \ • 
asee a=1.1 \ \-
a984 
- P=4.1667e-04 \ \ 
0.982 9 = 1.0 \ -
0.98 ' ' • ' ' ' 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.S 0.6 
Normalized bid price x 
Figure 6.5 Variation of optimal solution with wealth: lARA. 
129 
0.4 
0.3S 
0.3 W^SOOO 
a = 0.8 
P=4.1667e-04 
0 = 1.0 
0.3 0.4 0.5 
Normarzed bid price x 
0.6 0.7 O.S 0.1 0.9 
Figure 6.6 Variation of optimal solution with wealth: DARA. 
The proposed expected utility model results in interesting changes in suboptimal 
bids for different parameter values, even for the simple case of static commitment order. 
In the following sections, we attempt to model some of the complexities involved in 
including schedule changes in the objective function. 
6.6.2 Avoiding Startups/Shutdowns 
In this section three situations will be analyzed that could involve a participant con­
sidering a change in the commitment schedule of generating units. In order to do this, 
two approaches will be presented for each of the different scenarios. One is an expected 
profit maximization approach, and the other is an expected utility maximization ap­
proach. The expected profit maximization approach has been illustrated in reasonable 
detail in previous chapters. 
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6.6.2.1 One-Hour Purchase with Avoided Startup 
The first scenario involves a small system of four generating units, where the purchase 
of energj' during one hour could result in avoiding the startup of an inefficient peaking 
unit, with significant savings. Let us consider a four generating unit system that has a 
base case unit conamitment for a period of 168 hours as shown in Figure 6.7. The dashed 
curve represents system generating requirement plus reserves. The curve above that is 
the online capacity curve. It can be seen that in certain periods, a generating unit needs 
to be started up to meet spinning reserve requirement. Upon closer examination of the 
generating unit characteristics (not shown), it was observed that one of the peaking 
units was started up at hour 42, and was on until hour 48, when it was shut down. This 
is because the unit's minimum up time is six hours. Also, upon examination of the load 
curve, it was observed that a purchase of 20 MW during hour 42 would be sufficient to 
avoid this startup and shutdown, thus resulting in savings. In order to determine the 
magnitude of savings, a second unit commitment was performed, with the load for hour 
42 reduced by 20 MW. This unit commitment is shown in Figure 6.8. The difference 
between the generating costs resulting from the two commitments was determined to be 
$275,040 - S271,810 = $3230. Thus, the value of the purchase of 20 MW for one hour was 
determined as $3230/(20*1) = 161.5 $/MWH. This value will now be used to analyze 
the bidding strategy of the participant, from both an expected profit maximization and 
an expected utility maximization point of view. 
The bid distribution parameters for the participant will be assumed to be as follows: 
Beta distribution with 
a = 15.7103 
b = 4.6644 
m = 15.0000 
The Expo-Power utility fimction parameters will be assumed to be: 
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Figure 6.8 Purchase case unit commitment for 4-unit system. 
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a = 1 
,/? = 4.1667 X 10--' 
e = i 
W = Q 
Also, cost of generation c = 161.5 S/MWH. For this case, the expected value maximiza­
tion result is obtained by maximizing the following objective: 
F{x ,a ,b){c  — mx)  (6.13) 
where F{x ,  a ,  b)  is the incomplete-beta function, and represents the probability of 
success of bid x, S (x). The expected utility maximization result is obtained by maxi­
mizing the following objective: 
F(X, a, b)  ( e  -  e -a(M'-+20(c-mx))- j 
The optimization results are given in Table 6.4. EV'-Max indicates expected value 
maximization, and EU-Max indicates expected utility maxintiization. It can be seen that 
the expected value maximization solution has a lower bid price (x* and pj) than the 
expected utility maximization solution. This is consistent with the fact that the latter 
solution takes into effect the risk aversion of the buyer. Consequently, the probability of 
acceptance (S(x*')), and expected utility {EUib{pl)) suboptimal bid x" are higher 
for the latter case. 
An interesting point to be noted is regarding c, which is very large for current day 
fuel prices. This indicates that there may be significant cost savings for a participant, 
if a longer term contract were entered into, for purchase of peak capacity and energy. 
The effect of such a contract on bidding strategies would be a lower c, which will lead to 
a lower x*. In the next two examples, we examine cases of where c is much lower, and 
falls within a reasonable price range. 
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Table 6.4 Variation of suboptimal •values of 4-unit s\'stem 
with strategy. 
Strategy x' Pb' SiPtV EibiPb*) Ehibipb") 
EV-Max 
EU-Max 
0.9665 
0.9927 
14.4975 
14.8903 
0.9992 
0.9999 
146.88 
146.61 
0.9946 
0.9954 
6.6.2.2 11-Hour Purchase with Avoided Startups 
The following two scenarios involve the analysis of purchase and sale of power for a 
larger 16-unit system, over a period of time longer than one hour. The analysis presented 
is meant to be an illustration of some of the considerations that could go into the decision 
of whether to bid or not, and if so, what bid price to select. 
Let us now consider a 16-unit system that has a base case unit commitment for a 
period of 168 hours as shown in Figure 6.9. Upon examination of the load curve, it was 
observed that a purchase of 200 MW during hours 14 through 24 would be required to 
avoid some startups and shutdowns, thus resulting in savings. In order to determine 
the magnitude of savings, a second unit commitment was performed, with the load for 
hours 14 through 24 reduced by 200 MW. This unit commitment is shown in Figure 6.10. 
The difference between the generating costs resulting from the two commitments was 
determined to be $2,396,200 - $2,383,400 = $12,800. Thus, the value of the purchase 
of 200 MW for 11 hours was determined as $12,800/(200*11) = 5.8182 $/MWH. This 
value will now be used to analyze the bidding strategy of the participant. 
The same bid distribution and utility function parameters will be assumed again 
for this participant. For the first hour of the proposed purchase bid, the modeling is 
identical to that for the previous case. However, once the bid has been accepted, and 
the purchase schedule is committed to, the participant has to consider the possibility 
of the subsequent hours' bids being rejected. Unlike in the previous cases, there is a 
monetary impact of a rejected bid for this situation. The impact could be modeled in 
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number of detailed ways including a decision tree analyzing the possible actions of the 
participant. However, to keep the modeling clear conceptually, we choose to model this 
"downside" risk simply by a constant penalty, p $/MWH. The justification for this is 
that in the worst case, a rejected bid can be replaced by energy from one of a number 
of alternative sources, such as peaking units, dispatchable contracts or even emergency 
power contracts, p simply represents the cost of using one of these alternatives'^. A 
conservative participant might use the most expensive of these sources to model the 
downside risk. Adding this component into the model, the expected value maximization 
and expected utility maximization objectives become: 
F{x,  a ,  6)(c - mx) + (1 - F(x,  a ,  b)){—p) (6.15) 
F{x,  a ,  b)  (e  -  e-^(^+2oo{c-mx)) '»  j  ^  b))  (O -  (6.I6) 
For the first hour of the proposed purchase, the value for p = 0, because if the bid 
is rejected, the participant can choose to stay with the original commitment schedule. 
For subsequent hours, let us assume that p = 20. Then, Table 6.5 shows the values for 
suboptimal bid prices for the first hour and the subsequent hours. Since the penalty for 
the first hour is different from the penalty in the subsequent hoxirs, two different sets of 
solutions are obtained. 
Table 6.5 Variation of suboptimal values of 16-unit system with strategy 
(purchase case). 
Strategy x* Pb* sipbv EibiPb") euibipn 
EV-Max, 1st hour 
EU-Max, 1st hour 
EV-Max, other hours 
EU-Max, other hours 
0.3617 
0.3621 
0.9196 
0.9341 
5.4260 
5.4318 
13.7938 
14.0114 
6.8802E-5 
6.9825E-5 
0.9733 
0.9874 
2.6981E-5 
2.6978E-5 
-8.2963 
-8.3424 
2.2121E-6 
2.2124E-6 
-1.0331 
-1.0212 
^.^Iso conceivable, is a p that varies with the amount of time that is left in the transaction, or one 
that is dependent on how much wealth has been recovered in the past hours. However, these axe more 
complex to model, and we assume a constant p for this scenario. 
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It may be seen that once again, expected utility maximization leads to a more con­
servative (higher) buy bid than expected value maximization. Also, it may be seen that 
this effect is more pronounced for the subsequent hours case, when there is a non-zero 
downside. In other words, when the downside risk is significantly large, the participant's 
risk aversion is observed to have a larger effect. Another interesting observation is that 
the maximum expected utility in the case where p = 20, is negative. This is an indica­
tion to the participant that the pxirchase bid is not an advisable activity. This is also 
consistent with the fact that c = 5.8182 is a relatively low value of generation, given the 
bid distribution parameters. In other words, for this purchase bid, the participant's cost 
curve is not competitive enough to justify the risks. Thus, we can see that the results 
from the suboptimai bidding strategy predict a situation where the participant should 
not submit a buy bid. 
6.6.2.3 15-Hoiir Sale with Avoided Shutdown 
Let us now consider the 16-unit system again, from the point of view of a seller. From 
the load it was observed that a sale of 120 MW during hours 20 through 34 would be 
required to avoid the shutdown of a base load unit during off-peak hours, thus resulting 
in savings. In order to determine the magnitude of savings, a second unit commitment 
was performed, with the load for hours 20 through 34 increased by 120 MW. This 
unit commitment is shown in Figure 6.11. The difference between the generating costs 
resulting from the two commitments was determined to be $2,408,200 - $2,396,200 = 
$12,000. Thus, the additional cost of the sale of 120 MW for 15 hours was determined 
to be c = 12,000/(120 * 15) = 6.66 $/MWH. This value will now be used to analyze the 
bidding strategy of the participant. 
Again, the same bid distribution and utility function parameters will be used. Also, 
a penalty p = 20 will be assessed for a rejected bid, in hours subsequent to the first hour 
of the proposed sale. This penalty is a representation of alternatives the participant 
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Figure 6.11 Sale case unit commitment for 16-unit system. 
might have to satisfy generation requirement constraints, such as shutting down units, 
dispatchable sale contracts, pumped storage units, or even dumping power into the 
system, each with its associated cost. The objectives for expected value maximization 
and expected utility maxinaization become: 
(1 — F { x ,a , b ) ) (Tnx — c) + F ( x , a , b ) { — p )  (6.17) 
(1 - F { X ,  a ,  b ) )  ( 9  -  e - ' » ( ' ^ + 1 2 0 ( m x - c ) ) - j ^ _ ^ -0{W-l2Op)''^ (g 
Results of optimization are given in Table 6.6. It may be observed that expected 
utility maximization bid prices are lower (more conservative from the seller's point of 
view) than expected value maximization prices. Also, this effect is more pronounced for 
the case where the penalty is non-zero. Thus, depending on if the participant chooses 
to use expected value maximization, or expected utility maximization, i.e., depending 
on whether the participant is risk neutral, or risk averse, the analysis presented shows 
what the suboptimal bid price should be. 
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Table 6.6 Variation of suboptimal values of 16-unit system with strategy 
(sale case). 
Strategy X' Ps' SijPsY Elbijps') EUibiPs') 
EV-Max, 1st hour 
EU-Max, 1st hour 
EV-Max, other hours 
EU-Max, other hours 
0.7077 
0.7016 
0.5864 
0.5545 
10.6154 
10.5241 
8.7964 
8.3174 
0.7676 
0.7849 
0.9661 
0.9823 
3.0311 
3.0251 
1.3766 
1.2638 
0.1374 
0.1376 
0.0392 
0.0472 
The scenarios just presented are examples of buying and selling situations with a 
commitment change being considered. They are by no means an exhaustive list of such 
scenarios. However, the purpose of illustrating the complexities involved in considering 
commitment changes in bidding decisions is achieved by these scenarios. 
6.6.3 Simiiltaiieous Buy/Sell Activity 
The previous section considered cases where the participant had already made a 
decision to bid for either buying or selling at a given hour. In this section, we consider 
the situation where the participant bids to buy and sell simultaneously. In this situation, 
let us assume that the participant has, by means similar to the above section, determined 
a cost/value of the energy for both the purchase and the sale block of energy. Let these 
costs be given by Cb and Cs respectively. Then, three possible cases are of interest. 
These cases arise out of three possible comprehensive production cost shapes, shown in 
Figure 6.12. 
In the first case, the operating point is such that Cf, < Cs- In the other two cases, ca > 
Cs, with the difference being greater in the last case. The following analyses illustrate 
the application of the expected value and expected utility maximizing approaches to 
these three cases. 
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Figure 6.12 Simultaneous buy/sell: three possible cases. 
6.6.3.1 Case 1 where Cb < 
Let us assume that Cb = 8.99 $/MWH, and = 9.04 $/MWH, for a block of energy, 
say 200 MW. All other parameters for bid distributions and utility function remain the 
same. Further, let us assume that the participant considers both buy and sell bids to be 
distributed according to the same distribution^. Then, the objectives for expected value 
and expected utility maximization models are as follows: 
(1 - F(xs, a, b)){mxs -  c,) + F{xb,  a ,  h){cb — rnxb)  (6.19) 
(1 - F{Xs, a, 6)) {e - e-^Cl^+ZOOCmx.-c.))" j ^ _ g-/3(W^+200(c6-mx»))» j (g 20) 
where Xg are the normalized buy and sell bid prices respectively. It can be observed 
for this case, that the objective function is separable into two separate cases, sell and 
buy. Suboptimal solutions are given in Table 6.7. The usual observations can be made 
®None of these assumptions are restrictive from the point of view of modeling: they are made 
primarily for the sake of simplicity. 
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regarding the effect of risk aversion on the suboptimal values. Again, depending on the 
risk attitudes of the participant, the analysis shows different solutions to the bidding 
problem, with the expected utility maximization strategy being the more "conservative" 
of the two strategies. This means that the sell bid price is lower, and the buy bid price 
is higher than in the expected value maximization strategy. 
Table 6.7 Variation of suboptimal values for simultaneous buy/sell - Case 1. 
Strategy Xb* Xs' Ph' Ps' Eib{pb' , P s ' )  EUib{pb\ P s ' )  
EV-Max 
EU-Max 
0.5527 
0.5638 
0.7551 
0.7499 
8.2898 
8.3069 
11.3270 
11.2480 
1.3920 
1.3897 
0.1057 
0.1058 
6.6.3.2 Case 2 where > Cs 
Let us assume that Cj, = 10.99 $/MWH, and Cj = 9.04 Then the objectives 
are the same as before, and results of optimization are shown in Table 6.8. The effect of 
modeling risk aversion through the utility function, is again an increase in the suboptimal 
buy bid price and a decrease in the suboptimal sell bid price. Depending on the risk 
attitudes of the participant, the analysis shows different solutions to the bidding problem. 
Table 6.8 Variation of suboptimal values for simultaneous buy/sell - Case 2. 
Strategy Xb' Pb" Ps* Eib{pb',ps*) EUib{pb\Ps') 
EV-Max 
EU-Max 
0.6653 
0.6675 
0.7551 
0.7499 
9.9795 
10.0126 
11.3270 
11.2484 
1.5114 
1.5092 
0.1152 
0.1154 
6.6.3.3 Case 3 where Cb » c. 
Let us assume that q, = 12.99 $/MWH, and Cg = 8.04 $/MWH. From the modeling 
point of view, this situation poses an interesting problem. Since the broker matches 
highest bidder for buying to lowest bidder for selling, there is a higher probability in 
this case, that the participant might be matched to sell to itself. In the event of such 
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a match, the savings are not real. To avoid this situation, an additional constraint has 
to be imposed, and that is Xb < Xg- This will prevent the broker from matching the 
participant's buy bid to its own sell bid. However, the more profitable buy bid situation 
(more profitable because Cb ^ Cs) is artificially limited by this constraint. Thus, we 
expect the optimal solution to be at the boundary, where is xj, = Xj. Table 6.9 shows 
that this is indeed the case. Further, for the expected utility maximization model with 
constraint imposed, the suboptimal bid prices are lower than those for the expected value 
maximization model with constraint imposed. Thus, once again risk aversion effects are 
illustrated, with the additional constraint imposed if the participemt wishes to avoid the 
situation where there is a match between two of his own bids. 
Table 6.9 Variation of suboptimal values for simultaneous buy/sell - Case 3. 
Strategy ^6* Pb' Ps' Eib{pb',Ps') EUib{pb',Ps') 
EV-Max 0.7619 0.7326 11.4290 10.9885 2.6895 0.2015 
(no addl. constr.) 
EU-Max 0.7660 0.7254 11.4898 10.8803 2.6843 0.2019 
(no addl. constr.) 
EV-Max 0.7422 0.7422 11.1336 11.1336 2.6641 0.1981 
(with addl. constr.) 
EU-Max 0.7393 0.7393 11.0899 11.0899 2.6631 0.1982 
(with addl. constr.) 
6.6.4 Consideration of Take-or-Pay Fuel Contract Requirements 
In this section, a fuel contract with a take-or-pay fuel block is included in the bidding 
considerations. Let us assume that the selling participant is considering a taJce-or-pay 
fuel contract that can be consumed by dispatching a certain mix of tmits at 100 MW. 
Further, let us assiune that the cost of this contract, if used by this mix of units, works 
out to be 8 $/MWH. The participant now considers satisfying take-or-pay requirements 
by bidding to sell 100 MW in the brokerage. For this situation, c = 8, and the penalty 
for a rejected bid is simply the cost of the take-or-pay contract itself. So we can model 
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it as a 8 $/MWH penalty-. This problem then reduces to the earlier case of considering 
a penalty for rejected bid, with p = 8. The objective functions are similar to the ones 
given in Equations 6.17 and 6.18. 
Results of optimization are given in Table 6.10, with the usual implications. If the 
participant thus wishes to satisfy take-or-pay requirements by bidding to sell through 
the brokerage, then the bid prices for different risk attitudes should be as shown in 
Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10 Variation of suboptimal values for take-or-pay 
fuel block consideration. 
Strategy Xs'  Ps' SiPsT EibiPs*) EUii,{ps') 
EV-Max 
EU-Max 
0.6400 
0.6275 
9.6000 
9.4126 
0.9122 
0.9287 
0.7574 
0.7411 
0.0241 
0.0249 
6.6.5 System Health Considerations 
Previously, the risk that we have included in modeling has been price risk. Production 
risk is the other kind of risk that exists, and will be included in the model as follows. 
First, the assumption is made that the two kinds of risks are independent. In other 
words, the participant's generating system health, for example, has no effect on market 
prices. This assumption is not always satisfied. For example, if the participant is 
a large generating company owning a significant percentage of a region's generating 
capacity, then market prices and bids could be affected by perceived outage risks in that 
participant's generation mix. A typical example would be the northeastern region of the 
United States at the time of writing this dissertation, where certain large nuclear units 
are under risk of outage periodically. This situation does have a tangible effect on the 
market behavior of participants of the energy markets in that region. However, for a 
number of situations the independence requirement is satisfied. In this section, we will 
model a unit outage possibility as part of the bidding decision. 
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Let us consider again, the 16-unit system of Section 6.6.2.3. for the identical sale of 
120 MW over a period of 15 hours, in hours 20 through 34. Now, we add the possibility 
that the outage of one of the generating units, with a forced outage rate (f.o.r.) of 4.1 %, 
i.e., with a probability of forced outage, Pf.o.r of 0.041, is to be modeled. In other words, 
after the participant has agreed to the ssde, this imit could experience an outage. That 
could have a deleterious effect on the profitability if the sale. To model this, we perform 
two more unit commitment simulations. The first is a base case simulation with the unit 
unavailable, smd a sale case with the 15 hour sale in place, with the unit una\-ailable. 
The results from simulation are shown in Figures 6.13 and 6.14 respectively. 
The price of the sale from these simulations is calculated in a manner similar to 
Section 6.6.2.3 as c = 10.11 $/MWH. Thus, the loss of the unit results in an increase 
in the costs from c = 6.67 $/MWH. Now, given that the probability of forced outage, 
and the bid distributions are independent, the following objectives can be derived for 
the bidding problem. The objective for the expected vjilue maximizing participant is as 
follows: 
(1 - Pf .o.r.) {(1 - F{x,  a ,  b)){mx - c) + F{x,  a ,  b){-p)}  + 
P/.o.r. {(1 - F{x,a,b))(mx -  c) + F{x,  a ,  b){-p)}  (6.21) 
The objective for the expected utihty maximizing participant is as follows: 
(1 - Pf.o.r.) {(1 - F{x, a, b)) {e - e-^(W^+120(mx-c)r j ^ 
F(x,a,6)(0-e-^(^-i2Oprj| + 
Pf .o.r. {(1 - F{x,  a, b))  (0  -  j ^ 
F(x, a, b)  (e  - J (g 22) 
Results of optimization are given in Table 6.11. Upon comparison with Table 6.6 
shows that all the suboptimal bid prices are higher for the case where system outage risk 
is included. In the expected value maximization case, the possibility of outage has made 
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the participant effectively revise the generating cost as a probabilitj* weighted average 
of healthy and outaged costs. In the expected utilit>- maximization case, a similar effect 
has occurred, with the added consideration of price risk aversion. Admittedly, such 
an inclusion on system health risk is only as good as the forced outage probability is. 
However, if the participant wishes to include a more detailed model for incorporating 
outage risk, the bidding model can certainly be modified to include it. 
Table 6.11 Variation of suboptimal values of 16-unit system with strat­
egy (sale case considering unit outage possibility). 
Strategy x* Ps' SiPsY EibiPs') EUibiPs') 
EV-Max. 1st hour 0.7100 10.6504 0.7607 2.9208 0.1325 
EU-Max, 1st hour 0.7043 10.5648 0.7773 2.9178 0.1326 
EV-Max. other hours 0.5868 8.8018 0.9659 1.2404 0.0323 
EU-Max, other hours 0.5551 8.3261 0.9821 1.1291 0.0403 
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7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Suggestions for Future Work 
The research presented m this dissertation was a first-attempt at developing a bidding 
strategy framework for the energy brokerage market. While progress was made towards 
this goal, it is recognized that many issues remain unresolved, and many problems 
unsolved in this area. Of these, the following areas are suggested as areas for further 
research. 
7.1.1 Market-Based Strategies 
• The market rules used in this research were very simple, in order not to distract 
from the stated goal of strategy development. However, given the fact that several 
complex markets are evolving currently, such as the California ISO-PX market, it 
would be of value to extend the strategies developed here to fit a single clearing-
price model, in addition to the bilateral market structure assiuned here. 
• The lower bounding result derived and used in this research lead to the subopti-
mality of the bidding solution. This lower boimding was needed primarily because 
of the extremely limited form of information that was assumed as being public. 
Exploring the effects of assuming that more data is publicly available could provide 
a basis for further research. This would involve the determination of how each new 
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data item would impact the strategies and their outcomes. 
• Transmission is modeled at a rudimentary level in this research. An enhanced 
transmission model, with the inclusion of transmission loss-allocation, and ancil­
lary service considerations would provide a more realistic representation of the 
energy markets. This could involve using estimates of anticipated line loadings, 
transmission usage costs, and ancillary service costs. The mechanisms for obtain­
ing and modeling these estimates, and the impacts of such detailed models on the 
effectiveness of bidding strategies is a good candidate for further research. 
From a modeling perspective, a detailed survey of different probability distribu­
tions in addition to the ones modeled in this research, would be of value. Enhanc­
ing the simulator to add an automatic regression feature would greatly reduce the 
time spent in evaluating such distributions. Currently, regression is performed by 
manually interfacing the data with a statistical package such as SPSS. 
Analytical sensitivities of the results from suboptimal bidding to the estimated 
parameters of competitors' bid distributions may not be possible for the models 
proposed here. However, a detailed study of numerical sensitivities would be a 
useful area to research further. Such a sensitivity study would also provide better 
ways to design and implement heuristics for tuning of the suboptimal bids. 
The initial testing of the strategies presented in Chapter 5 involved the assumption 
that only one participant uses the strategy at a time. This procedure was used 
to test the effect of a strategy when it is assumed that market conditions do not 
change substantiedly from the time the market data was obtained to the time 
actual bidding for the subsequent periods is performed. Variations on this format 
of testing would help identify the true value of these strategies imder different 
market conditions. For this, several rounds of simulation, with each participant 
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using various strategies based upon the results of the previous round, would provide 
more insights. Again, for this kind of testing to be implemented on a large scale, 
inclusion of an automatic regression feature in the simulator would be of value. 
7.1.2 Scheduling-Based Strategies 
• The illustrative scenarios described in this research axe somewhat limited by the 
capabilities of the simple unit commitment program used. It would be of value to 
interface the simulator to a more versatile unit commitment or scheduling package 
in order to further explore the effects of changes in commitment schedules. 
• In some of the scenarios presented in Chapter 6, the penalties for defaulting on 
a transaction were assumed to be simple numbers. Further research in this area 
could include the explicit modeling of stand-by imits, piimped-storage hydro units, 
emergency dispatchable generation contracts, or insurance and financial contracts, 
to determine a realistic value for this penalty. 
• The use of utility functions to model risk assumed that the participants already 
knew what parameters to select. However, the selection of the appropriate util­
ity function parameters is in itself an interesting and challenging area for future 
research. 
• The availability of financial tools for risk management currently is somewhat lim­
ited. But in future, if such tools evolve into more widely used and effective means 
for hedging risk, then the objective functions in the bidding process could change. 
Exploration of possible objective functions is another possible area for future re­
search. 
• In Table 1.1, several factors were listed, that could affect the bidding strategies of 
the participant. Of these, only a limited number have been discussed within the 
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scope of this research. Inclusion of some of these factors into bidding strategies 
would be a natural extension of this work. Examples include the inclusion of unit 
maintenance requirements, load-related factors, fuel-related factors and emission-
related factors, into the bidding strategies. 
7.2 Conclusions 
In this dissertation, a framework has been presented for the development of bid­
ding strategies for the individual participants in an energy brokerage. The framework 
included the definition of different types of participants, the factors that affected the 
bidding behavior of the participants, and a probabilistic model to incorporate available 
market information in the determination of bid prices for the participants. Based on this 
probabilistic approach, various distributions were selected for modeling competitor bids, 
and expressions were derived for the determination of optimal bid prices. A simulator 
was developed to implement and test these strategies. The following section presents 
the conclusions reached from this activity. 
7.2.1 Market-Based Strategies 
The probabilistic modeling of competing bids has been shown to hold promise, al­
though future research is expected to enhance and improve the effectiveness of this 
approach. The three functions selected for modeling the competitors' bidding behavior 
in this research were the polynomial, incomplete-beta and incomplete-gamma functions. 
The relative advantages and disadvantages of these distributions were discussed in Chap­
ter 3. Overall, the incomplete-beta function approach seems to be the most flexible of 
the three distributions. The polynomial distribution has the advantage of being simple 
to obtain a fit for, as well as to implement. But it suffers from the accuracy point of 
view in satisfying the CDF property of being bounded by 1. Also, the multiple solutions 
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given by this model are not guaranteed to be real numbers. Furthermore, heuristics 
are difficult to implement for this distribution. The incomplete-gamma function is very 
similar to the incomplete-beta function in its properties. However, because of the fact 
that its domain is not finite (normalized), it is difficult, using this distribution, to obtain 
a proper fit to market data. Thus, the incomplete-beta function approach was found to 
be the best of the three because it is flexible, and relatively easy to implement model. 
Based on the simulations performed on the test system, shown in Chapter 5, the 
following conclusions are drawn. 
• The availability of market information, such as transaction prices, can be used to 
model competitors' bidding behavior. The simulations showed that, while there is 
promise in using the limited information to improve bidding performance, trans­
action prices are not always an effective proxy for actual bid information. 
• An attempt was made in this research, to introduce heuristic tuning of the bids 
by the participants, after the probabilistic method was completed. The results 
clearly do not indicate which of the heuristics is superior. However, the results do 
indicate that, in the case of the incomplete-beta function, it is possible to improve 
the performance by more detailed modeling of the competitors. 
• Also, because of the presence of the normalizing bid-price factor m, it is possible 
to add a certain amount of "intelligence" to the bidding strategy, by incorporating 
a market spread in the parameters of the distribution. Exactly how participants 
might arrive at this spread was not explored in this research: only how to incor­
porate such information was discussed. However, the results indicate how partici­
pants would be able to improve their performances, if such, conjectures about the 
spread in the market were to become available to them. 
• The extent to which peirticipants would be willing to model their competitors could 
151 
depend on their own costs, objectives, as well as on their key competitors. For 
example, Company 1 and Company 5 in the test system were the predominant 
sellers in the simulations presented in Chapter 5. Also, when one of these com­
panies attempted to increase their sell bid prices beyond a certain point, it was 
observed that the other company "cornered" the market. This suggests that the 
two companies have similar cost and capacity structures. (Examination of the pro­
duction cost databases of the two companies shows that indeed, this is the case. 
But access to each other's production cost databases is not necessary for the com­
panies to conjecture that this is the case.) This could be sufficient motivation for 
the companies to model each other's bidding behavior in more detail, or, if this is 
not possible, to force their bidding strategy- to be more conservative. In addition, 
such advantages could motivate some new companies to be created, that provide 
market intelligence services to the participants. 
• Transmission impacts the effectiveness of the strategies in a complex memner. Two 
types of effects were observed from the simulations. One was the rejection of 
trajisactions because of violations in transmission line limits. The second was the 
rejection of transactions because the energy cost savings was insufficient to justify 
the incurred transmission costs. Of these, the former is a factor that will have to 
be considered regardless of the rules of the market. In other words, system security 
constraints will always directly affect the effectiveness of a strategy, if the proposed 
transactions violate them. The latter constraint is a result of our assumption 
that the broker takes transmission usage costs into account during the matching 
process. In some of the evolving markets, it is left to the participants to reserve 
transmission usage independently of the energy market. In this case, transmission 
usage costs will have to be incorporated into the cost components of the bidding 
strategies. In all likelihood, this will make some transactions non-cost-effective. 
In this research, we have not attempted to do this. The simulations included 
only indicate the extent to which such considerations affect the performance of 
the participants, and the simulations indicate that the effects could be significant. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that participants shotdd develop methods that 
will incorporate transmission usage costs into the bidding process. 
7.2.2 Scheduling-Based Strategies 
In Chapter 6, an attempt was made to illustrate how the strategies of a company 
that owns and operates generating facilities would be affected by scheduling considera­
tions. Some operating scenarios were described, which illustrated the complexities that 
are added to the strategic bidding problem when various unit commitment factors are 
included. It was also recognized that uncertainties in scheduling introduces risk. The use 
of utility functions was suggested as a means to model the attitudes of the participants 
towards this risk. Results were presented that contrast the expected utility maximization 
approach with the expected profit maximization approach followed in Chapter 3. 
The Expo-power utility function developed by Saha [4] was selected for this model­
ing because of its flexibility in modeling various types of risk aversion. An additional 
parameter W was introduced to take into account the initial wealth of the participant. 
The comparisons, between the expected utility and expected profit maximization ap­
proaches, indicate that the utility function approach provides a mechanism to include 
risk considerations in strategic bidding in a consistent manner. However, it must be 
emphasized that the accuracy of this model in representing a participant's risk attitudes 
depends on how well the participants select the parameters of the utility function. 
Generating system health considerations are very complex, and to include these in 
a detailed manner in bidding strategies is beyond the scope of this research. But an 
attempt was made to illustrate the complexities involved by considering the simple case 
of a unit outage, modeled through a unit forced outage rate. The example shows the 
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effect of such an outage on the suboptimal bid prices. However, the extent to which 
participants wish to model generating system health risks in their bidding strategies de­
pends on a number of factors, including the health of the system, the resources available 
to the participant, and alternate mechanisms that the participant may choose to spread 
the risk, such as insurance, or financial hedging tools. 
In conclusion, this research has provided a framework for strategv* development for 
bidding in an energy brokerage. A clear definition of the problems associated with 
strategic bidding has been presented. Initial attempts at providing solutions to the 
problems, while not being conclusively successful, have opened up several promising av­
enues for further research. These avenues include, but are not limited to, the apphcation 
of probabilistic modeling of competitor bids, the application of heuristic tuning, and the 
development and testing of such heuristics with the aid of a simulator. An attempt 
has also been made to incorporate the risk preference attitudes of participants, into the 
strategic bidding process. The use of utility functions to achieve this purpose has been 
successfully demonstrated. It is expected that the results of this research will not only be 
directly applicable to the electric energy market industry, but also to future researchers 
in this area. 
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APPENDIX 
In this chapter, the derivation of first order and concavity conditions for optimality 
are presented for the various distributions modeled in Chapter 3. 
A.l Derivation of First Order Conditions for Optimality 
A.1.1 Polynomial Modeling 
Consider the objective function for a buyer given in Equation 3.16, reproduced below: 
EibiPb) = (c - P6)(ao + oipft + a2Ph^ + ... + a„_ip5"~^ + OnPb') (A.l) 
For first order conditions to be satisfied, the first derivative of Eibipb) should be equal 
to zero. In other words 
E'M = 0 
-{ao + aiPb + a-iPb^+ OnPt") 
+(c-P6)(ai+2a2P6 + ---+ (n - l)an-iP6"~^ + = 0 (A.2) 
Simplifying the above equation, we get: 
0 = -oo - aipb - ... - On-iPb""^ - a„Pb" 
+cai + (2ca2 - ai)pb + ... + {ncOn - (n - l)an-i)p6"~^ - (A.3) 
Grouping similar terms, and introducing a new coefficient a„+i = 0, we get the 
following expression for first order condition, that is identical to Equation 3.17: 
(n + l)(ca„+i - a„)p6" + n(ca„ - a„_i)p6"~^+ 
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... +2(ca2 - ai)p6 4-(cci — Co) = 0 (A.4) 
Similarly, for a seller, the objective function is given by Equation 3.19 and is as 
follows: 
ElbiPs) = (Ps - c)(l - Go - aiPs - 0.2Ps^ " . . .  -  -  O n P s " )  ( A . 5 )  
Applying first order conditions to the above equation and by introducing the coeffi­
cient On-i-i = 0 in a manner similar to the approach for the buyer, we get the following 
result: 
E'lbiPs) — 0 
(1 - flo - aiPs - a2Ps^ - ... - - anP5") 
+(P5 - c)(-ai - 2a2Ps - ... - (n - l)a„_iP5"~^ - nanp/"^) = 0 
1 - ao - aiPs - ... - On-iPs" ^ - OnPi" 
+cai + (2ca2 - ai)ps + ...+ (nca„ - (n — l)a„_i)p5"~^ - nanPs^ (A.6) 
This leads to a similar condition for optimality as for the buyer, given by Equa­
tion 3.20, reproduced here: 
(n + l)(ca„+i - an)Ps" + n(can - an-i)i?s""^+ 
. . .  + 2 { c a 2  -  a i ) p 5  +  ( c f l i  -  Q Q  +  1 )  =  0  ( A . 7 )  
A.1.2 Incomplete-Beta Modeliiig 
First order conditions for incomplete-beta modeling can be obtained by differentiat­
ing the objective functions for a buyer and a seller given by Equations 3.27, and 3.28 
respectively, reproduced below: 
Eib{x) = (c - ^ (A.8) 
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For a seller, a very similar procedure would result in the following Eii,{x): 
Eu.(x) = (mi - c) (l - I' t-'(l - (A.9) 
First order conditions can be obtained by differentiating the above equations once 
w.r.t. X. The condition is as follows for a buyer: 
B(a,  b)  
Similarly for a seller: 
— 0 
(c — — m [ t"~^(l — 
Jo 
dt = 0 (A.10) 
1 
B(a,6) 
— 0 
(c — mx)x®~^(l — x) ' '~^  +m ^ 1 — J  f''~^(l — j = 0 (A.11) 
A. 1.3 Incomplete-Gamma Modeling 
First order conditions for incomplete-gamma modeling can be obtained by differenti­
ating the objective functions for a buyer and a seller given by Equations 3.32, and 3.33 
respectively, reproduced below: 
Eibipb)  = {c-pb)^^  e (A.12) 
EibiPs) = {Ps- c ) ( l -  £  e H" (A. 13) 
First order conditions can be obtained by differentiating the above equations once 
w.r.t. pft and Ps respectively. The condition is as follows for a buyer; 
r(a) 
Sinailarly for a seller; 
Elb(P(>) — 0 =T» 
(c - Pb)e~^''Pb'^~^ — f Jo = 0 (A.14) 
r(a) 
ElbiPs) = 0 
(c - P5)e~^'Ps''~^ ^ i}~ L = 0 (A.15) 
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A.2 Concavity Conditions for the Objective Function 
A.2.1 Polynomial Modeling 
Concavity conditions for a majdmum require that the second derivative of the ob­
jective function be negative. For polynomial modeling, this condition can be derived by 
differentiating Equations A.4 and A.7 w.r.t. and Ps respectively, and the following 
results are obtained: 
E'l'biPh) <0 (n + l)n(ca„+i - ( in)Pb^~^ + n{n -  l)(can -  an-i)pb^~'  + 
. . ,  +  2 ( c a 2  —  c i )  <  0  ( A . 1 6 )  
EibiPs) <0 =?> (n + l)n(can+i - a„)p5"~^ + ri{n - l)(can - On-Op/"' + 
. . .  +  2 { c o . 2  —  O i )  < 0  ( A . l  ( )  
A.2.2 Incomplete-Beta Modeling 
Concavity conditions for incomplete-Beta Modeling are obtained for a buyer and a 
seller by differentiating Equations A.10 and A.ll w.r.t. x respectively. The result is the 
same for both cases, and is obtained as follows: 
E'lbiPb) < 0 
[—2ma:®~^(l - 4- (c - mx) |(a -  — x)^~^ 
-(6 - l)x®-Hl - ^)^"^}] < 0 (A.18) 
=>• —jr j(a-t lf)mx^  — {(a + l)m + c(a + b — 2)}x 
B{a,o)  
+c(a - 1)] < 0 (A.19) 
x''~^(l — x)^~^ 
In the above inequation, the first term on the left hand side, ——rr , is 
always greater than zero for positive values of x, a,  b.  This condition is always satisfied 
158 
because a: is a positive fraction of the maximum bid price m. and a and b are positive 
by definition for the beta distribution. Thus, the above condition can be simplified to 
yield the following quadratic inequation; 
(a + b)mx'^ - {(a + l )m + c(a-h b — 2)}  x  + c(a - 1) < 0 (A.20) 
This is identical to the concavity condition given by Equation 3.29. 
A.2.3 Incomplete-Gamma Modeling 
Concavity conditions for incomplete-gamma modeling are obtained for a buyer and 
a seller by differentiating Equations A.14 eind A.15 w.r.t. and Ps respectively. The 
result is the same for both cases, and is obtained as follows, with p representing p^ for 
a buyer and Ps for a seller: 
E'M < 0 
[-(c - p)e~^p''-^ + e~P {(a - < 0 
[ p ^  -  { a +  C +  l ) p  -f (a - l)c] < 0 (A.21) 
In the above condition, the first term on the left hand side, ,—, is alwavs greater 
r(a) 
than zero for positive values of p and a.  This condition is always satisfied because p is a 
positive bid price, and a is positive by definition for the gamma distribution. Thus, the 
above inequation can be simplified to jdeld the following quadratic inequation: 
p^ -  {a+ c + l)p + c(a — 1) < 0 (A.22) 
This is identical to the concavity condition given by Equation 3.34. 
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